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ABSTRACT 
 
UNDERSTANDING TURKISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE 21STCENTURY:  
A HOMEGROWN THEORIZING ATTEMPT 
 
Biltekin, Gonca 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı 
 
September 2014 
 
 
For Turkish scholars, understanding especially the last decade of Turkey’s 
international politics has been a great challenge. Answering fundamental 
questions, -and many others-, requires collection of reliable, complete and 
uniform data and interpreting them on conceptual terms. The purpose of 
this thesis is to understand and explain Turkey’s foreignl affairs in a holistic 
way and offer a homegrown model based on original data. Building an 
original event dataset, this thesis accounts for the empirical observations 
made out of Turkey’s international practice and conceptualizes it as a 
complex system. It accounts for foreign policy change in complex systems, 
introduces concepts such as domestic responsivity, domestic, international 
nodes as well as intermestic and international nexus, and puts forward a 
helical model of power accumulation, as an outcome of successful foreign 
policy change. 
 
Keywords: Turkish foreign affairs, event data, homegrown theory, theory 
building, Turkish foreign policy, foreign policy analysis, power 
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ÖZET 
 
21. YY. TÜRK!YE DIŞ !L!ŞK!LER!N! ANLAMAK: B!R ÖZGÜN  
KURAMSALLAŞTIRMA DENEMES!  
 
Biltekin, Gonca 
Doktora, Uluslararası !lişkiler Bölümü 
Tez yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı 
 
Eylül 2014 
 
 
Türkiye akademisyenleri için Türkiye’nin özellikle son on yıldaki 
uluslararası ilişkilerini anlamak zorlu bir iş olmuştur. Konuya ilişkin en 
temel sorulara dahi cevap vermek, tam, güvenilir ve benzer biçimli verilerin 
toplanmasını ve bu verilerin kavramsal düzeyde yorumlanmasını gerekli 
kılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’nin uluslararası ilişkilerini bütüncül 
biçimde anlamak ve açıklamak ve özgün verilere dayanarak yerli bir model 
önermektir. Bu tez çalışmasında, Türkiye’nin uluslararası pratiklerini 
örnekleyen özgün bir olay veri kümesi oluşturulmuş ve incelemeler ışığında 
Türkiye’nin uluslararası davranışlarının bir “kompleks sistem” meydana 
getirdiği öne sürülmüştür. Tez, bu tür kompleks sistemlerde dış politika 
değişiminin nasıl gerçekleştiğini açıklamakta; bunu yaparken 
yurtiçi/uluslararası düğümler ve içarasıl/uluslararası kavuşumlar ile iç 
duyarlılık gibi yeni kavramlar ortaya atmakta, başarılı bir dış politika 
değişiminin güç birikimine yol açtığı bir sarmal güç birikim modeli öne 
sürmektedir. 
 
Anahtar sözcükler: Türk dış politikası, olay veri yöntemi, özgün kuram, 
kuram inşası, Türk dış ilişkileri, dış politika analizi, güç  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
For those who study Turkish foreign affairs, understanding especially 
the last decade of Turkey’s international politics has been a great challenge. 
After 48 years, Turkey has been given a seat in the UN Security Council, 
taken the very first steps to renormalize relations with Armenia, openly and 
deliberately confronted Israel about its treatment of Gaza, clearly stated its 
positive opinion on Iran’s nuclear program, and ended visa requirements 
with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon reciprocally. On a broader plane, Turkey 
has taken an active interest in formerly neglected relations with states such 
as Costa Rica, Eritrea and Mongolia. For the first time in history, a Turkish 
president visited several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Looking at this overall hyperactive diplomacy in its totality, the 
observers are utterly puzzled. What is happening? Is it because of 
Europeanization or because Turkey’s Western orientation shifted? Does it 
pursue economic advancement or religious solidarity? Is it only Turkey or 
has there been a systemic change? Is Turkey balancing against some major 
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powers, or has its global integration increased pace?  Is this foregn policy 
change the result of an economic boom, or is it its cause?    
Answering these questions, -and many others-, requires collection of 
reliable data and interpreting them on conceptual terms. There are two ways 
of doing this. The first and most taken route is to import conceptual 
frameworks originated in the theory-producing Western core and struggle 
to apply them to various phenomena one encounters in Turkey’s affairs. The 
second route is to collect and rigorously analyse a wide sample of Turkish 
foreign and domestic behavior, and strive to come up with operational 
clusters, which would presumably be the building blocks of an indigenous 
account of international politics from Turkey. This study takes this second 
route, because there are significant setbacks in the first course of action.  
In the first course of action, a research question is formulated, one or 
two Western originated IR theories are picked up, hypotheses are deduced 
and tested with the Turkish case to see whether they fit.  Based on 
hypothetico-deductive model of inference, this route limits the scholar to a 
pre-determined set of concepts at the expense of others, and leads to a 
“selective blindness.” Several phenomena, which may be related to the 
original question, are discarded because they are not accounted for in the 
chosen theory. So, despite the seeming richness in the field, the theoretically 
engaged scholar tries to answer the above questions in an idiosyncratic 
manner. Despite the increasing number of studies, proper operationalization 
of concepts is almost never discussed and replications are virtually non-
existant. Therefore, the implications of one study are seldom confirmed or 
refuted by other independent studies. Accompanied by lack of intra-
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disciplinal communication, this idiosyncratic treatment leaves no room for 
comparisons and systematic accumulation of knowledge. Secondly, the 
scholar who follows a hypothetico deductive model, could only marginally 
contribute to global disciplinal knowledge. The Turkish IR scholar plays –
like most of his/her colleagues in non-Western world- the part of “the native 
informant” to Western theorists, and with each “application”, this part is 
reified.  
This study, however, aims to work from the opposite end: its 
foremost purpose is to understand and explain the empiricial observations 
about Turkey’s international practice, but it tries to do so without limiting 
itself to pre-chosen concepts. With this choice, the goals are doubled: not 
only to account for the empiricial observations about Turkey’s international 
practice, but also to do it with an original conceptualization. Accordingly, 
rather than chosing a delimited, specific question, this study tries to answer 
the rather broad question “How could Turkey’s foreign affairs in 21st century 
be understood in scientific terms?“  
The formulation of the question as such requires justification on two 
grounds. The first one is about the broadness in the formulation of the 
research question, i.e.,  focusing on Turkish foreign affairs in its totality as 
opposed to focusing on particular aspects of Turkish foreign affairs such as 
behaviour by some actors (government, civil society, etc.), a particular type 
of behaviour (economic, miitary,diplomatic) or with specific foreign policy 
targets.  The  second justification is related to choice of Turkey as the focus 
of study.  
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 The reasons for formulating a broad question are due to technical 
requirements for building concepts and investigating relationships 
inbetween. The broadness of the question allows for collection of a wide 
range of data, which increases the possibility of finding hidden patterns. 
Better-grounded abstractions are sought by asking each empirical 
observation the question: “Of what is this an instance?”1 and patterns are 
built by answering “how they (the emprical observations) all hang 
together.” In the 21st century,  the volume and complexity of human 
interaction has reached an unprecendented level. Scrutinizing all available 
data widens the search for patterns, which only become visible by looking at 
various dynamics and after several aggregation trials. As such, a broad 
formulation helps to avoid the “selective blindness” that is imposed by 
“application”.  
The choice of Turkey as the study focus is also inspired by the same 
complexity, which brings about transformation for every actor at every level. 
Turkey seems to be one of the many, who both resists and  adapts to this 
transformation. In that sense, the developments in Turkey’s domestic and 
foreign affairs are reflective of wider changes in the world. Turkish 
experiences are not unique: For example, Turkey is not certainly the only 
country which has become more independent and assertive in foreign affairs 
in recent years. Brazil, Russia, India and China are increasingly assuming a 
                                                
1 James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee (eds) Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches 
to an Incoherent World (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000), 3. 
2 Leslie E. Armijo,“The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) as an Analytical 
Category: Mirage or Insight?”Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2007), pp. 7-42. 
3  Stanford Shaw From Empire to Republic - The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918-1923 A 
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more active role in the changing global system.2 Turkey also struggles with 
domestic or international problems, endemic to developing world. Problems 
such as ethnic and religious tensions, disparity in income and development, 
inequality in fulfilment of rights and freedoms are hand in hand with 
promising prospects such as willingness for a more open and democratic 
society, a more interconnected youth, cultural heterogenity, and a 
prospering economy. In other words, Turkey seems like the ideal petri dish 
for both challeneges and opportunities common to most of the developing 
world. Moreover, Turkey is located in a region quite rich in terms of 
historical precedents of various political behaviors and ideas: this legacy 
includes first cities, states and empires, codification of rules, invention of 
money, international maritime trade, as well as first known peace 
agreement. The history of Ottoman Empire is also opulent in terms of the 
processes and dynamics of modern transformation in the non-Western 
context. All these precedents and experiences shape not only Turkey’s but 
also a group of modern societies’ frames of reference for future interactions. 
Similarly, the Turkish War of National Liberation is the first of many 
struggles against colonial or imperial domination in 20th century,3 and 
inspired similar struggles in the post-colonial world.   
Looking at Turkish context may contribute to the disciplinary 
knowledge in various ways. Firstly, a peripheral position may illuminate 
different meanings of fundamental concepts of international relations  -
                                                
2 Leslie E. Armijo,“The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) as an Analytical 
Category: Mirage or Insight?”Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2007), pp. 7-42. 
3  Stanford Shaw From Empire to Republic - The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918-1923 A 
Documentary Study, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000 
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which are usually defined and studied from a hegemonic perspective- and 
how they play out in the periphery. More specifically, it can provide less 
Western-centric insights about how ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ are 
intermingled, the relevance and power of state in a globalized world, the 
overall weight of ideational and material factors in international politics, 
sovereignty and its diverse definitions, the question of shifting loyalties, 
democratization and changing discourses on security at domestic, regional 
and global realms, as well as the place of norms and principles in 
international relations. These are already hot topics discussed by the 
mainstream IR, but new concepts, which reflect different shapes that these 
dynamics take in different political and regional contexts, can provide novel 
insights.  
Secondly, looking at Turkey can present new issue areas and 
problems that mainstream approaches fail to see, either because of the 
relative absence of those phenomena in the theory-building core or due to 
“selective blindness”, which inherently jeopardizes “internationalness” of 
International Relations theory. Including Turkish experience would 
presumably augment IR theory’s “internationalness.” 
Thirdly, and most importantly, conceptualization of the ways, 
approaches and principles a Turkey utilizes to overcome its domestic and 
international problems may provide a ‘real-world’ oriented, ‘policy’ 
knowledge that might -at least partially- remedy the lack of practical 
guidance, that developing world might need. 
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The reasons for and the consequences of failure of the Western 
mainsteam core’s to include non-Western experience into IR theory are 
complex and dealt with in the following chapter. The chapter begins by a 
brief illustration of how demands for homegrown theorizing came to the 
fore, and how they are justified, both politically and philosophically. Many 
non-Western scholars are puzzled with the incongruencies between the 
Western-originated theoretical constructs and the practical issues and 
problems they face. Therefore search for novel, homegrown 
conceptualization is actually not uncommon across the world. The chapter 
concludes by providing examples of homegrown theorizing attemtps from 
across the world and draws some conclusions about their specific ways of 
building new conceptualizations.  
Drawing on the second chapter, the third chapter systematically 
analyzes homegrown theorizing attempts, and categorizes them according 
to their methods in building theories. Comparing these methods against 
each other allows us to assess effiency of each theory building method in 
building better theories in terms of explanation, reception and applicability. 
This categorization and comparison is a theoretical analysis of the body of 
methods and principles associated with theory building, and as such 
conveys a preliminary methodology of theory building, which is virtually 
absent in global IR. More specifically, the chapter highlights the importance 
of observation in building theories, and concludes by asserting the efficiency 
of large-N studies in identifying patterns, and conveying those patterns in a 
more comprehensible manner.  
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The fourth chapter provides a discussion and description of a large-N 
data collection method, event data. Event data are a formal method of 
measuring the political behavior. It quantifies the empirical observations 
and as such provides an efficient tool for scrutinizing a wide range of 
behavior by multiple actors and identifying patterns in political behaviour.  
As such, it is particularly convenient for conceptualization. 
The fifth chapter outlines arguments about Turkish foreign affairs and 
concludes that while individual researchers focus on individual aspects of 
Turkish foreign affairs, a comprehensive analysis is missing in Turkish 
foreign policy literature. The chapter concludes by claiming that the 
assumptions and findings of individual studies on Turkish foreign policy 
are based on idiosyncratic treatment of several fundamental questions, and 
employ different definitions of fundamental concepts, which hinder concept 
development and accumulation of knowledge.  
Sixth chapter presents the data, pertaining to questions frequently 
asked in Turkish foreign policy literature by employing correlational and 
time series tools to reveal patterns in time, actors, event volume and event 
type. The chapter provides operational definitions for activism and 
proactivism, and presents findings as to which foreign actors Turkey has 
become more active and/or proactive, when it has become more 
active/proactive, and what sorts of associations exists between Turkey’s 
relations with one group of foreign actors and with another.  
Based on arguments in Turkish foreign policy literature about how 
Turkish foreign affairs might be related to domestic factors, the seventh 
9 
 
chapter focuses on identity related factors such as Islam, and shared 
Ottoman past, as well as two domestic processual dynamics, i.e. civil-
military relations and domestic terrorism. The chapter presents findings as 
to their relevance for Turkish foreign affairs with different foreign actors.  
The concluding chapter offers an alternative conceptualization of 
Turkish foreign affairs, i.e. a model of data, based on longitudinal 
observations about Turkey’s foreign and domestic affairs. It defines Turkish 
foreign affairs as a complex system and introduces concepts of international 
and intermestic nexus, which are comprised of interrelationships between 
domestic and international nodes. The intermestic nexus of volume points to a 
negative relationship between Turkey’s domestic responsivity and level of 
activism in foreign affairs. Based on the model, the chapter conceptualizes 
foreign policy change as a process of helical power accumulation in a 
complex system. Concluding chapter also summarizes the findings and 
presents study’s implications pertaining to policy, theory making, 
methodology and discipline building. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
HOMEGROWN THEORIZING 
 
 
 
If problems are value laden, if theories 
are constructed to explain problems, if 
methodologies are always theory-laden, 
and if observations are methodology 
laden, can there be value-neutral design 
and interpretation of research?4 
 
 
Any attempt for building an original homegrown theory of IR is born 
into a philosophical dilemma. On the one hand, there is a need to redress 
several perceived shortcomings of Western IR: The theories of “the core” are 
dismissive of “the periphery,” or Western-centric, and more often not, 
reiterative of the international political status quo. On the other hand, the 
very same critical attitude bears the question: what makes it sure that any 
theory from the non-West would be better than one from the West? 
Wouldn’t it be equally dismissive, egocentric and biased against the status 
quo? If the biases, interests and values of Western researcher contaminate 
his/her “science,” wouldn’t the non-Westerners’? 
                                                
4 Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1986), 22-23 
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In this chapter, a solution is seeked to the above meta-theoretical 
dilemma. The chapter begins by a brief discussion of the place of values in 
science and its reflection on the discipline of International Relations. The 
second part deals with how the debates on values and science have evolved 
into a criticism of mainstream theories for their parochialism and 
consequently gave way to vocalization of a demand for homegrown theory 
building. The third part suggests an epistemological position, which may 
provide a key to overcome the above dilemma surrounding homegrown 
theory building: Standpoint epistemologies regard values as intrinsic to 
scientific study; yet perceive them as objectivity-increasing mechanisms. 
Three IR approaches, which use standpoint epistemologies, are also 
discussed. Finally, the chapter suggests criteria to define what homegrown 
theory is and reviews a sample of actual homegrown theory building 
attempts from across the world.  
2.1. Theory- Building, Methodology and Knowledge Production  
At first sight “homegrown theory” seems like an oxymoron: what is 
“homegrown” is particular by definition, as it is inherently related to a 
particular community, people, or region, and consequently to their values, 
culture and beliefs. A theory, on the other hand, is presumably universal, 
devoid of what is particular, parochial and subjective. Therefore, question of 
values in social science is central to any discussion about homegrown 
theorizing, as it is the inherent value-ladenness of “the homegrown”, and 
apparent eradication of values in “scientific” theory, that gives rise to this 
dilemma.  
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A closer look on the place of values in (social) science, however, may 
reveal “homegrown theory” is not only possible, but probably the most 
common form of theory production. It is particularly positivist conception of 
science, which gives rise to this apparent dilemma. With the advent of 
positivism, the criteria what makes a collection of knowledge “science” has 
become its objectivity, attained by methodological rigor, which supposedly 
erases the effect of the values of the researcher upon the study. As such, it is 
believed that knowledge takes a more scientific/objective aspect when it 
moves from personal values, norms and beliefs, assured by observation of 
measurable data.  
The question of values –or normativity- in social science, can be 
analyzed in four components of scientific inquiry: the purpose of knowing, 
the observer, the observed, and the outcome- the knowledge produced. With 
respect to these components, positivism maintains that a) science is an 
endeavor in understanding and explaining which emanates from an 
impartial curiosity. b) The observers’ values or common sense should be 
given no place in scientific inquiry. c) The social world can be analyzed with 
the same scientific method used with respect to the natural world. 
(naturalism).  d) The outcome of scientific inquiry is ‘the universal, objective 
truth.’ Therefore, through positivist lenses, there is no place for values in any 
component of scientific production of knowledge.   
Nevertheless, the development of natural sciences attests to the fact 
that the purpose of knowing is far from being impartial; it is intrinsically 
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related to the desire to change and improve conditions of human life. 5 Max 
Horkheimer, one of the founders of Frankfurt School of Critical Social 
Theory, argued that traditional (positivist) theory separates knowledge from 
human interests through establishing an absolute distinction between fact 
and value. For him, the purpose of social theory is to facilitate and support a 
process of emancipatory social transformation. Social theory would create a 
debate between all interested parties, which “must unfold as a process of 
interaction in which growing consciousness develops into a liberating and 
practical force.”6 Secondly, he argued that empiricism treats active human 
beings as mere facts and objects within a scheme of mechanical determinism. 
Such treatment underplays human agency, and conceals the fact that both 
observer and the very social facts the observer studies are socially and 
historically constructed by human beings. As such, the observer is also an 
accomplice in the construction of social reality. And lastly, he argued that 
positivistic representation of social reality as devoid of human values, reifies 
the status quo, as if such social facts are not constructed but inherent. All in 
all, all four components of scientific inquiry in social sciences are inherently 
embedded in values. Therefore, Critical Social Theory’s criticisms to 
positivism in social science revealed that knowledge production has a 
fundamental value-laden aspect to it. 
Despite the criticisms, however, the appeal of positivism for social 
sciences has not vanished. Social scientists have tried to pursue their work in 
the midst of an ever-growing dilemma. On the one hand, the knowledge the 
                                                
5  Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, 16. 
6  Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in Critical Theory and International 
Relations, ed. Steven Roach (New York: Routledge, 2008), 139. 
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scientist produces continued to be assessed on the grounds of its 
methodological rigor, defined as being free from values.7 On the other hand, 
the researchers have increasingly come to an understanding that  
What we took to be humanly inclusive problematics, 
concepts, theories, objective methodologies, and 
transcendental truths are in fact less than that. Instead, 
these products of thought bear the mark of their 
collective and individual creators, and the creators in 
turn have been distinctively marked as to gender, class, 
race and culture.8  
 
As the scientist’s normative and philosophical concern for the world, 
society, geography s/he lives, embodied in his/her theory9 come to clash 
with the scientific expectation of “objectivity,” a crisis in science became 
inevitable. 
In the discipline of International Relations, long before the post-
structural turn, concerns about normativity in scientific inquiry were 
embedded in the great debates.10 The very first debate between realism and 
idealism was marked by a critical inquiry about what to do with the values 
of the researcher and the practitioner. Most classical realists argued that 
values should be given no place in the explanations of international affairs. 
E.H. Carr, in his critique of utopianism, believed that any project based on a 
non-partial universal good is basically a lie since  “intellectual theories and 
ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the expression of absolute 
                                                
7 Christian Brueger, “From Epistemology to Practice” Journal of International Relations and 
Development 15, no. 1 (2012): 97-109, 104. 
8 Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, 15.  
9  Petr Drulak, “Introduction to the International Relations (IR) in Central and Eastern 
Europe Forum” Journal of International Relations and Development 12, no.2 (2009): 168–220. 
10 Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-
Positivist Era”, International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 3, (1989): 243. 
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and a priori principles, are historcally conditioned, being both products of 
circumstances and interests...”11 Thought, he claimed, is not only relative, 
but also purposeful. Theories are reflexion of practice.12  
Yet, one could discern a normative quality to the Morgenthau’s and 
E.H Carr’s own work. While both rejected that foreign policy practitioners 
should be attributed normative concerns, they, as scholars, had their own 
normative concerns; laying the foundations of a new discipline, avoiding 
war, revealing the hypocrisy of the so-called “benevolent.”  
The ‘personal equation’ of the political scientist both 
limits and directs his scholarly pursuits. The truth 
which a mind thus socially conditioned is able to grasp 
is likewise socially conditioned. The perspective of the 
observer determines what can be known and how it is 
understood.13 
 
For them arriving at scientific/objective truth was not only possible, 
but also preferable since it would help as the best normative advice.14 
Therefore, in Hoffmann’s words, the first debate revealed “the impossibility, 
even for opponents of a normative orientation, to separate the empirical and 
the normative in their own work; and about the pitfalls of any normative 
dogmatism in a realm which is both a field for objective investigation and a 
battlefield between predatory beasts and their prey.”15 
 
                                                
11  Edward H. Carr, Twenty Years Crisis (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 65. 
12  Carr, Twenty Years Crisis, 68-71. 
13 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations,” in 
Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, ed. William T.R. Fox, (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 21. 
14 Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations”, Daedalus 106, 
no. 3, (1977): 45. 
15 Hoffmann, “An American Social Science “, 43. 
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Methodology was at the epicenter of the second debate, as efforts 
once again were directed towards a more scientific/objective IR. 
Behaviorialists’ push for quantitative methodology was certainly a move 
towards a more value-free research. The third debate (inter-paradigm 
debate), was seemingly more about criticisms regarding realism’s image of 
the world, i.e. its ontology. As regional integration, transnationalism, 
interdependence and study of non-state actors come to the fore, realism’s 
simple ontology of state-based international system was challenged from 
various grounds.16 Yet, the debate slowly evolved from a debate on 
ontological parochialism of realism, to methodological and epistemological 
parochialism of the field17 as it coincided with the first depiction of IR as an 
“American social science.”18 
The dilemma between the scientific and the normative in 
International Relations has been ever garnering attention since Richard 
Ashley’s article Poverty of Neorealism19 and Robert Cox’s Social Forces, States 
World Orders.20 These early criticisms point to “the straightjacket of 
neorealism”21 in defining what is proper knowledge production. In asserting 
“theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”22 Cox acknowledged 
that the production of knowledge, hence the theoretical lens employed by 
the “haves” and “have-nots” would be profoundly different. Reflecting 
                                                
16  Ole Wæver, “The Rise and Fall of The Inter-paradigm Debate”in International Theory: 
Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
17 Lapid, “The Third Debate”, 238. 
18  Hoffmann, “An American Social Science”. 
19 Richard Ashley, “Poverty of Neorealism” International Organization 38, no. 2 (1984): 225-
286. 
20 Robert W. Cox “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2, (1981): 126-155. 
21  Pınar Bilgin “Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29, No. 1, (2008): 10. 
22 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders”, 128. 
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Horkheimer’s criticism of traditional science, Cox criticized the problem-
solving theories because of their status-quo oriented normative basis and 
argued that they are antithetical to critical theories, used by the agents of 
change. Therefore, the mid-1980s of the discipline looked like a battlefield, 
with a multitude of players on several fronts. On the one hand, there were 
(neo) realists versus its critics23 where debate was more or less focused on 
shortcomings of realism and its response, on the other hand there was a 
more generalized debate between traditional, behavioral and radical 
approaches (paradigms), which marked the emergence of “inter-discipline 
of International Relations”24. Finally, with questions of knowledge, power 
and values, debates can be seen as a series of " ‘intensely political 
happenings’ (Ashley, 1989) occurring between vested cultural, economic, 
and political interests (Biersteker, forthcoming)”25. 
 Ashley and Walker, who were the first self-acclaimed dissenters of 
current knowledge building in IR, argued that IR was in a crisis, which was 
intertwined with a “crisis of human sciences, a crisis of patriarchy, a crisis of 
governability, a crisis of late industrial society, a generalized crisis of 
modernity”26 In some ways, IR has always been in crisis. From the First 
World War onwards, that is, since the emergence of IR as a discipline, the 
great debates of IR surged one after another. The researchers were 
                                                
23 Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986) 
24  Hayward R. Alker, Jr.  and Thomas J. Biersteker, “The Dialetics of World Order: Notes 
for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire” International Studies Quarterly 28, 
no. 2 (1984): 121-142. Kal J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & 
Unwin, 1985). 
25  Lapid “The Third Debate”, 238, Footnote 4. 
26  Richard K. Ashley and Robert B. J. Walker “Conclusion:  Reading Dissidence/Writing 
the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies” 
International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3, (1990): 377. 
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increasingly frustrated by the "amount of debris on the battlefield of 
international relations theory"27 and felt that there were "few guides on 
making choices"28 about the best method, theory or paradigm to study a 
particular phenomena. The so-called third debate, however, ruled out the 
very possibility of having such foundations or criteria29. “Anti-
foundationalists” claimed there could be no foundational criteria for 
attaining objective truth.30 For Waltz, “Nothing seem[ed] to accumulate, not 
even criticism."31 The state of the discipline is described as in a “process of 
paradigm deterioration"32 or “anarchy.”33 Consequently, it is even 
concluded, “in both theory and practice international politics can bring on 
despair. This is an occupational hazard in the field for which there is no 
remedy.” 34  
Once it is revealed “theory is always the product of the theorist’s 
position in time and place,”35 the hope for a universally generalizable theory 
is lost. Ferguson and Mansbach reflect on such loss as follows: 
Many students of international relations, like the 
present authors, were once convinced that they were 
participants in a quest for theory, which would, in 
                                                
27  James Der Derian, On Diplomacy (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 11. 
28  Gene M. Lyons, “The Study of International Relations in Great Britain: Further 
Connections”, World Politics 38, no. 4, 643. 
29  Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), 140. 
30 Chris Brown “Turtles all the Way Down: Anti-foundationalism, critical theory and 
international relations” Millennium 23, no.2, (1994): 213-236 
31  Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 18.  
32   James N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence (New York: Frances Pinter, 1980), 
129. 
33  Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism” International 
Organization 38, no.2, (1984): 287. 
34  Patrick M. Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics. (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1987), 301. 
35  John M. Hobson, “Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western 
Imperialism? Beyond Westphalian Towards a Post-racist Critical IR”, Review of 
International Studies 33, No S1, (2007): 91-116. 
 
19 
time, unravel the arcane secrets of world politics. 
Knowledge and understanding would be gradual and 
cumulative, but in the end, they might even enable us 
to overcome age-old scourges like war… Yet, our  
understanding of key phenomena is expanding only 
very modestly, if at all. 36  
 
The third debate’s pessimistic vision, however, instigated flourishing 
of new theoretical endeavors such as feminism, post-modernism, post-
structuralism, and historical sociology. This was due to the new 
understanding that “There is …no such thing as theory in itself, divorced 
from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so represents itself, it 
is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed 
perspective.”37 These critical approaches advocated self-reflexivity, that is, to 
reveal and acknowledge the underlying assumptions that inform one’s own 
analyses.38 
2.2. Western Theories and non-Western Phenomena 
Although the initial responses to call for self-reflexivity comprised of 
revealing epistemological and ontological foundations, a simultaneous effect 
of these criticisms was also to question the geo-cultural parochialism 
(Westernism) of mainstream theories.  
The first criticisms to mainstream theory in terms of its Western-
centred focus, was in the field of security studies. In the post-1945 period the 
                                                
36  Yale H. Ferguson ve Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: Theory and International 
Politics, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 3. 
37  Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders”, 128. 
38  Mark Neufeld, Restructuring of International  Relations Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 3-6. Lapid, “The Third Debate”, 241. 
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rise of the United States to a position of global leadership and the challenge 
from the Soviet Union coincided with the consolidation of realism as the 
normal science of International Relations and with the dominance of 
American scholars of the field. Strategic Studies, informed by realism’s 
ontological assumptions and concepts, has been concerned almost 
exclusively with the national security needs of the United States.39  
Strategic Studies is for the most part an off-spring of 
Anglo-American defence policy needs, and as such it 
bears conspicuous signs of its parentage. Its 
attachment to security is heavily conditioned by the 
status quo orientations of hegemonic countries safely 
removed from the pressure of large attached 
neighbors. Strategic Studies is policy oriented, and 
therefore both empricially bound and consrained not 
to wander much beyond the imperatives of the 
national policy level. In this sense Strategic Studies 
exists within the confines of the classical Realist model 
of the struggle for power”40  
While the East-West struggle affected many parts of the world, the 
concepts and theories emerged out of it lacked substantial relevance to what 
has been experienced in these diverse places.41 For example, one African 
scholar argues that “Had the mid 1990s war in the Great Lakes 
Region…been fought in Europe, it would have been legitimately termed a 
‘third world war.’”42 The concepts that were generated, like “small wars” or 
“proxy wars” was inadequate in terms of representing the experiences of 
                                                
39  Mohammed Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective” in Critical 
Security Setudies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 137. 
40  Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era, (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 8-9. 
41  Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies” Review 
of International Studies 32, (2006): 329–352. Robert B. J. Walker, “Realism, change and 
international political theory,” International Studies Quarterly 31, No. 1, (1987): 65–86.  
42  Cirino Hiteng Ofuho, “Africa: Teaching IR Where It’s Not Supposed to Be”, in 
International Relations Scholarship Around the World, ed. Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver 
(New York, Routledge, 2009), 77. 
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people in other parts of the world.43 In the post-Cold War context, the 
representation of post-colonial states as ‘rogue’ ‘weak’, ‘quasi’, ‘collapsed’ 
and ‘failed’ states, has offered little analytical benefit for those who have an 
indigenous interest in alleviating the human conditions there, but they 
“enable certain policies which serve the economic, political and security 
interests of those who employ them.”44  
The inefficacy of conceptual tools in analyzing diverse non-Western 
political settings was not particular to realism. Most mainstream theories 
“are presented as universal theories, and might, indeed, be accepted as such 
by many, all three (i.e. Liberalism, Realism, and the English School 
pluralists) can also be seen as speaking for the West and in the interest of 
sustaining its power, prosperity, and influence.”45 While most mainstream 
(positivist) international theories failed to deliver the promise of a value-free 
theory which would supposedly be applicable to other parts of the world, 
the post-positivist theories offered limited benefit because of their 
“simplified and Westernized description of the situation that does not take 
into account the specific local socio-political context”46 or because “Post-
positivist and postcolonial discourse share a complex, specialized language 
that is largely inaccessible to individuals who lack academic training in the 
                                                
43  Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study 
of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21; Tarak Barkawi, “On 
the Pedagogy of ‘Small Wars’”, International Affairs 80, No.1 (2004): 19–38. 
44  Pınar Bilgin and Adam David Morton “Historicising representations of ‘failed states’: 
beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences?” Third World Quarterly 23, No. 1, 
(2002):56. Pınar Bilgin and Adam David Morton “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The 
Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24, no. 3 (2004): 169–180; Mohammed Ayoob, 
“Defining Security”, 138. 
45  Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan “Why is there no non-Western international relations 
theory? An introduction” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7, No. 3 (2007): 287–312. 
46  Claire Wilkinson “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzystan: Is Securitization 
Theory Useable Outside Europe?” Security Dialogue 38, no. 1, (2007): 5. 
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core and is of limited use for grappling with ‘real world’ situations.”47 
Despite their “emancipatory intent”48 the relevance of post-structuralist 
theories to real world situations remains limited. For example, Hoffman 
states that Ashley’s “Dialectical Competence Model”, while being critical 
against previous conceptions of international relations, does not offer 
principles for “self-realization or emancipation of human potential.”49 If one 
looks at Ashley’s later turn into post-structuralism, it is rather unsurprising 
for Ashley’s work to lack this normative element, since post-structuralism 
denies any possibility of finding a universal normative foundation for 
emancipation. Sankaran presents frustration of non-Western scholars with 
post-modernist IR as follows:  
1) Many postmodernist writings…are oblivious to the 
intimate dialogue between “Western and non-Western 
economies, societies, and philosophies that underwrite 
the disenchantment with modernity.” 
2) Some post-modernist work tends to be so preoccupied 
with practices of representation and signification that 
one is in danger of losing a vital and physicalistic sense 
of the violence that accompanies war; 
3) Epistemological positions that have been espoused 
by some postmodernist international relations theories 
themselves reproduce dichotomous choices that are 
not very politically enabling 
4) In political terms, the postmodernist suspicion of 
subjectivity and agency may be problem for peoples 
that are not so advantageously placed in the global 
hierarchy of late capitalism 
5) There is a need, despite the very compelling 
historicization of the socially constructed nature of 
subjectivity, to carve out spaces for enabling political 
action within and outside the discipline of 
international relations.50 
                                                
47  Tickner, “Seeing IR Differently”, 324. 
48  Stephen Eric Bronner Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists,(Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1994), 3. 
49  Mark Hoffman, “Critical Theory and Inter-paradigm Debate”, Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies 16, No. 2, (1987): 233. 
50  Krishna Sankaran, “The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical 
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Normative theories, which deliberately posit ‘a world project’ as 
preferable, and thus provide a set of principles for emancipation in 
Kantian/Habermasian fashion, were also problematic due to the Western-
inspired nature of such worlds.51  
All in all, whether positivist or post-positivist, almost all mainstream 
theories were dismissive, indifferent, or ineffective with respect to problems 
of the non-Western world. 
…theory has never quite been borne out by events in 
the Third World. Some paradigms appear to explain 
some cases but not others. Even central concepts…are 
troublesome when applied to the Third World. Most 
perplexing, however, have been the unstated 
normative and empirically unsubstantiated 
assumptions that underlie much of what is written the 
field…Mainstream IR theory…is Eurocentric theory, 
originating largely in the US and founded, almost 
exclusively, on what happens or happened in the 
West. If the published record is any measure, then 
most IR theorists believe that studying the Western 
experience alone is empirically sufficient to establish 
general laws of individual, group, or state behavior 
irrespective of the point in time or the geographical 
location.52  
This ontological dismissal of the non-Western phenomena in theory 
building also had political implications. If Cox’s famous assertion that 
“theory is always for someone and for some purpose” is taken to be serious, 
then one can argue that core-produced theory was for core-based purposes.  
                                                                                                                                    
International Relations Theory”, Alternatives 18, No 3, (1993): 388.  
51  Acharya and Buzan, “Why is there no non-Western international relations theory?”, 289-
290, Hobson, ”Is critical theory always for the white West”; Chandra T. Mohanty, “Under 
Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses” Boundary 2 12, No. 3,  
(1986): 333–58. 
52  Stephanie G. Neuman, “International Relations Theory and the Third World: An 
Oxymoron?” in International Relations Theory and the Third World ed. Stephanie G. 
Neuman, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 2. 
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The dissidents of the third debate argued that Western-centered 
approaches are complicit in reproduction of a certain reality and reification 
of status quo. The debates revealed “the ways in which dominant 
knowledge of the world reinforces power in international practice itself.”53 
As Ayoob points out, IR theory and international practice reinforced each 
other so much so that “monopoly over the construction of theoretical 
knowledge depicts fundamentally the problem of inequality in both 
international relations and International Relations. It shapes the thought 
patterns of policymakers and analysts alike across much of the globe.”54 
These political implications of ontological dismissal of non-Western 
phenomena, turned into a call for “marginalized populations and 
perspectives” to raise their voice, which would supposedly “provide a basis 
for alternative conceptualizations.”55 
Marginalized both as objects and subjects of study, non-Western 
scholars are left with two choices: either to import conceptual frameworks 
originated in the West and struggle to apply them to various and mostly 
unfitting phenomena they encounter in non-Western parts of the world, or 
to build home-grown conceptual tools from local experiences. For the 
change-oriented non-Westerner, then, the quest becomes one of producing 
knowledge about oneself, by oneself. The incongruence between Western 
theories and non-Western phenomena “demands that we seriously attempt 
                                                
53  Arlene Tickner “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World” Millennium - Journal 
of International Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 295.  
54  Mohammed Ayoob, “Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for 
Subaltern Realism” International Studies Review 4, no. 3 (2002): 27-48. 
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to present conceptual alternatives to the dominant theories in IR.”56 Calling 
into “question the principles underpinning the orthodox approaches” and 
refraining from simply providing data for “an existing framework of 
analysis,”57 scholars who have an interest in periphery, should thus develop 
a framework based on concepts, variables, or principles that are derived 
from local experiences, that is, achieve some “theoretical autonomy.”58 Since 
knowledge in IR theory is as constitutive of reality as it is “autistic,”59 it is 
clear that periphery scholars should take an active interest in building 
international relations theory that would speak for them. It may be argued 
that homegrown theories may lead to particularism and parochialism,60 
since “(D)ifference can be a slippery and dangerous rallying point for 
inquiry projects and for politics.”61A self-reflexive parochialism -however 
much irrational it may sound- becomes the only venue to vocalize an 
autonomous perspective. This might, indeed be the only way for 
International Relations to be more “international”:  
“It is perverse that a discipline called International 
Relations should be so manifestedly parochial, but the 
usual diagnosis (too little participation from, and 
acknowledgement of, IR research outside the Anglo-
American core) is suspect. Paradoxically, if IR were 
more parochial, in the sense of multiple, nationally 
defined, conceptions of the discipline, it would be 
more inclusive.”(emphasis original) 62   
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While homegrown theories may be criticized for being parochial and 
relying on the distinctiveness rather than similarities, it must be pointed out 
that what seems to be distinctive at the onset, may indeed be a pattern 
throughout ages and peoples. A homegrown theory cannot claim to be 
universal by definition, but still it can be relevant for previously overlooked 
phenomena. For example, any theory that might be build upon teachings of 
Indian philosopher Kautilya, would not be diametrically opposed to the any 
theory that drives inspiration from Hobbes, Machiavelli or Sun Tzu. Yet, 
they may prove different enough to illuminate the necessity to include 
intermediary variables, which would help better explain various 
international phenomena. For example, Kautilya’s vision of international 
system may be similar to that of realism as both rely on power as a crucial 
determinant of international status; nevertheless, Kautilya also includes 
“happiness” as another determinant, and thus points to the importance of 
the benevolence of the emperor.63 One may wonder whether there are 
indigenous conceptions of international relations, foreign policy or strategy, 
which govern international affairs of a people, and may also be useful in 
understanding the phenomena in another part of the world. It is not unlikely 
that an explanation to Latin American transnationalism might remedy the 
scholarly confusion surrounding the Arap Spring. Conceptualizations based 
on ethnic, religious and linguistic affinity that spread across a region, might 
be more conceptually useful in bringing about emancipation than “domino 
theory” and provide insights about agency in international relations.  
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Therefore, those researchers who live in or study the politics of non-
Western world, should take an active interest in building homegrown 
theories, in which concepts are based on local experiences, indigenous 
philosophies or cultures. Homegrown theorizing is desirable, not only 
because it may actually help alleviate the mainstream IR’s deficiency in 
explaining what is going on in most parts of the world, but also it would 
enable non-Western scholars to achieve theoretical and practical autonomy 
from Western dominance, which would bring about a global social 
transformation. 
Although, demands for homegrown theories are justified both 
politically (“Non-Western should be a producer of knowledge”) and 
ontologically (“Non-Western world should also be an object of study”), an 
epistemological justification (“How to theorize by focusing on the 
particular?”) is still needed. The next part deals with this epistemological 
question and offers a way to overcome the metatheoretical dilemma that 
arises from the superficial distinction between fact and value by a 
universalist conception of theory. Already utilized in international relations, 
standpoint epistemologies arose from the need to converge political agency 
and production of knowledge, and provide epistemological justification 
upon which homegrown theories can be built. 
2.3. How to Overcome the Meta-theoretical Dilemma: Standpoint 
Epistemologies 
While in the past, innovation in IR might have stemmed from a 
genuine interest in novelty, the scholars who try to account for 
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transformation tried to overcome the epistemological dilemma by 
deliberately and self-reflectively establishing a normative standpoint as the 
basis for their knowledge production. This normative standpoint, namely 
betterment of human condition, has provided the philosophical basis to 
various forms of knowledge production endeavors which would reflect 
experiences of denizens, to make them visible, and in some cases offer ways 
to counteract the suppression, erasure, or ignorance that they face.  In doing 
so, the studies that are based on a standpoint can also increase objectivity in 
science by providing the other half of the story. As previously claimed, the 
mainstream IR, despite its claim for objectivity, is indeed partial. Once 
inherent value-ladenness of social research is acknowledged, one cannot 
claim to produce “universally applicable, objective truth” but s/he can still 
strive for increasing objectivity. Vocalizing the experiences, issues, problems 
and perspectives of the “uninteresting” may act as an “objectivity-
increasing” mechanism.64   Therefore, standpoint epistemologies are 
necessarily and self-reflectively politicized, while they still commit to 
increasing the objectivity of inquiry in their respective fields.65   
There are a few approaches -namely post-colonialism, subaltern 
studies and standpoint feminism- which deliberately use an identity-based 
standpoint as the foundation for their theoretical claims. While most of these 
approaches originated in other fields, they found their way into study of 
international relations and attained important but limited reception. The 
following section describes these approaches, and illustares how identity-
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based standpoints may be used a foundation for theoretical arguments in 
international relations. 
2.3.1. Post-Colonialism 
Post-colonialism first emerged out of an attempt to redress the 
shortcomings of writing about the non-Western subject without referring to 
its colonial past and relationship with the colonizer. Thus, postcolonial 
writers share a common interest in showing the ways how colonialism 
shaped not only the material conditions of the colonized, but also its cultural 
conditions, mainly through representation and knowledge production.  
Based on works by Foucault and Gramsci, Edward Said’s Orientalism (1979) 
marked the advance of postcolonial criticism firstly in literature and 
humanities, and then other disciplines.  
Said argued that the concept of “the Orient” was constructed by the 
“imaginative geography” of Western scholarship, which is complicit in the 
colonization and domination of non-Western subjects. Inspired by 
poststructuralism, some post colonial theorists, like Homi K. Bhabha, have 
focused on the binary modes of thought and the dichotomies, which are 
used to justify domination.66 Among them, Gayatri C. Spivak has specifically 
dealt with the question of representation of the colonial “Other.” She also 
scrutinized the relationship between the production of 
discourse/representation and postcolonial subjectivity/political agency. 67 
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Postcolonial studies owe much the methods of post-structuralists in 
showing and subverting the binary oppositions established between the 
Western self and subjected others. On the other hand, the works of 
postcolonial theorists are distinguished from those of post-structuralists 
with their deliberate ethical concern, so much so that postcolonial discourse 
is inseparable from an ethical project.68 This normative basis, i.e. the 
purpose, is usually opening up space for the subaltern to speak.  
To move beyond the normative aloofness, and hence, impracticality 
of post-structuralism, most postcolonial writers value resistance and agency, 
both in theory and practice. Postcolonial scholars resist totalizing and 
discriminating representations of or generalizations about the non-West by 
framing their own “counter narratives”. Since explanation and interpretation 
from a different perspective necessitates a perspective, some form of 
generalization with an inevitable dose of essentialism becomes obligatory. 
This presents an ethical dilemma for postcolonial theorists, where they 
engage in the same activity they are denouncing. The postcolonial thinker, 
Spivak responds to this dilemma by the concept of strategic essentialism 
which is a “strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible 
political interest”69. On the methodological and theoretical level, Spivak calls 
for self reflective utilization of the idea of essence -albeit with a recognition 
of and critique of the essentialist nature of all generalizations. In other 
words, to “move beyond the deconstruction of knowledge” to its 
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reconstruction, she encourages a temporary yet self reflective period of 
“post-poststructuralist positivism”. On the practical level, strategic 
essentialism is used as a means of using group identity as a basis of struggle 
and resistance, thus, enabling the subject to have agency, while also debating 
issues related to group identity within the group.  
Although postcolonialism firstly started as an endeavor in literary 
studies, a specific understanding of international relations formed the origin 
of postcolonial theory. Nevertheless, its impact on the study of international 
relations has only been felt in 2000s. The earliest calls for bridging post 
colonialism with international relations came from Krishna70 and Darby & 
Paolini.71 The utilization of concepts central to postcolonialism in the 
analysis of international relations came afterwards. First one was studies of 
Darby and Paolini, where they aim to ”take account of the perspectives and 
interests of non-European peoples.”72 Several chapters in the volume focus 
on non-Western experiences of globalization with respect to gender, race, 
and sexuality. Drawing on earlier attempts to bridge postcolonialism and 
international relations, Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair, specifically 
focused on intersections of race, gender and class, and offered a re-
conceptualization of power in international relations in such manner.73 
Discussing the venues that postcolonialism may provide for a novel 
approach to international relations, they argue that power of representation; 
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the intersections of race and gender; global capitalism, class and 
postcoloniality; and finally recovery, resistance and agency may be used as 
the central themes, all relevant for study of international relations. For 
example, L.H.M. Ling points to the racial understanding behind Western 
responses to Asian crisis of 1997-98.74 Drawing on Homi Bhabha’s concept of 
“mimicry” Ling argues that Asian economies surpassed a phase of “formal 
mimicry”, where the colonized mimics the colonizing in order to survive, to 
a phase of “substantive mimicry” where the colonized not only mimics but 
also challenges and competes with the colonized. With respect to Asian 
economic development, the Western elite welcomed the mimicry by Asian 
capitalism as long as it does not subvert the power status between “West 
and the rest.” But when Asian capitalism hyper-masculinized the 
competition, that is, catching up with the West became an issue of manhood, 
bravery, pride and patriarchal domination of the domestic society, the 
Western elite denounced Asian development as “crony capitalism” which 
was deemed faulty since the beginning and punished it through financial 
means. In her account, Ling does not dismiss the complicity of the 
patriarchal domestic elite in subjugation of domestic society.75  
Apart from several concepts, such as mimicry, hybridity and 
hypermasculization which are introduced to IR, postcolonial insights have 
also provided specific methodologies which might be used to reshape the 
ways of looking into IR. Edward Said’s concept of “contrapuntal reading” –
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reading a text by taking into account what is central to the narrative, but is 
left untouched, and revealing the perspectives of both the colonizer and the 
colonized-76 might be used as a means to involve third-world voices and 
experiences to the Western-centered histories, which are ripe with 
omissions.77 Similarly, Spivak’s strategic essentialism, offers not only a way 
to vocalize a distinct discourse but also act on that discourse. Both of these 
philosophical “methods” can be used in laying foundations upon which 
localized knowledges, i.e. “homegrown theories” can be built.  
2.3.2. Subaltern Studies 
The second approach, which is distinctively based upon a standpoint 
epistemology, is India-based Subaltern Studies Group. It is a school of 
history established by a number of Indian historians in 1982. They “have 
focused on writing history from below, discovering new forms of political 
action and opposition, that do not appear on the screen (at least not as 
“political”) when viewed through the lens of categories derived from 
Western political philosophy.”78 While it is hard to distinguish subaltern 
studies from post-colonial studies in their principles and methods, one can 
argue that the normative basis of subaltern studies is much more local-
oriented. While postcolonialism is attuned to intersections of several 
subalternities, Subaltern Studies Group are much more interested in 
questioning not only the relationship between the above and the below at 
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the interstate level but they basically look at the experiences of the below 
within the below, and how their problems are aggravated by the 
international power hierarchies.79 They also put much more emphasis in the 
actual political agency and resistance by these domestically marginalized 
groups. 
Since their ontological focus is the everyday problems and 
experiences of the domestically exploited, the convergence of Subaltern 
Studies with study of international relations are more problematic than that 
of postcolonialism. Nevertheless, there are some works in international 
relations literature, which are either substantially or self-acclaimedly 
subaltern. For example Mohammed Ayoob, in his theory of Subaltern 
Realism, account for the security problems of the Third World, whom he 
regards as the “subalterns in the international system.”80 He argues that the 
origins of most conflicts in the international system are domestic and related 
to the ongoing state-building processes of the Third World states. He states 
that internal conflicts are not truly ‘internal’ because the sovereignty and 
borders of the state are not recognized as legitimate by the society. 
Therefore, a state-society nexus is at the center of all conflicts, a point which 
most mainstream theories miss because of their Western-centered bias. He 
also states that conflicts that take place in the Third World are seldom 
immune to the external effects. Great powers’ interference in internal, and 
regional conflicts exacerbate the problems. Although Ayoob calls his 
approach as Subaltern, and openly acknowledges his Subaltern School 
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inspiration, his approach has little concern for the marginalized within the 
domestic sphere, while maintaining some form of postcolonial sensitivity.  
Another subaltern work by an international relations scholar is Fantu 
Cheru’s account of various forms of resistance in different parts of Africa. 
He states that forms of everyday resistance, which aimed at subsistence, are 
mostly neglected by political scientists and international relations scholars 
because they are deemed irrelevant to the workings of the states system. He 
states that such forms of resistance not only breaks down the international 
system inch by inch, but they also provide innovative and transformative 
strategies from below against the forced upon obligations by the indigenous 
state. These obligations, i.e. tax increases, cut in wages, dislocation of the 
peasantry, and engaging the poor by production of primary commodities for 
the export market, are mostly legitimated as necessary for national 
development projects.  
]T]hose in a position of power and privilege not only 
ignore the demands of the poor for fundamental 
change, they hate the poor. The peasantry on the other 
hand regards elite initiated development as a threat to 
their existence. In an environment of mutual 
suspicion, the poor take matters in their own hands 
since they know from experience that the oppressors 
never make change; only the oppressed do.81  
They resist by sabotaging government projects, undertaking unofficial 
jobs, running underground shops, forming local cooperatives for 
agriculture, working independently from state institutions and stealing state  
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property. Since local poor has long lost any hope of help from the state, they 
do not refrain from such activities.  
While seemingly domestic, the conflict between the poor and the lite 
has an important international dimension. The obligations, enforced upon 
the poor result from the inequality and domination in the international 
system. The inequality in the international system is translated into domestic 
sphere, whereby the lowest strata of the society pay the costs. Therefore 
grass-roots resistance against the indigenous state also transforms into 
resistance against external domains of power.  
Looking from the subaltern perspective, highlights the experiences of 
the below within the below, and makes the observer more alert against the 
dangers of totalizing generalizations, which are common in the discipline of 
international relations. Taking into account the experiences of the subaltern, 
may help home-grown theorist not only to focus on previously 
undertheorized phenomena, but also to avoid the trap of “domestic 
universalism,”i.e. the argument that one’s perspective applies to each and 
every body within the confines of the proposed standpoint identity. 
2.3.3. Standpoint Feminism 
Feminist standpoint epistemology initially developed in the social 
sciences, primarily in works by philosopher Sandra Harding82  and political 
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scientist Nancy Hartsock.83 Based on Hegel’s thinking about the relationship 
between the master and the slave, and later by Marx, Engels, and the G. 
Lukacs, standpoint feminism asserts that socially and politically 
marginalized groups are epistemologically privileged with respect to 
hegemonic social structures. This informs the epistemological basis of 
knowledge production. Similar to subaltern thinking, feminist standpoint 
theorists argue that those on the “outside” of dominant social and political 
groups are trapped in a nexus whereby they not only try to get along in their 
respective worlds, but also cope with the dominant society. Therefore, their 
status as an “outsider” allows them to perceive social structures and their 
functioning in ways unavailable to members of the dominant group. 
Harding argues that “starting thought out” from the experiences of 
the marginalized leads to formulation of new research questions and re-
determines the priorities: “The questions an oppressed group wants 
answered are rarely requests for so-called pure truth. Instead, they are 
queries about how to change its conditions; how its world is shaped by 
forces beyond it; how to win over, defeat, or neutralize those forces arrayed 
against its emancipation, growth, or development; and so forth.”84  
However, she emphasizes that one does not need to be a member of a 
marginalized group to employ their standpoint.  It comes through active and 
critical engagement about one’s experience and the relationship of this 
experience with social and political structures. 
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With respect to women’s experiences, feminist standpoint 
epistemology argues “men’s dominating position in social life results in 
partial and perverse understandings, whereas women’s subjugated position 
provides the possibility of more complete and less perverse 
understandings.” Like postcolonialism, feminism has an emphasis on social 
and political action. Indeed, Harding explicitly states that political action is 
the basis for scientific inquiry: “Feminism and the women’s movement 
provide the theory and motivation for inquiry and political struggle that can 
transform the perspective of women into a standpoint, a morally and 
scientifically preferable grounding for our interpretations and explanations 
of nature and social life.”85  
Despite its focus on women’s experience standpoint feminism does 
not “try to substitute one set of gender loyalties for the other. They try 
instead to arrive at hypotheses that are free of gender loyalties.”86 While 
acknowledging that some form of generalizable, hence essentialist 
hypothesis of womanhood is obligatory for establishing such a standpoint, 
she defines goal of feminist knowledge seeking as “to achieve theories that 
accurately represent women’s activities as fully social and social relations 
between the genders as a real –an explanatorily important- component in 
human history” since from the feminist perspective, it is mainstream, 
traditional forms of thought that is “subjective in its distortion by andro-
centricism.”87  
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Feminist research in IR has gained momentum since 1980s, although 
there has been limited convergence between the works of feminist and 
mainstream scholars.88 Nevertheless, many feminist theorists have 
attempted a feminist re-construction of central concepts in IR. For example, 
broadening of security studies owes much to the feminist thinking which 
stipulates that security should be understood in multidimensional and 
multilevel terms, i.e., the elimination of physical, structural, and ecological 
violence at individual, domestic, international and global levels.89  
As much as the previous epistemologies, feminism in international 
relations employ a sensitivity to political agency by the marginalized, i.e. 
women. According to Christine Sylvester,90 contrary to conceptualizations of 
security by mainstream IR, security is not an end to be achieved at once, but 
a continuing process where struggle and contention is involved. This insight 
is usually inferred from the experiences of women under “security 
practices” by states. As such feminist IR questions definition and meaning of 
war, internal conflict, migration, environmental hazards, and the 
effectiveness and viability of security measures by states from a woman’s 
perspective. Accordingly, even when dealing with the classical notions of 
security, feminists tend to focus on the consequences of what happens 
during wars rather than on their causes.91 
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The standpoint epistemologies outlined in this section share some 
common characteristics, which are conducive to homegrown theory 
building, i.e. production of knowledge about oneself, by oneself. These are: 
a) They all set the basis of the knowledge on social, economic and 
political differences, rather than assuming that a “universal objective truth” 
can be attained. As such, they neither accept domination of positivist criteria 
nor engage in normative aloofness/ relativity of post-structuralism.  
b) They all engage in strategic essentialism with respect to specific, 
mostly disadvantanged groups. 
c) They all prioritize political agency, emancipation and action. 
These common tenets of standpoint epistemologies might provide a 
philosophical starting point for scholars, who try to provide an indigenous 
account of international politics from non-Western parts of the world. The 
next section reviews these homegrown theorizing attempts.  
2.4. Call for Homegrown Theorizing 
The previous sections outlined the ontological, political and finally 
epistemological justifications for homegrown theory building. This section 
deals with actual homegrown theory building attempts from around the 
world.  
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Once it became clear that Western theory and practice were so 
interwoven that it was of limited use to non-Westerners,92 a call for 
pluralism in terms of the geographical locations where knowledge about 
international relations is produced was made. Accordingly, 
cosmopolitanism was called upon as way to transcend the boundaries 
between core and periphery.93  
Nevertheless, this call for a truly “international” IR, has not been fully 
materialized. There have been several structural obstacles for equal 
participation of the periphery in global knowledge production. Firstly, the 
knowledge production in the periphery is so immersed with the Western 
paradigms, that there is little room for originality.94 Although there are 
significant IR communities in non-Western world, some with considerable 
material opportunities, there has been little independent theory-building in 
these places. Probably because they were the only game in town, core-
produced theoretical tools, however much unfit they may be, were used by 
the non-Westerners in their attempts to understand, explain and solve the 
problems faced by the periphery. For example, in Japan, China, India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and all of Africa, a relatively realist orientation is 
dominant.95 The area studies, where problems and experiences of the non-
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Western world were most covered, theoretical engagement with data has 
been rare.96  
The second obstacle is related to material conditions in the periphery. 
Defiencies in communication and differences in institutional structure, the 
language and the material conditions of teaching, publishing and 
conducting research, are not conducive to equal and productive 
participation of the periphery into global knowledge production about 
international relations.  
Finally, there seems to be a neglect on the part of core IR scholars in 
hearing out the voices from the non-Western world.  Western centered IR 
community mostly treated non-Western scholars are either “native 
informants”97 or “social science socialized”98, hence they are denied the 
status of knowledge producers. This was deemed similar to denying “the 
non-Western” agency status in conducting international relations.  The claim 
for universality of core-based knowledge is accompanied by a normative 
stance where they are also considered to be superior to both political 
concepts and arrangements in non-Western parts of the world. Behera 
explains the reasons for lack of original theory building in India as follows: 
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The structural reason why traditional IR in India has 
not, indeed, could not produce a non-western IR 
theory is because it has fought that intellectual battle 
on a turf chosen by the west, with tools designed and 
provided by the west and rules-of-game set by the 
west enforced, as they were, by not just its political 
and military might but more importantly, its all-
pervasive discursive power.99 
Despite these obstacles, the epistemological space provided by the 
third debate, improvements in the material conditions of research in non-
Western world, and increasing cooperation between policy makers and 
academia instigated an increase in the number and geographical expansion 
of attempts to build theory out of local characteristics or contexts. With 
respect to IR, while certainly not absent before, such works have shown a 
steady increase in the past ten years. Works from Africa,100 China,101 Japan,102 
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India,103 and Latin America104 have been developed out of particular 
contexts, where knower, known and the place of knowing have a common -
usually geographically defined- aspect. These scholars attempted to theorize 
for themselves and for their locally defined purposes.  
These homegrown theories are like any other theory: homegrown 
theories have concepts, suggest a particular relationship between those 
concepts, and they rely on observation in support of their arguments. Hence, 
what delimits homegrown theory from mainstream theories, are 
independent from their formal structure. The distinctive quality of 
homegrown theory stems from the standpoint they use in their formulation. 
In other words, the novelty of homegrown theory comes from use of an 
indigenous experiential standpoint in time, place or culture.  
The theories dealt with in this chapter are selected based on the above 
criteria, i.e. they should have a specific standpoint as their basis, they should 
have concepts, suggest relationships between concepts and at least 
illustratively deal with data. If authors do not support their arguments with 
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data, then their conceptualizations are not scientific theories, but 
philosophical theories. Most scholars, who have a keen interest in building 
homegrown theories, suggest possible sources or starting points for such an 
attempt, but do not engage in rigorous data collection.105 Without substantial 
engagement with data, however, these studies remain what they are, i.e. 
proposals for developing homegrown theories, not homegrown theorizing 
per se.  
The following is a review of homegrown theory building attempts, 
grouped in terms of the standpoint they employ. Both within and across 
these groups, these theories have almost nothing in common. Their 
problematique, their ways of achieving originality, their resources for 
concepts, the forms of data they use are various and very much different. 
While this chapter presents these attempts and deal with their content, their 
differences are the subject matter of the next chapter.  
2.4.1. Russia 
In many ways, the dominant approach in Russian IR is realism. 
Contrary to experiences in other countries where realist concepts are 
imported from the West, Russian realist school has developed rather 
independently even as early as late nineteenth century. In geopolitics, 
despite effected by the Western concepts, Russian scholars had a rather 
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independent thinking, which blended in norms and institutions as well. The 
same is true for Marxism, where Lenin adapted the German philosophy in 
an original way.  
Once shaped by Marxist teachings on the one hand, and pressured by 
East/West dichotomy during the first half of the Cold War, late socialist and 
then post-socialist Russian scholars, has come “to conceptualize the two 
cultural entities as in dialogue with one another.”106 Engaging with Western 
perpectives, Russian IR theory has incorporated a few Western-derived 
concepts,107 which gave way to Russian versions of related paradigms.  
The adaptation of liberal concepts, however, has been mixed in terms 
of originality. Tsygankov and Tsygankov argues that while most liberal 
thinking in Russian IR is not only Western dependent, but also uncritically 
pro-Western, there is a national liberal school, where some Russian liberal 
scholars adapted liberal concepts to Russian experiences, interests and 
realities. For example, while pro-Western liberals think that U.S.-dominant 
institutions as a factor of peace ⁄ stability, national liberals draw both on 
international institutions and non-unipolar world as a means to achieve 
peace.108 Unlike pro-Western liberals, national liberals emphasize the risks of 
globalization, while not denying the opportunities associated. While pro-
Western liberals regard democratization in its Western form as a must, 
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national liberals think that the process must reflect local conditions. As 
policy options, pro-Western liberals point to a full integration with the West, 
while national liberals opt for a pluralist Russia as cross-cultural synthesis, 
which is neither Western nor Eurasian oriented.109 
Tsygankov and Tsygankov note that such division between pro-
Western liberals and Russia’s alternative liberals is built on a long historical 
dispute between so-called Old and New liberals. In the late 19th–early 20th 
century, the New liberals, saw Russia as a distinctively strong, but also 
socially responsible state. Therefore, today’s national liberals are also 
products of a long indigenous intellectual tradition, giving birth to concepts 
where their Western meanings are transformed and acquired a context-
specific one. Like current national liberals, the new liberals were progressive 
since they remained committed to reformist agenda, but they also opted for 
a strong Russian state which would assist the society during reforms at the 
domestic level and continuing to be a strong power in international 
relations. Therefore, both “nationalism” and “liberalism” acquire a different 
meaning in Russian context than that of employed by Western theorists. 
Kantian liberalist argument, which holds that republicanism will foster 
peace and cooperation between states, is not relevant with respect to Russian 
national liberalism, since liberalism is deemed as a way of empowering the 
state domestically and internationally balancing against unipolarity while 
maintaining distance and independence against major democratic powers.  
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Another home-grown theory building attempt from Russian IR, has 
been introduction of “grammatological geopolitics” by Kuznetsow.110 
Building on A. Toynbee’s and more recently S. Huntington’s theory of “clash 
of civilizations,” Kuznetsow argues that division of civilizations into eight 
separate clusters based on denominational affiliations of the nations, might 
be further improved. While Huntington’s theory proposes that the potential 
zones of conflict are the fault lines of these civilizations, Kuznetsov’s 
grammatological geopolitics define civilizations in terms of the alphabets the 
nations use and argue that a much accurate prediction of conflicts can be 
attained by the resulting fault lines.111 By looking at their alphabets, 
Kuznetsov identifies seven more, “smaller” sub-cultures, like Greek, 
Hebrew, Armenian, Georgian, Mongolian, Korean and Ethiopian. He argues 
that these subcultures are more prone to conflicts than civilizations because 
of their rather fast developmental potential. Unlike Huntington’s, Kuznetsov 
argues, this new definition of civilizations explains wars better than 
Huntington’s: Between Serbia (Cyrillic) and Croatia (Latin) in 1991-1995, as 
well as Georgia’s (Georgian) war with Russia (Cyrillic) in 2008, South 
Ossethia (Cyrillic) in 1991-1992, 2004, and 2008, and with Abhazia (Cyrillic) 
in 1992-1993, 1998 and 2008.  
In both cases of Russian attempts, a particularly Russian standpoint is 
used to redefine the concepts introduced in the West. While not entirely 
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original, Russian liberalism and grammotological geopolitics offer novel 
insights about international politics. 
2.4.2. China 
Since 1990s, IR theory has become a highly debated field among 
Chinese scholars, and Western theories have created strong resonance.112 
Critical engagement with the Western theories led to the agreement that 
“Western IR theory cannot solve all Chinese problems and puzzles –that 
Chinese should have their own theories to explain the world, especially to 
theorize Chinese diplomatic practice (or foreign policy).”113 
As one of the ways to “building IR theory with Chinese 
characteristics” –as it is often termed in discussions- Chinese thinker, Hsun 
Tzu (Sun Tzu or Xun Zi) and his political teachings are considered as a 
source of understanding and explaining Chinese foreign policy behaviour.114 
Especially his thoughts on types of great powers and international order 
inspired frameworks to explicate China’s “peaceful rise.”115 
For Xun Zi, the type of leader, nature of policy, and the resulting form 
of international order were three systemically consistent manifestations of 
one thing. There were three types of rulers: True King, whose power is 
based on morality and ethics irrespective of his military strength, hegemon 
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(Lord-protector), who is morally fair but also militarily strong, and Might 
(Powerful) whose power is solely based on military strength.116 The type of 
international order is based on these three types of rulers. True King, “tries 
to win men” through ethics and mores, and establishes a peaceful and stable 
international order, based on voluntary submission of other states. 
Hegemon, on the other hand, tries to acquire allies through trust and 
honesty. Yet such international order comprises two zones; allies benefit 
from peace and stability, whereas enemies suffer disorder and chaos. Might 
tries to capture land through military power, which only leads to disorder 
and chaos.117 
To determine the responsibilities and obligations of different nations, 
Xun Zi describes Five Ordinance System, which is a hiearchy of power 
between nations that are under the rule of the emperor. The obligations of 
nations are based on their geographical proximity to the emperor and their 
individual power status.118 More distant and less powerful nations have less 
reesponsibilites, whereas closer and more powerful nations take on more 
responsibilities. Yan argues that for contemporary international system, a 
similar differentiation among states should be sought with respect to 
international norms: If a state’s power status is more central, that state 
should be given extra responsibilities and should more strictly follow 
international norms. With respect to peripheral states, however, 
International norms should be applied more flexibly.119  
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Xun Zi saw change in any nation’s power and subsequent change in 
international politics as the direct result of leaders’ ability to select talent.120 
Accordingly, Yan argues that an appropriate human resource strategy, is the 
main tenet of a successful rise. Firstly, “a high level of openness [in the 
recruitment] as regards selection of people from all over the world, based on 
high competence and moral standards enhances a government’s ability to 
make the right decisions”121 and increases its political power. Accordingly, 
rapid adjustment and corrective action to remove unqualified officials, 
would reduce the probabilities of decision-making errors. Based on Xun Zi’s 
conceptions of power, Yan builds a formula to differentiate between 
different forms of power and their contribution to the nation’s 
comprehensive power.122 
 
Figure 1 Xuetong's Formulation of Comprehesive Power 
He differentiates his concepts of political power and cultural power 
from Western conceptions of soft power, and argues that while concept of 
soft power subsumes the two, but political power, which is based on the 
ability of decision-makers, is the decisive factor in determining nation’s 
overall power, as shown in the formula.  
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Another attempt by a Chinese scholar to build homegrown theory is 
the adaptation of English School concepts to Chinese historical context by 
Suzuki.123 Drawing on nineteenth century Chinese experience with the 
European powers, Suzuki states that Chinese incorporation into European 
international society a)is not a post-1980s phenomenon as claimed by most, 
and b) was counterproductive in terms of achieving a more benign pattern 
of relationship. Suzuki states that English School fails to acknowledge the 
role played by imperialism. When China was faced with the adoption of 
international law, the European diplomatic system, and participation in 
conferences, Chinese experience was one of growing suspicion and mistrust, 
not cooperation and socialization as English School might predict. As such, 
Suzuki points to the Eurocentric bias of the English school, in showing that 
non-Europeans’ encounters with “civilized manners” of Europe might not 
lead to a more cooperative relationship which is based on a moral 
understanding of order, but might lead to adoption of a realpolitik defensive 
attitude by the non-European power, due to the imperialistic tone of the 
encounter.124 As such Suzuki shows that “Western diplomacy” , an 
intermediary tool used in creation of a formation of international society, 
may not be seen as benign, and may lead to an opposite effect in different 
contexts. When integration to international society is regarded as an attempt 
to dominate, neither “international society” nor “diplomacy” retains the 
original meaning that is ascribed by English School theorists. In the Chinese 
context, “international society” is hardly different from international system, 
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since the social relations between states magnify the differences between 
states and aggravate the antagonism, let alone remedy it.  
Another attempt to look at Western concepts in order to highlight 
their changeable meanings in Chinese context is Cai Tuo’s work on global 
governance.125 Cai defines global governance as a cooperation of official and 
non-official agents (domestic, international and transnational) over a global 
problem, who work within the borders of a country. Hence, he argues, 
global governance is internalized as transnational cooperation on national 
territory. Drawing on Chinese experience, he argues that in developing 
nations, civil society is usually weak, thus unable to project its influence 
transnationally. Moreover, sovereignty is a concern and they are mostly 
“apprehensive of non-territorial politics and globalism.”126 Thirdly, they are 
accustomed to dealing with global problems through established 
intergovernmental institutions and mechanisms. Therefore, Chinese civil 
society takes part in transnational networks, only when the global problem 
in question is addressed locally. In most cases, Chinese government also 
takes part in these networks, since without state support or recognition, 
global governance is hardly effective.127 
Cai argues that transnational cooperation at the national level is the 
only outlet for domestic civil society to learn how to increase its influence in 
addressing global problems. It is also a learning mechanism for domestic 
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government, where a top-down understanding of management is slowly 
giving way to more open one. 
Through his analysis, Cai explains what global governance means in 
Chinese eyes, given historical, cultural and material circumstances the 
Chinese government and the civil society work. As such, he reveals the 
discrepancy between the developing societies and developed societies in 
terms of both attitude and ability. His analysis also offers practical guidance 
as to the improvement of civil society and argues that involvement of host 
state institutions may serve improving global consciousness and global 
values.  
Homegrown theory building with respect to governance is also 
stimulated by Chinese conceptions of world order in ancient Chinese 
philosophy, which is inspired by Confucius and Mencius among others. As 
a system of both thought and belief, Confucianism shapes the thought 
patterns and practices of Chinese.  
Confucian conception of international order is Tianxia, which means 
‘space under the heaven’. It designates a combination of nature, super-
nature, and morality. It is basically a cultural concept, containing the system 
of morality, or “the way of the heaven.”128 It presents a distinct worldview, 
where harmony, rather than chaos or anarchy, is the default order of 
things.129 Therefore “the metaphysical ground of Confucianism is that the 
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nature of the universe is harmony or a process of harmonization. Conflict is 
not ontologically true.”130 This holistic worldview does not presuppose an 
ego and alter, rather everything is a continuation of ego. As such, conflict is 
neither inevitable nor natural.131 
Qin argues that this holistic view of relations may prove more useful 
in understanding global world, contrary to the Western IR Theory’s focus on 
“international-ness of world politics,” which he claims, is a discussion of 
“politics in a non-world.” Accordinlgy, in his attempt to explain East Asian 
governance practice, Qin draws on the Confucian philosophy, sociological 
theories, and theories about relational governance in business management, 
and argues that theories of International Relations focus on rule-based 
governance and excludes relational governance, which is “a process of 
negotiating socio-political arrangements that manage complex relationships 
in a community to produce order so that members behave in a reciprocal 
and cooperative fashion with mutual trust evolved over a shared 
understanding of social norms and human morality.”132 
Reviewing governance literature in International Relations, Qin 
Yaqing states that most theories of governance rely on a rule-based 
governance, with the underlying assumption that individuals are rational, 
cost-calculating actors with exogenous self-interests. Rules govern these 
individuals, and shape their preference ordering by setting opportunities 
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and limitations. Yaqing argues that while in more individualistic societies, 
rule-based governance dominates, in communitarian societies, relational 
governance is the main practice. While elements of rule-based governance 
are rationality, egoism, and contractual rules, the essence of relational 
governance is composed of relationality, morality, and trust, all of which are 
drawn from Confucian philosophy. He argues that rule-based governance 
take tangible results as the objective, whereas relational governance 
emphasize process, i.e. maintaining a relationship which makes 
participation, strengthening of ties, and developing a shared understanding 
possible. He states that while a combination of both sorts are expected in 
each community; in individualistic Western societies rule-based governance 
dominates, whereas in communitarian East Asian societies, relational 
governance would dominate. He argues that ASEAN and APEC are not 
based on same governance model with the EU or NATO, but they are 
judged as ineffective when seen through rule-based governance models. The 
merit of ASEAN and APEC may not be achieving tangible results, but 
maintaining continuous dialogue and negotiation.  
The specific parts of Qin Yaqing’s theory of relational governance, is 
not original. He is inspired by business management studies which try to 
explain governance forms of Asian firms, but his conceptualization differs 
from theirs, in terms of his understanding of trust as a genuine social norm, 
rather than as another cost-reducing mechanism. He is not the first to 
introduce “relational” and “processual” ontology to the study of IR,133 but 
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his attempt to reconceptualize “relational” with respect to governance and 
criticize rule-based (and norm-based) governance with their focus on 
individualistic conception of interests and rationality is new. As such, 
elements of Confucianist philosophy, trust and morality, become the 
binding glue that integrate two theories from different disciplines. 
The last and probably most developed example from Chinese efforts 
to build a home-grown theory out of Chinese practice is “theory of 
superficial friendship” by Yan Xuetong, who analyzed China-US bilateral 
relations from 1950 onwards, and tried to explain the “sudden deteriorations 
followed by rapid recoveries [which] have been the norm in China–US 
relations since the 1990s.”134 
He argues that fluctuating relations, characterized by “short-term 
improvements in China–US relations that have followed each short-term 
dip” are neither because of rising nationalism in China, nor attributable to 
Chinese overconfidence built upon China’s fast economic growth.13564  
Showing that the fluctuating pattern of China–US relations started 
after the Cold War, he argues that the discrepancy between hightened 
expectations of the two sides and the actual policy inclinations derived by 
their interests, was the underlying cause. He states that the good will by 
both sides actually worsened the balance in their bilateral relations, because 
it impeded their ability to pinpoint realistic policies based on their 
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interests.136 It actually gave way to establishment of a superficial friendship, 
“where two nations imagine that they have more mutually favourable than 
unfavourable interests, when the reality is the opposite. Inconsistency 
between knowledge and the reality is a main destabilizing factor in bilateral 
relations.”137 
He builds a typology of bilateral interests, and analyzes China-US 
bilateral interest based on such typology.  
Table 1 Xuetong's Typology of US-China Bilateral Interests 
 
Xuetong states that with respect to different sectors of China-US 
relations, the ratio of mutually unfavorable interests to mutually favorable 
interests differ, which aggravates the inconsistency. With respect to security, 
there are more mutually unfavorable interests than mutually favorable ones. 
As regards to economy and culture, however, China and the United States 
have more mutually favourable than mutually unfavourable interests, so 
much so that Xuetong defines them as “cultural friends.”138  
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He states that since Chinese and Americans are friends on an 
individual level, where people are more concerned about economic and 
cultural interests, there is optimism as to the future relations between 
governments. But at the government level, the focus is usually on politics 
and security, where mutually unfavorable interests dominate.139 
Table 2 Patterns in US-China Relations over Time 
Xuetong also differentiates between cooperation types. Both mutually 
favorable interests and mutually unfavorable interests can be the basis on 
which cooperation is established. He posits that whereas shared interests 
leads to positive cooperation, mutually unfavorable interests lead to 
preventative cooperation where each side try to hold the danger of their 
interests to their relationship at a minimum. 
IR discipline in China is very rich in terms of attempts to build home-
grown theories. The Chinese problematique seems to find peaceful but 
assertive ways to engage with the outside world, while maintaining 
integration at the domestic sphere. In the their search for novel 
conceptualizations, they either relying on ancient Chinese thinkers, redefine 
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mainstream concepts through critical engagement, or put forward totally 
new concepts. Although the lively debates within Chinese IR are seldom in 
English, there is a certain level of interest in the core about the developments 
in Chinese IR. 
2.4.3. India 
In much resemblance to China, India is rich with local traditions and 
approaches to international relations. Kautilya, who was also regarded as an 
Indian Machiavelli,140 has been a source of inspiration for attempts to reach 
at original conceptualizations. Before dwelling into individual 
conceptualizations, however, a brief summary of Kautilya’s ideas might help 
to provide a background.  
Kautilya wrote his famous work Arthastra (Science of Polity) after 
Alexander the Great’s conquests of India, and explained the logic behind the 
building of the first empire in the Indian sub-continent.141 His work was 
discovered in 1915, and presented to international academic community.142 
This early presentation, however, was not more than a description of 
Kautilya’s ideas on state, war and foreign policy.  
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Kautilya’s view of state comprised of six elements –Ministers, People, 
Fortifications, Armies, Treasury and Allies- at the center of which lies the 
king, vijigishu. Vijigishu is not an ordinary king but a “king desirous of fresh 
conquests.” Kautilya’s purpose is to lay bare the strategies to make the 
vijigishu a chakravartin,” universal monarch who can put an end to the 
perpetual struggle of the contending states and lead his army to the farthest 
horizon unchallenged.”143 
The vijigishu is at the centre of mandala, a State of Circle. Mandala 
operates through the law of matsya-nyaya, “the law of the fish” where “the 
big ones eat the little ones.” Similar to Hobbessian nature, matsya-nyaya is a 
system in which territorial expansion and power consolidation is the only 
remedy against threats.  
Mandala is a circular geographical construct, comprised of enemies 
and allies. The immediate neighbours of a state is the first circle and it is 
entirely composed of enemies, or ari. The immediate neighbour of ari, by the 
same logic, is the enemy of the ari, hence is likely to be vijigishu’s mitra or 
friend. Mitra’s are surrounded by ari-mitra (friend of the enemy) which are 
surrounded by mitra-mitra. Therefore, mandala resembles a chess board of 
whites and blacks, resembling aris and mitras of the central king. Kautilya 
differentiates between an ordinary ari and parshnigraha, rear enemy, which 
would attack only when the central king is attacked by another ari.144 There is 
also the madhyam, a neutral neighbour and udasina, a neutral but very 
powerful non-neighbour. 
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Based on this description of Mandala, Kautilya enumerates six-
principles of foreign policy to vijigishu: 
(i) Sandhi (peace): “Whoever is inferior to another shall 
make peace (with him).”  
(ii) Vigraha (war): “Whoever is superior in power shall 
make war.” 
(iii) Asana (neutrality): “Whoever thinks ‘No enemy 
can hurt me, or am I strong enough to destroy my 
enemy’ shall observe neutrality.” 
(iv) Yana (march): “Whoever is possessed of necessary 
means shall march against his enemy.” 
(v) Samshraya (seeking alliance or shelter): “Whoever is 
devoid of necessary strength to defend himself shall 
seek the protection of another.” 
(vi) Dvaidhibhava (double policy): “Whoever thinks that 
help is necessary to work out an end shall make peace 
with one and wage war with another.”145 
Kautilya’s principles are familiar to students of IR, with its emphasis 
on power and agression. Although his principles were prescriptions for 
achieving preponderance, they also resemble modern realist theories and 
may be interpreted as explanations how states behave. For example, sandhi: 
hegemonic peace theory, bandwagoning. vighara: offensive realism. asana: 
defensive realism. yana: offensive realism. samsharaya: alliances, security 
regimes. dvaidhibhava: hard balancing. Nevertheless, it also has a few 
unheard conceptualizations such as covert and silent war.146 Covert wars are 
those in which guerilla tactics are pursued, whereas in silent wars spies and 
magicians are used instead of armed forces.  
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Kautilya’s Arthastra has been of use to Indian IR scholars in two 
distinct ways. First group of work conceptually engaged with the Kautilya’s 
teachings and tried to locate his ideas in a broader perspective. Nevertheless, 
they seldom presented empirical evidence for its contemporary relevance. 
The second group of scholars has drawn empirical evidence for Kautilya’s 
relevance in contemporary Indian international relations, but they do not 
develop original frameworks from his concepts, but use them in their 
original form.  
In line with the first type of engagement with Kautilyan thinking, 
Modelski argues that Kautilya’s circle of states is a framework for 
understanding and explaining international system. He thinks Arthastra’s 
high abstraction and relative lack of reference to the historical circumstances 
and events of the past, gives its concepts “a timeless quality.”147 Yet, in his 
analysis, he pertains to Kautilya’s framework employing a Westphalian lens. 
For example, he argues that, Kautilya’s ambitious king does not seek to take 
total control of the conquered territories, but expects simple obedience. Since 
the king gives up the opportunity to exercise exclusive sovereign rights on 
the conquered territory, he interprets the king’s behaviour as similar to a 
hegemon. Moreover, conflating cooperation with submission, Modelski asks 
whether the Kautilya’s state system was one of international order, where 
some sort of mutual understanding prevails. However, it is apparent that in 
Kautilya’s framework, order is pursued as long as superiority of the 
conquering king is served. Since it is never a system of equal rights, 
cooperation is possible if and only if the weaker party is forced to do so. He 
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concludes that Kautilya’s system of states does not resemble an international 
order, but an anarchy, which is remedied by relative stability in domestic 
sphere, provided by brahmans.  
Other scholars who take an interest in Kautilya’s thinking refer to 
India’s contemporary foreign policy to explicate how his ideas shaped 
strategic thinking in India. Rashed uz Zaman, acknowledged that Kautilya’s 
teachings were popular amongst Indian decision-makers and it is possible to 
trace its effect on India’s policies.148 He argues that Nehru was inspired by 
Kautilya’s mandala, apparent in India’s friendly relations with countries like 
Afghanistan, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and its enmity with Pakistan 
and China during his time.149 Moreover, India’s military actions against the 
states of Junagadh (1948), Hyderabad (1949) and the Portuguese colony of 
Goa (1961) shows that Gandhian principle of non-violence was forsaken at 
the expense of Kautilyan matsya-nyaya. Uz Zaman argues that India’s cold-
War relations with the US, China and the Soviet Union were also illustrative 
of how Kautilyan principles of “neutrality against a powerful neighbour” 
and “seeking help from a distant but powerful non-neighbour.” Although 
uz Zaman does not develop original concepts out of Kautilyan teachings, he 
illustrates how they might have shaped Indian foreign policy and strategic 
thinking.  
Drawing on works by Indian scholars on international law and 
institutions, Chimni outlines six distinct visions of just world order. These 
perspectives are designated as establishment, left, Dalit, subaltern, anti-
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modernist, and spiritual.150 Chimni argues that each of this Indian 
perspectives deal with issues central to international law and institutions 
and that “they provide rich critical resources not only to think through 
alternative strategies to establish a just world order, but also to 
conceptualize its contours and content.”151 
However, his review of these six perspectives falls short of 
delineating such contours in terms of IR theory. Rather than theorizing, 
Chimni proposes policy prescriptions for makers of a new world order, i.e. 
legislators of international practice, and highlights the priorities that they 
should take into consideration. These priorities are regulation of 
transnational corporations to ensure that it does not lead to creation of 
international rules at the expense of host state’s development objectives; 
finding remedies for democracy deficit in international institutions; re-
strengthening ideas of sovereignty against intrusions from great powers or 
international institutions; the need for a strategy of complex internationalism 
to oppose “absolute power” in international relations; development of a 
discourse on human rights as the only universal solution to protest against 
the state; and spiritual transformation of peoples and institutions, which he 
deems as vital as political/material reconfigurations for a just world order.152 
Another compilation of Indian perspectives on world order, is by 
Kanti Bajpai who reviewed four perspectives of Indian international 
thought: Nehruvian internationalism, Gandhian cosmopolitanism, political 
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Hinduism or Hindutva and neo-liberal globalism.153 While first three 
perspectives are originated in India, the fourth is gaining a foothold in 
Indian international thought more recently. He argues that Nehruvian 
internationalism is very similar to a Westphalian conception of order, yet it 
is differentiated by non-alignment. While Nehruvianism is not naïve in the 
use of force in international relations,154 “Jawaharlal Nehru rejected power-
politics and the Western concept of maintaining security and international 
order through balance of power.”155 Therefore, non-alignment was both a 
principle of exercising autonomy in foreign affairs, and an ‘order-building’ 
instrument through which a ‘third’ area of peace outside the two power 
blocs were to be created to secure the establishment of a just and equitable 
world order.156 
Gandhian cosmopolitanism, with its emphasis on non-violence 
(ahimsa) presented a world order, where rights of the individuals, 
emancipation and freedom are prioritized. In Gandhian thought nation-state 
and nationalism was only an instrument to ensure human liberation from 
imperial powers, and state should be a radically decentralized body. 
International system was important to the extent that it gave way to a world 
order, where small, autonomous groups of people interact on the basis of 
non-violence, truth power and economic equity. Gandhian conception of 
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world order was ontologically original in that it placed small communities 
as the primary actors of world politics.157 
Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, sees Hinduism as an overarching 
civilization, which comprises all peoples of Indian peninsula, irrespective of 
their religion, language, or caste. As Behera points out, Hindu culture 
embraces a non-dualistic mode of thinking, where belonging to one group 
does not necessarily lead to exclusion of another. Moreover, a person need 
not be “characterized as first a Hindu or a Muslim, or a monk. Select tenets 
of more than one religious faith could be simultaneously followed” (emphasis 
original).158Behera argues that exclusionary self-other dichotomy with respect 
to traditional identities was introduced by British, through figures, maps, 
numbers, i.e. census.  
With respect to world order, Hindutva emphasizes civilizations. Yet, 
a hierarchy of civilizations is drawn, with Hindu civilization occupying the 
first place among other civilizations. Hindu conception of world order 
would be comprised of sovereign nations based on their indigenous culture 
under the framework of a global dharmic regime, rules and institutions 
which avert great power domination but succumb to universal tenets of 
Hinduism. Despite its focus on values, Hindutva does not ignore power, 
since material strength and civilizational greatness was deemed mutually 
dependent. Unlike Gandhian cosmopolitanism, Hindutva embraces 
inequality as a social fact, both domestically and globally.  
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Like China, India is very rich in terms of the philosophical resources 
to construct home-grown concepts. Unlike Russia, homegrown theorizers in 
India are less interested in redefining Western conceptions. The main 
problematique, on the other hand, is similar to those of Russian and Chinese 
IR: how to achieve autonomy and equality in international sphere.  
Prescriptions, rather than explanations dominate the homegrown theorizing 
attempts. As such, most of them offer world-views with principles to follow, 
rather than arguments about how one category of phenomena is related to 
another. 
None of these worldviews however, was given much consideration in 
mainstream IR Theory. Behera argues that aside from its policy implications, 
“non-alignment was never accorded the status or recognition as a ‘systemic’ 
IR theory because it did not suit the interests of powers that 
be.”159Nevertheless, this lack of engagement by mainstream IR, may result 
from the rather prescriptive nature of these world-views: as policy 
suggestions, they are evaluated by the decision-makers –rather than 
theorists- on the grounds of their pratical consequences, as opposed to their 
explanatory power. For example, even Nehru disregarded the ideas of 
Gandhi, which he found dangerous to sovereignty and security of the 
nascent Indian state. Similarly, Hindutva was deemed as a form of Indian 
fascism.160Therefore, despite the rich tradition and innovative practice, 
Indian home-grown theory attemtps have rather been less successful in 
terms of global reception. 
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2.4.4. Latin America  
Unfortunately, the works of most home-grown thinkers do not 
usually constitute a party in cutting edge theoretical debates of mainstream 
IR. Yet, Latin American contribution to political economy and international 
relations is one –if not the only- exception. Dependency theory, which 
emerged out of Latin American context in 1950s, argues that terms of trade 
for underdeveloped countries relative to the developed countries had 
deteriorated over time. This argument later led to world-systems theory by 
Immanuel Wallerstein.and adopted by neo-Marxist theorists of international 
relations.  
Dependency theory emerged as a refutation of the central argument 
of modernization theory, which is: the values, institutions, and attitudes 
characterizing traditional society constituted the primary causes of 
underdevelopment.161 Dependency theorists argued that “it is not internal 
characteristics of particular countries so much as the structure of the 
international system -particularly in its economic aspects- that is the key 
variable to be studied in order to understand the form that development has 
taken in non-communist industrializing countries.”162 
The development of Dependency School of Economics has emerged 
as a response to not only theoretical shorcomings of the modernization 
theory but also to economic policy failures of Latin American states. 
Dependency writers often identified themselves as being “unambiguously 
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on the side of change in the South in order to benefit the poorest and most 
oppressed members of society there.”163 Failure of Latin American economies 
to attain self-sufficiency after the WWII was the driving force behind 
establishment of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) under 
the UN in 1948.164 With economic development of Latin America as the 
primary motive, the analyses and recommendations by those who work 
under ECLA,165 were the pioneers of dependency theory. They argued that 
“exogenous factors, namely, the international division of labor and the role 
occupied by the Latin American economies as primary goods exporters, 
produced asymmetrical relations between the large core countries and the 
nations of the periphery.”166 
The underlying theory behind dependkency studies was an economic 
one. Contrary to David Ricardo’s thesis that free trade would benefit both 
parties because of the comparative advantage, Raul Prebisch, an Argentinian 
economist who worked as the first director of ECLA, argued that there is a 
“declining terms of trade” for Third World states, because peripheral nations 
had to export more of primary goods to get the same value of industrial 
exports. Through this system, all of the benefits of technology and 
international trade transfer to the core states.167 
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Dependency theorists integrated Prebisch’s thesis with their 
observations regarding Latin American society and the global relations of 
production. The expectations after the Second World War was that with the 
expansion of domestic market, the industrialization of the Latin American 
countries would get to a point where self-sufficiency and sustained growth 
would follow.168 Dependency theorists argued that looking beyond domestic 
determinants of economic growth and development is not sufficient. An 
international outlook, which takes into account historical and sociological 
variables, along with interactions between and across domestic and 
international realms is also needed.  
Although they rest on similar assumptions, there have been several 
approaches to dependency. While works of Paul Baran, Patrick Sweezy and 
Andre Gunder Frank added upto a North American originated neo-Marxist 
tradition of dependency, works by scholars from Latin America, like 
Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, constituted the structuralist 
tradition of dependency.169The main reason for disagreement between the 
two schools was the determinism associated with neo-Marxist accounts, 
which posit that external dependency relations inhibit any form of 
development.170 Latin American structuralists argued that structures not 
only constrain the agents, but they are historically changed by them, so the 
pessimism of the North American scholars is exaggerated. For Latin 
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American structuralists, dependency and autonomy were two ends of a 
political continuum, as development and underdevelopment were two ends 
of the economic continuum. Therefore, dependency and development were 
not mutually exclusive. They argued that the local political elites in 
peripheral states have structured their domestic rule on a coalition of 
internal interests favorable to the international economic structure. 
Therefore, inernational capitalist structure, by itself, does not lead to a single 
form of depedency; it is raher the sociological consequences and the 
subsequent alliances which shapes the dependent status of the South.171  
Since their elaboration focused on “historically changing relationships 
between specific national and international structures of political and 
economic domination, and political alliances and struggles among distinct 
social groups”172 Latin American originated structuralist dependency theory 
could be applied to a wider scope of countries from economically developed 
ones in East Asia to underdeveloped countries in Africa.173 The emphasis on 
alliances and struggles within and across national borders, made the theory 
more historically nuanced and more conducive to social change, at the 
expense of predictive power.  
World system analysis is based on previous accounts of dependency 
theorists. For Wallerstein, current capitalist world-system is continually 
expanding by inclusion of people external to the system. Moreover, it is also 
deepened, by further polarization between the bourgeoisie and the 
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proletariat. The polarization is due to the nature of capitalist system. 
Bourgeosie, determined to accumulate surplus to survive in the competitive 
system, needs further markets and new recruits to proletariat class. The 
new-comers are usually part-life-time working class, whose main income is 
the wages, but also able to support themselves through extra activies, like 
doing domestic work and growing vegetables in the backyard. Some receive 
gift income from relatives and neighbours. By this addtional support, the 
employer is able to give less than is required for the subsistence of 
employee. The additional support comes from either another producer or 
another employer, who give away the surplus they might have retained. 
Therefore, any core-periphery relationship may have consequences for 
another dyad, creating a complex web of interrelationships within and 
across borders.  
This inequality between the receiver of and producer of surplus, lies 
at the core of dependency theory. It begins but by no means restricted to the 
economic realm, giving way to political systems. Core and periphery are 
used as adjectives to depict sides of the inequality. As such, state borders are 
mostly transversed in unequal relations. There are multiple layers of 
coreness and peripheriality, from which one can differentiate multiple 
dyadic relationships in different levels. Wallerstein states that there is a 
“lack of co-incidence between the economic processes and the state 
boundaries. That is the reason why unit of analysis for the world-systems 
analysis is the system, not individual states.” 174  
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Wallerstein and his associates offer designing quantitative 
methodologies in order to account for their theories emprically. Unlike 
critical theory of inernational relations, their chosen methodology is not anti-
positivist; on the contrary, they offer designing hypotheses in accordance 
with their theories, building empirical datasets and testing those hypotheses. 
Their methodological innovation consists of having world-systems as the 
unit of analysis, not the states, since they argue that the agents in the world-
system are not confined to any state’s borders.  
Both dependency theory and world-system analysis is inspired by 
neo-Marxist school of economics. Wallerstein extended Marx’s depiction of 
class and division of labour and applied it in a global level, where classes 
across state borders form groups, who behave as the structural determinants 
encourage and constrain them. As such, both are Marxist in origin, but the 
key concepts of Marxism are revitalized drawing on the experiences of late-
coming capitalist socities; Latin America in the case of Dependency School, 
mostly Africa and Asia in world-systems analysis. Both schools had strong 
connections to disciplines of history and economy, and used their relevant 
insights, and applied them with a more nuanced focus on political and social 
relations within and between states. As such, the novelty they introduced 
does not stem from a break away with the Western-originated schools, nor 
from sticking to disciplinary boundaries, but from exactly the opposite. They 
combined the concepts that has already been built, but applied them in 
different levels, in different geographical contexts and introduced new 
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definitions of such concepts or reaarrange them in accordance with 
empirical findings. 
2.4.5. Japan  
Japanese attempts at home-grown theorizing in IR is more recent 
compared to other countries and regions in this section. Like Chinese studies 
on Xun Zi and Indian studies on Kautilya, Japanese scholar Graham Gerard 
Ong draws on ideas by modern Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro, 
especially his “logic of emptiness.”175 in his attempt for defining 
international relations from within a Japanese perspective.  
Ong begins by defining Chinese dialecticism which inspired the work 
of Nishida Kitaro. Distinct from Hegelian dialecticism, where contradiction 
is resolved, by thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis, Chinese dialecticism uses 
contradictions to understand relations between events, to transcend, 
integrate or sometimes embrace clashing viewpoints. Contrary to Western 
forms of knowing, which involve categorization and isolation, Chinese 
dialecticism sees objects and events constantly changing and rearranging 
themselves, constituting an irreducible whole. If any element of this whole is 
studied in isolation, it is considered prone to extreme and mistaken 
conclusions.  
Nishida Kitaro, drawing on such dialecticism, argued that the act of 
knowing should not be separated from being known. Active reflective grasp 
and passive intuition, in which one is grasped by things, occur 
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simultaneously. Since Western dichotomy of Self and Other does not allow 
thinking in these terms, he argues for cultivation of a new relationship in 
which self and the world inter-act and inter-tuit each other. He then applies 
this to interaction of Japan with the West and notes that “I think we can 
distinguish the [W]est to have considered being as the ground of reality, the 
[E]ast to have taken nothingness as its ground’”176 By having nothingness as 
the ground, Ong argues that, Nishida provided for a formation of identity 
for Japan, where self-other dichotomy no longer exists, and “through the 
emptiness of its culture, Japan was said to have the ability to assimilate all 
‘unresolved contradictions’, including Western culture.” Logic of emptiness 
also “allows it to ‘eventually internalize its exterior and swallow the 
historical world into its totalising system’”177 
By suggesting a concept of political being, Ong explains Japan’s 
political behavior and identity in contemporary world. It also corresponds to 
other vocalizations of Japanese IR thought. For example, Ogata Sadako 
argues that the concept of interdependence which purports a mental image 
where transactions across borders take place are not conducive to Japanese 
thinking of IR. The process of “internationalization” on the other hand, is 
much more familiar, since it is “used to describe ‘the current process of 
change taking place in Japan as well as the desired course of direction that 
Japan should follow’ in its relation with other states and international 
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actors.”178 reflecting the twin process of inward and outward thinking in 
Kitaro’s “logic of emptiness.”  
Apart from an explanatory motivation, Ong’s re-conceptualization of 
Kitaro’s ideas also prescribes a policy of identity for Japan in its foreign 
relations, therefore supplying an answer to post-WWII domestic discussion 
in Japan as to what it means to be Japanese.  
Ong’s reconceptualization of Nishida’s ideas in the context of IR 
reflects a rather inward looking perspective, which is endemic to IR 
theorizing in Japan according to Inoguchi.179 The main problematique of 
Japanese International Relations was to understand the dynamic that led to 
Japan’s involvement and defeat in World War II, and how this defeat is 
related to Japan’s limited international influence despite its huge economic 
capability.  
2.5. Conclusion 
 This chapter began by the meta-theoretical dilemma intrinsic to 
“homegrown theorizing”: how to build generalizable knowledge by 
focusing on the particular. A brief discussion on the place of values in 
(social) science and IR, however, revealed that “homegrown theory” is not 
only possible, but probably the most common form of theory production. All 
the knowledge production that has been made since the advent of the 
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discipline was, as shown earlier, was indeed particularistic and parochial. 
Accordingly, the road to better theories is not aiming for “universal, 
objective truth”, but to “increase objectivity” by multiple parochialisms.  
These multiple parochialisms may help to increase 
“internationalness” of International Relations and contribute to the 
disciplinary knowledge in various ways. Firstly, a standpoint position may 
illuminate light upon different dimensions of some core concepts of 
international relations. More specifically, it can contribute to discussions 
about how ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ are intermingled, the relevance and 
power of state in a globalized world, the overall weight of ideational and 
material factors in international politics, sovereignty and its diverse 
definitions, the question of shifting loyalties, democratization and changing 
discourses on security at domestic, regional and global realms, as well as the 
place of norms and principles in international relations. While these are 
already hot topics, discussed by the mainstream IR, new concepts which 
reflect different shapes that they take in different political and regional 
contexts can provide novel insights. Secondly, it can present new issue areas 
and problems that mainstream approaches fail to see, due to conceptual 
shortcomings. Thirdly and most importantly, conceptualization of the ways, 
approaches and principles a mid-range power utilizes to overcome its 
domestic and international problems may provide a ‘real-world’ oriented, 
‘applicable’ knowledge that might -at least partially- remedy the lack of 
practical guidance, which have plagued the critical approaches. 
A homegrown theorizing endeavor, firmly based on a standpoint 
epistemological basis, may help acknowledge the inherent value-ladenness 
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of research, and establish truth claims, on the basis of their specific 
standpoint in time, place and circumstances. As the alternative to 
universalist schemes of mainstream IR, homegrown theorizers, may 
embrace situated knowledge, or a standpoint epistemology, which 
“proceeds from specificities and works upward to comparative 
generalizations, rather than downward from a priori assumptions.”180  
The sample of homegrown theory building attempts from around the 
world provided in this chapter, reveals that these theories originate from a 
practical and political need to conceptualize local experiences in an original 
manner. Even though most of theorists rarely acknowledge the underlying 
epistemological basis of their attempts, their distinctive quality is the result 
of the standpoint they use in their formulation. In other words, the novelty of 
homegrown theory comes from use of an indigenous experiential standpoint 
in time, place or culture.  
Nevertheless, the homegrown theorizing attempts are widely 
differentiated in terms of not only their geographical origins, but also in 
their conceptual origins, theory-building methods, and data collection 
methods. While some of them redefine previously established mainstream 
concepts, others refer to culture-specific concepts. While most of them 
suggest a novel relationship between concepts, others reshape previously 
established relations between those concepts. While some refer to qualitative 
data to substantiate their claims, others use quantified data. This wide range 
of differentiation calls for a recategorization of these theories, apart from 
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their geographical origins. Such recategorization may help to understand 
their particular strategies, i.e. methods, to build theories. Accordingly, the 
next chapter compares these methods against each other and assesses 
effiency of each theory building method in building better theories in terms 
of explanation, reception and applicability. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
METHODS OF HOMEGROWN THEORIZING 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, the political and epistemological basis for 
building a homegrown theory has been provided along with examples of 
homegrown theory building attempts from around the world. In this 
chapter, their methods of theory building are analyzed in order to find an 
appropriate methodology to theorize Turkish foreign practice.  
Since every homegrown theory is a theory, the first part deals 
provides an analysis of theory in general, and provides main tenets of 
methodology of theory building. In the second part, I analyze the 
homegrown theories, and locate their specific methodology in building 
theories. In the third part, I provide a discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of these methods in terms of their potential for further 
development, and conclude that quantitative analysis of data is the most 
appropriate method for initial collection of data. In the last part, I discuss 
quantititative analysis, with respect to its effectiveness in answering 
questions about Turkey’s international affairs in a comprehensive manner.
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3.1. Methodology of Theory Building 
In philosophy of science, there are two basic approaches to theories. 
First one is a lingusitic approach, used by logical positivists, the second is a 
semantic approach.181 Logical positivism, which dominated studies of 
political science and international relations as the underlying philosophy of 
science, posits that theory is a lingusitic entity, i.e. “a systematically related 
set of statements”,182 which can either be true or false. The semantic view, on 
the other hand, posits that theories are collection of models, which are 
representational maps of reality. Therefore, for semantic view, theories are 
collections of representations that are more or less similar to reality. 183 
3.1.1. Elements of Theory  
In both linguistic and semantic approaches, the basic element of 
theories is concepts. They are classes of phenomena with respect to a specific 
property.184 Since concepts organize phenomena with respect to their 
properties, concepts are abstractions in the form of definitions. Descriptions 
can be categorizations, classifications, taxonomies or typologies. A theory, 
which only has such descriptions, is a descriptive theory. Since descriptions 
are axiomatic, that is, presupposed, descriptive statements are the purely 
                                                
181  Kevin A. Clarke and David M. Primo “The Theoretical Implications of Empirical 
Implications of Theoretical Models” Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago IL, September 2004. 
182  Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Sciences, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), 
10. 
183  Clarke and Primo “Theoretical Implications”, 12. 
184  Elizabeth Steiner,  Methodology of Theory Building (Sydney:Educology Research, 1988).  
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philosophical.185 However, since the objects of theory-building are ideas, 
there can be no theory with concepts; and since all concepts are 
philosophical abstractions, this philosophical level is also theoretical. For 
example, a discussion of “power” on the basis of its definiton is a 
philosophical-theoretical endeavour.186 
In empirical sciences, however, theories move beyond definitions, 
they also have an explanatory component. Explanatory theoretical 
statements are descriptions of contingent relations between properties of the 
object of the study.  
 
Figure 2 Elements of Theory 
As with theories, two approaches to theory also have different views 
about models. Model is something that bears a similarity to something else. 
“Model-of” is derived from observation of phenomena. For example, a road 
map that is drawn looking at the actual roads in the terrain is a model-of 
roads.  
                                                
185  Nuri Yurdusev, “’Analiz Seviyesi’ ve ‘Analiz Birimi’ bir Ayrım Argümanı” Uluslararası 
!lişkiler 4, no. 16 (2008): 3- 19. 
186  Yurdusev, “Analiz Seviyesi”, 5. 
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Figure 3 Semantic View of Models (Models of Data) 
There are also models-for, which are derived from theories, so that 
theories are operationalized in the empirical world. For example, rational 
choice model is derived from assumptions of rationality, unifiedness of 
actors, etc. and applied to decision-making in foreign policy. For logical 
positivism, a model is a model-for, that is, models are derived from theories 
and they inform subsequent hypotheses.187 Hence, they are usually models-
for-data collection.188 In semantic approach, models are models-of-data, 189 ie. 
descriptions of relations between concepts, not in the forms of statements, 
but by representional maps.  
                                                
187  Jim Granato and Frank Scioli, “Puzzles, proverbs, and omega matrices: The scientific and 
social significance of empirical implications of theoretical models (EITM)” Perspectives on 
Politics, No. 2, (2004): 315; Rebecca B. Morton, Methods and models: A guide to the empirical 
analysis of formal models in political science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
280.	  
188  Gary King, Robert Owen Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
189  Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann, "Models in Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/models-science/> 
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Figure 4 Logical Positivistic View Of Models (Models for Data Collection) 
3.1.2. Reasoning in Theory  
Every theory in science has to have a mechanism, a type of reasoning, 
which makes scientific inference from empirical phenomena possible. The 
reasoning makes relationship between abstracts (concepts and their 
relationships) to empirical observation, possible. With respect to reasoning, 
the English philosopher Francis Bacon stated that  
There are and can exist but two ways of investigating 
and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly 
from the senses and particulars to the most general 
axioms; and from them as principles and their 
supposed undisputable truth derives and discovers 
the intermediate axioms… The other constitutes its 
axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending 
continually and gradually, till it finally arrives at the 
most general axioms, which is the true, but 
unattempted way.190 
In both cases, the process of linking theory to observation begins by 
observation. In the first case, the theorist observes a few particulars, then 
                                                
190 Francis Bacon, The New Organon and The Related Writings, trans. F. Anderson (New York: 
Liberal Arts Press,1960), 43. 
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forms theory (the most general axioms) from which hypotheses 
(intermediate axioms) are derived. This is usually called deduction. In the 
second case, the theorists observe a few particulars, then form hypotheses 
from least general to most general. This is usually called induction.  
Over time, philosophers extended and developed these two basic 
forms of reasoning. Carl Hempel argued that an event can be explained by 
“covering” it under a law. For him, one of the ways this can be done is 
through the ‘deductive-nomological model’ in which explanation of the 
observed event is deduced from a a priori general law.191 The second way is 
‘inductive-statistical model’ in which statistical laws based on probabilities 
are established by observation of events.192  
While induction and deduction are two basic forms of reasoning, 
neither of them is unanimously accepted as the appropriate form for 
scientific inference. With respect to induction, the philosophers who favor 
deduction claimed that since exhaustive induction is impossible –one cannot 
observe every single instance of his/her object of study-, any generalizations 
through induction would be unreliable. Even with statistical models, where 
probabilities are established, the outcome would be a statement that two 
concepts are interrelated. Therefore an explanation of the phenomena is not 
sufficiently presented. For example, in international relations, although there 
is a statistically significant negative relationship between war and 
                                                
191 Steve Smith “ Positivism and Beyond” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. 
Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 15. 
192 Steve Smith, “ Positivism and Beyond”, 15. 
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democracy, such relationship only does not lend itself to a sufficient 
explanation of why this is the case.  
On the other hand, deduction is also criticized for its exclusively 
rationalist focus. Since engagement with empirical evidence is a requisite of 
scientific inference, pure deduction based on reason, is not sufficient.193 To 
overcome this problem, Karl Popper introduced hypothetico-deductive 
model of scientific inference. Since building concepts out of induction is 
deemed unreliable, Popper suggested that hypotheses are formed through 
“intuition” but then they should be either confirmed or disconfirmed by 
inductive process, i.e. by testing those hypotheses through looking at 
particulars, which are gathered through induction.  
 
Figure 5 Hypthetico-Deductive Model of Scientific Inference 
Nevertheless, hypothetico-deductive model does not help to build 
concepts or theories, but only to test them. Popper argued that scientific 
theories arise “genetically in many different ways, and the manner in which 
a particular scientist comes to formulate a particular theory may be of 
biographical interest, but it is of no consequence as far as the philosophy of 
                                                
193 Clarke and Primo, “Theoretical Implications.” 
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science is concerned.”194 Refinement and improvement of theory is possible, 
but hypothetico-deductive model does not offer explanations as to how one 
comes to build concepts at the first place.  
In addition to deduction and induction, philosopher Charles Sanders 
Peirce introduced the concept of abduction as a form of reasoning through 
which theories are built. While induction is to make generalizations about 
the population by looking at the sample, and deduction is to attribute pre-
conceived properties of the general to the sample, abduction “consists in 
examining a mass of facts and in allowing these facts to suggest a theory. In 
this way we gain new ideas; but there is no force in the reasoning”195 Peirce 
argued that abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis, 
and that it is the only operation which introduces any new idea, because 
induction is only reliable in testing an existing hypothesis, while deduction 
is probable in an already established closed system of logical calculus. As 
such, “deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that 
something actually is operative; abduction merely suggest that something 
may be.”196 For Peirce, there is no justification for abduction, since it is only a 
suggestion, from which deduction can draw a prediction, that would be 
tested by induction. 
                                                
194 Stephen Thornton, "Karl Popper", Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/popper/>. 
195 Charles Sanders Peirce, "A Letter to Calderoni" in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce- 
8, ed. Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1931), 209. 
196 Charles Sanders Peirce,  "Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism in Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce- 5, ed. ", Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1931), 171-172. 
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Figure 6 Types of Scientific Inference 
From the discussion on abduction, one can conclude that the 
preliminary step in building any new theory is observation of a sample of 
facts. Indeed, what logical positivists (i.e. deductivists) suggest in terms of 
the origin of theory, i.e.“intuition”, is not different from a process of 
abduction from observation. Inductivists also emphasize observation as the 
only source of scientific knowledge. Abduction also fits in the actual daily 
process of making generalizations through observation.197 As Verba 
suggests, building theory in political science is impossible without 
“knowledge of prior work on the subject and the collection of some data.”198 
Therefore, as the first step of theory-building, one should also look at 
methods of observation. 
                                                
197 Evan Heit “Properties of Inductive Reasoning” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 7, No. 4 
(2000): 569-592 
198 Gary King, Robert Owen Keohane and Sidney Verba Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 19. 
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3.1.3. Methods of Observation 
A third dimension of theory building is observation. In most cases 
observation is analyzed as a phase of theory-testing, and separate from 
theory-building. However, as explained in the previous section, observation 
is an intrinsic part of abduction, i.e. to discern possible relationships 
between concepts. Therefore, observation and the data that is generated 
through observation is important not only in terms of testing theories, but 
also building them. 
Two general approaches to generate data in social sciences are 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. Based on numerical measurements 
of properties of specific phenomena, quantitative researchers “abstract from 
particular instances to seek general description or to test causal hypothesis.” 
Most quantitative research lends itself to be replicable by other 
researchers.199 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, does not rely on numerical 
measurements, but provide verbal accounts of particular events. “Such work 
has tended to focus on one or a small number of cases, to use intensive 
interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in 
method, and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of 
some event or unit.”200 
Beyond this general division, however, it is hard to depict a single 
method as exclusively generating quantified or non-quantified data. For 
                                                
199 King et. al. Designing Social Inquiry, 3. 
200 King et. al. Designing Social Inquiry, 4. 
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example, case study method is usually regarded as a “qualitative method”. 
However, as long as the data generated through case study research is 
quantified, it can also be a “quantitative method.”201 For example, an 
analysis of US-Soviet cooperation is a case study of international 
cooperation. But if the cooperation behavior of the US-Soviet dyad is 
quantified on a continuum, such case study generates quantitative data. 
Another example can be content analysis. The data generated by content 
analysis can either be quantitative or qualitatitive. Therefore, the use of 
“quantitative” and “qualitative” as adjectives before method or data 
requires more elaboration.  
A scientific method is usually a data processing mechanism to deal 
with raw data and translate them into processed data, from which patterns 
can be discernible.202 Raw data as well as the processed data may either be 
qualitative and quantitative. Therefore, types of data analysis methods can 
be illustrated as follows: 
                                                
201 Larry M. Dooley, “Case Study Research and Theory Building” Advances in Developing 
Human Resources 4, No. 3 (2002): 335-354. 
202 Harvey Russell Bernard Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000), 419. 
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Table 3 Types of Data and Data Analysis 
 
In international relations, examples for qualitative analysis of 
qualitative data are “ethnography, elite interviews, macrohistorical analysis, 
and ‘qualitative comparative analysis’ based on Boolean and fuzzy set 
methods.”203 In these methods, raw data in the form of verbal statements are 
translated into verbal processed data. Some of the case study research is also 
in this group.  
Quantitative analysis of qualitative data is to translate verbal record 
of events, units into numeric form. Surveys, with closed ended questions are 
of this sort. Freedom or democracy indexes are also similarly developed.  
Qualitative analysis of quantitative data is when raw numerical data 
is processed into non-numeric form. Research that produce graphs, schemas, 
maps or visualization of any other sort from numerical data is in this 
category. Translation of numerical foreign trade or foreign aid data to 
graphic form is an example. In some cases, this sort of analysis follows from 
quantitative analysis of qualitative data.  
                                                
203 Jack S. Levy “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference” Conflict Management 
and Peace Science 25, no. 1 (2008):1–18. 
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Quantitative analysis of quantitative data is conducted when 
inferential-statistical methods are used to infer patterns from numerical data.  
As explained in the prevous section, observation is required in the 
first and third phases, in scientific studies: the initial observation which 
would lead to form an emergent theory (I –Abduction) and when deduced 
hypothesis is being tested (III-Induction). In the first phase, the observation 
can comprise of raw (unprocessed) data or processed data (either qualitative 
or quantitative). In the third phase, however, usually processed data (either 
qualititative or quantitiative) is required. Since our focus is on theory 
building, only observation in the first phase is dealt with.  
For theory building purposes, qualitative and quantitative data has 
different merits and disadvantages. Most “leaps of abduction” is usually 
done after observing raw data. These data are usually presented as 
illustrations of emergent theory. In international relations, for example, 
plausibility probe case studies, which “fall short of the degree of detail 
needed either to explain a case fully or to test a theoretical proposition” are 
used to illustrate “the empirical relevance of a theoretical proposition by 
identifying at least one relevant case”204 
This form of qualitative raw data facilitates a faster formulation, 
provides a pilot study, reduces costs and saves energy. On the other hand, 
more rigorously processed data may prove more useful for identifying 
patterns. Quantitative analysis allows for a larger number of observations, 
and makes possible to identify patterns between properties of phenomena. 
                                                
204 Levy, “Case Studies”, 6-7. 
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For example, Rosenau argues that even in a single country study, if number 
of observations are sufficient, one can infer patterns embedded in a number 
of data points across-time.205 Moreover, quantitative analysis is easier to 
replicate, which increases the chances for criticism and development of the 
emergent theory by other researchers.  
Qualitative analysis of data, on the other hand, provides rich details, 
and provides a greater diversity.206 As such it may help to think about more 
carefully about the operationalization or definition of concepts. It can also 
help to generate different concepts, which may have been overlooked in 
extant theories. However, they may be less facilitating in identifying 
patterns since too much diversity in data may not be conducive to 
inference.207 
Therefore, while qualitative analysis is more useful in developing 
conceptual (definitional) component of theories, quantitative analysis is 
more useful in explanatory component of theories, i.e.establishing 
relationships between concepts.  
3.2. Homegrown Theorizing as Theory-Building 
In previous chapter, several homegrown theory building attempts 
from all over the world were indentified. These homegrown theories are like 
                                                
205 James N. Rosenau, “Toward Single-Country Theories of Foreign Policy: The Case of the 
USSR” in New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, ed. 
Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr. and James N. Rosenau, (Boston, MA: Allen & 
Unwin, 1987), 53–74, 
206 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman “Case Study Methods in the International Relations 
Subfield” Comparative Political Studies 40, No. 2 (2007): 178. 
207 Heit “Properties of Inductive Reasoning,” 570. See Table 1, “Touchstone Results in 
Inductive Reasoning” 
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any other theory: they have concepts, suggest a particular relationship 
between those concepts, and they rely on observation in support of their 
arguments. All of them originated from a specific community who share a 
sociological standpoint. All authors built on such standpoint in their 
production of novel knowledge and particularly draw their data from the 
part of the world they experience. While all pursue originality in concept-
building, they vary in their way of achieving originality.  
Nevertheless, the common characteristics of homegrown theories end 
there. Their conceptual origins, theory-building methods, and data collection 
methods differ fundamentally. Some of the scholars build on works by local 
thinkers, writers or scholars of a different discipline and operationalize their 
previously developed concepts with an IR outlook. Most of these studies 
refer to indigenous intellectual and/or philosophical approaches as the 
starting point of their theoretical framework. Second group of scholars 
transform mainstream Western ideas or concepts in a manner that it is no 
longer part of the mainstream, since they reflect indigenous meanings 
attached to them by particular societies. The third group of theorists develop 
their concepts out of local values and commonly used concepts of daily life 
and use them in an IR theory framework. Each of these ways resembles how 
international relations concepts have developed in the West. Following is a 
table of previously illustrated homegrown theories, categorized in terms of 
the above parameters.   
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Table 4 Homegrown Theories and Methodology 
Country/ 
Region 
Theorist Concept Data Form of 
Data 
Concept 
Borrowing 
(Specific Source) 
Russia      
 Kuznetsov Grammatological 
geopolitics 
Ethnic 
conflict in 
Europe and 
Caucasia 
Qualitative Redefiniton of 
Western Concepts 
(Huntington) 
 Tsygankov 
and 
Tsygankov 
Russian 
liberalism 
Russian 
foreign policy 
Qualitative Redefiniton of 
Western Concepts 
(Russian liberal 
tradition) 
China      
 Yan 
Xuetong 
Power China’s 
Peaceful rise 
Qualitative  Redefiniton of 
Homegrown 
Concepts (Xun Zi) 
 Yan 
Xuetong 
Superficial 
friendship 
China-US 
relations  
Quantitative  Original Concepts 
 Cai Tuo Global 
governance 
Chinese 
experience in 
global 
governance 
Qualitative Redefiniton of 
Western Concepts 
(global 
governance 
literature) 
 Qin Yaqing Relational 
governance 
Chinese 
Foreign 
policy 
Qualitative Redefiniton of 
Western Concepts 
(TC 
Confucianism) 
India      
 Rana Non-alignment India’s non-
alignment 
policy 
Qualitative Redefiniton of 
Homegrown 
Concepts (Nehru) 
208 
 
                                                
208 Rana, (1969) considers non-alignment as a balance of power strategy, based on security 
and interest. Nevertheless, interest and security is understood as identical with those of 
international society. Siddharth Mallavarapu, “Development of International Relations 
Theory in India: Traditions, Contemporary Perspectives and Trajectories” International 
Studies 46, no.1-2, (2009):165-183 
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Table 4 (Cont’d) 
(as 
portrayed in 
Bajpai and 
Behera) 
Political 
Hinduism 
(Hindutva) 
Global 
dharmic 
regime 
Indian 
history and 
culture 
Qualitative Homegrown 
Concepts (Hindu 
texts) 
 Rashed Uz 
Zaman 
Kautilyan 
Principles 
India’s 
foreign policy 
Qualitative Homegrown 
Concepts 
(Kautilya) 
 Mohammed 
Ayoob 
Subaltern 
realism 
Conflict in 
the Third 
World  
Qualitative Redefiniton of 
Western Concepts 
(Subaltern school, 
classical realism) 
Latin 
America 
     
 Cardoso Dependency  Latin 
American 
experience 
with 
capitalism 
Quantitative Original Concepts 
 Wallerstein World-
systems  
African 
experience 
with 
capitalism 
Qualitative Redefiniton of 
Western Concepts 
(Marxism) 
Japan      
 Gerard 
Graham Ong 
Logic of 
Emptiness 
n’s foreign 
policy 
Qualitative Homegrown 
Concepts 
(Nishida Kitaro, 
Buddhism) 
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While initially, the above sample of theories is selected as attempts at 
homegrown theories, now it is possible to analyze them with greater depth. 
As stated earlier, the preliminary step in building any new theory is 
observation of a sample of facts. The data used at first phase of (I. 
Abduction) theory building, should be based on indigenous experience. This 
alone, however, is necessary but not sufficient for a theory to be called as 
homegrown theory. The distinctive character of homegrown theories lies in 
its translation of the novelty derived from data into concepts.  
 
Figure 7 Methodology of Homegrown Theory-Building 
The second step is building concepts. After the researcher collects 
data, and then he/she may prefer to conceptualize his/her own homegrown 
theory (A). In other cases, s/he prefers to engage with some pre-existing 
conceptualization on the basis of his/her findings, in other words, 
homegrown theorizers may borrow from previously established concepts. 
As long as some novelty has been attained; borrowing does not disqualify 
homegrown theorizing.  
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Borrowing concepts occurs in three ways. Theorists may borrow from 
mainstream theories. If they restructure mainstream concepts, then they may 
qualify as homegrown theory. (B) This can either be done through 
redefinition of concepts, or applying them in a different level of analysis. If 
there is not a restructuring, then it is not homegrown theorizing, but mere 
application, which either refutes or confirms the original mainstream theory. 
They may also borrow from homegrown conceptualizations (indigenous 
philosophies, ideas, culture). This can be done with (C) or without any 
restructuring (D). If there is no restructuring, the resulting homegrown 
theories are mostly vague, and hard to generalize across places.  
In some cases, the resulting theories are derived from a combination 
of both mainstream and homegrown conceptualizations. So, while 
categorizing them, one should look at the resulting homegrown theory, and 
determine the primacy of such pre-established concepts in bringing about its 
distinctive novelty. If its distinctive novelty comes from previous indigenous 
conceptualizations, then they are categorized as redefinitons of homegrown 
concepts, if it comes from mainstream theories, then it is categorized as 
redefinitions of mainstream concepts. 
Finally, the proposed relationship between concepts can either be 
original or non-original. Coming from original concepts guarantees 
originality of the theory, but borrowing from either mainstream or 
homegrown conceptualizations do not necessarily lead to original theory 
production. Therefore, all these attempts should also be analyzed in terms of 
the originality in the proposed relationship between concepts. The following 
is systematic categorization of homegrown theory building pathways 
through all three levels. 
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I. A. X. Authentic Homegrown Theory Building: This way, original concepts 
are established out of local experience and an original relationship is 
proposed. e.g., Theory of Superficial friendship and dependency theory. 
I. A. Y. Not Applicable (If concepts are original, there is no way that the 
explanatory component can be non-original)  
I. B. X. Homegrown alteration of mainstream theories. It is usually 
redefinition and application of an extant concept in a different level of 
analysis. Examples are world-systems theory and relational governance. In 
other cases, concepts are rearranged in a different manner. For example, in 
subaltern realism states are categorized as subaltern and non-subaltern. 
Subaltern states are in the process of nation-building, and have different 
security environments in which security of state and security of people 
reinforce each other. The resulting theory offers novel insights, but alters an 
extant theory. This group of theories is semi-homegrown.  
I. B. Y Homegrown Improvement of Mainstream Theory: In these cases, the 
extant concepts and their relationship remain same, but defined in different 
manner. For example Kuznetsov defines civilization in terms of alphabet, 
Tsygankov defines liberalism in line with Russian experience. The resulting 
theory is not actually homegrown theory, but an homegrown improvement 
of mainstream theory.  
I. C. X. Referential Homegrown Theory Building: Ideas of a homegrown 
thinker/culture are redefined to make inferences from homegrown 
experiences. Redefinition helps to make homegrown ideas more relevant for 
contemporary phenomena. Example, Xuetong redefines power in line with 
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Xun Zi’s ideas to account for China’s “peaceful” rise. Such redefiniton helps 
to explain why accumulation of power does not lead to conflictual balancing 
behaviour. 
I. C. Y. Mainstream Assimilation of Homegrown Theory In this case, 
homegrown concepts are redefined in a way that the resulting explanation is 
subsumed under a mainstream theory. For example, Rana treats non-
alignment as a form of balancing, which emanates from interests and 
security considerations. The resulting theory is not homegrown.  
I. D. X. Insular Homegrown Theory Building In these cases, homegrown 
ideas are not redefined, but employed without change. Although the 
resulting explanation is original, it is mostly vague to non-indigeneous 
researchers, and hardly generalizable. Examples are Hindu understanding 
of global dharmic order and Ong’s “Logic of emptiness.” The resulting 
theory is homegrown, but unlikely to generate further development. 
I. D. Y Anachronistic Assimilation of Homegrown Theory In these cases, 
homegrown ideas are not redefined, but employed without change, but still 
the resulting explanation is subsumed under a mainstream theory. For 
example, Rashed Uz-Zaman, states that Kautilya’s principles dictate Indian 
foreign policy. But since “Kautilya was a realist” Indian foreign policy can 
also be explained through realism. The resulting theory is not homegrown. It 
is assimilated into mainstream theory by way of anachronism.  
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3.3. Evaluation of Homegrown Theory Building Attempts 
From above categorization, one can discern that; only three group of 
homegrown theory building attempts satisfy the criteria to be emergent 
home-grown theories. These are Authentic Homegrown Theories, 
Referential Homegrown Theories, and Insular Homegrown Theories. 
Following is an assesment of these types of theories.  
Table 5 Emergent Homegrown Theories 
Theory Type Theorist Major 
Concepts 
Data 
Source 
Data Type Concept 
Type 
Authentic 
Homegrown 
Theory 
Cardoso Dependency  Latin 
American 
experience 
with 
capitalism 
Quantitative Original 
Concepts 
Authentic 
Homegrown 
Theory 
Yan 
Xuetong 
Superficial 
friendship 
China-US 
relations  
Quantitative  Original 
Concepts 
Referential 
Homegrown 
Theory 
Yan 
Xuetong 
Power China’s 
Peaceful 
rise 
Qualitative  Redefiniton 
of 
Homegrown 
Concepts 
(Xun Zi) 
Insular 
Homegrown 
Theory  
Gerard 
Graham 
Ong 
Logic of 
Emptiness 
Japan’s 
foreign 
policy 
Qualitative Homegrown 
Concepts 
(Nishida 
Kitaro, 
Buddhism) 
Insular 
Homegrown 
Theory  
Political 
Hinduism 
(Hindutva) 
Global 
dharmic 
regime 
Indian life 
and culture 
Qualitative Homegrown 
Concepts 
(Hindu texts) 
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There are many established criteria to evaluate theories. Parsimony, 
predictive power, explanatory power, coherence, completeness, 
tentativeness (sometimes termed as testability or falsifiability), and 
applicability are some of them. In international relations, no single IR theory 
qualifies for all criteria. They are mostly ideals that theorists try to attain. For 
the purpose of evaluating an emergent theory in terms of its potential for 
development, a few of these criteria are more relevant than others. These are 
explanatory power and applicability.  
At the onset, no new theory is complete or accurate. Since an 
emergent theory needs continuous refinement and development, it should 
be applied, and confirmed or disconfirmed by other researchers, which 
makes theory building a collective exercise. Therefore, for development of 
any emergent theory, other researchers’ engagement with the concepts is 
necessary. More engagement helps clarify, transform and refine the 
concepts, so that the theory would account for more of the empirical 
observations. Applicability of the emergent theory is important for its later 
development.  
Since building a robust theory requires engagement, the foremost 
quality of a new theory is that it can be understood and applied by other 
researchers. As Lynham points out, “an important function and 
characteristic of theory building is to make these explanations and 
understandings of how the world is and works explicit and, by so doing, to 
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make transferable, informed knowledge for improved understanding and 
action in the world tacit rather than implicit.”209 
When assessed in terms of their applicabiltiy, Insular Homegrown 
Theories are poor canditates. For example, “logic of emptiness” used by 
Gerard Ong, fails short of transmiting to the mind of the reader, one is 
confused where one can apply “logic of emptiness” to foreign policy 
behaviours of states. How can we infer from our empirical observations that 
the logic of empiness is at work? Original concepts are good, but those 
whose meaning is too blur for others to understand are unproductive.210 In 
the Japanese case, “the logic of emptiness” is hard to grasp, more so if one 
thinks of how it can be applicable to foreign relations of a state. If nobody 
else is able to apply the concept, then the theory is doomed to isolation, and 
its development would halt. Referential Homegrown Theories have more 
potential for applicability than Insular Homegrown theories, but it is 
dependent upon theorist’s level of capacity for clarification. A poor 
clarification of concepts may limit its transferability to the people cognizant 
of the referent culture or ideas. Limited transfreability may also be one of the 
reasons why such theories are only discussed within communities of 
culturally homogenous scholars. Applicability of Authentic Homegrown 
Theories, on the other hand, also depends on author’s particular capacity for 
clear articulation. 
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Closely associated with applicability is capacity for generalization, i.e. 
explanatory power. If theory is highly applicable to other cases, then its 
explanatory power is high. Definitions of concepts should be clear, and 
distinct but they should not be too specific which would inhibit their 
applicability to phenomena found in various environments.  
Explanatory power is an important concern for emergent theories for 
further development. Although homegrown theories are based on 
indigenous experience, any theory with too limited a capacity for 
generalization ceases to be a theory. Insular Homegrown theories are poor 
candidates also for further generalization. Are there any other states where 
logic of emptiness might work? Referential Homegrown Theories have more 
potential for applicability than Insular Homegrown theories but their 
generalization capacity might be limited to the referent culture. Is “global 
dharmic regime” general enough to account for experiences of non-Hindu 
societies? The explanatory power of Authentic Homegrown Theories, on the 
other hand, depends upon theorist’s definition of concepts.  
From above evaluation, one can conclude that, Authentic 
Homegrown theories have much more potential for development than 
Insular or Referential Homegrown Theories. A closer look at those theories, 
reveal that the data Authentic Homegrown theorizers use at their abductory 
stage, are quantititative data of bilateral relations. While dependency 
theorists based their theoretical innovation on foreign trade data, Xuetong 
used a quantititative analysis method to generate quantitiative data from 
international behaviour of China and the US toward each other. This is 
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probably not a coincidence since quantitative data is more conducive to infer 
patterns from otherwise perplexing data.  
The use of quantitative methods is also important for applicability of 
the theory. Since theorists, transparently displays the data that gave way to 
original concepts, other researchers are given a first –hand and replicable 
example to operationalize those concepts in their hyppthesis-testing studies. 
The quantititave method enable others grasp the boundaries of the concepts, 
irrespective of their cultural background. Once concepts and patterns are 
clearly displayed, the readers actually understand the puzzle in question, 
and how operationalization might take place, that is, how concepts are 
converted into observable and confirmable components.”211 
3.4. Turkish Foreign Affairs and Quantitative Analysis 
Since quantitative analysis of bilateral relations are more conducive to 
infer patterns and clarify concepts, building a homegrown theory of 
Turkey’s international relations is more likely when a similar method is 
used. Following is a discussion of quantititative analysis, with respect to its 
effectiveness in answering questions about Turkey’s international affairs in a 
comprehensive manner.  
Especially in the last decade, Turkey’s foreign policy actors, the 
foreign actors they engage with and the relations established, have not only 
numerically increased but have grown ever more complicated. Accordingly, 
there has been growing debate about the nature of the evolution of Turkish 
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foreign affairs and whether it involves dramatic new changes. Despite 
numerous research inquiries, primarily of a qualitative nature, there remain 
few firm, consensus-based answers to such pivotal questions about Turkish 
foreign affairs as to its current ideological and physical direction, the nature 
and type of its main actors, and its primary motivations. 212   
Obviously, a longitudinal assessment of Turkish foreign policy is 
needed to answer such questions. Although there have been several studies 
concerning the matter, a quantitative study would signicantly improve our 
understanding of specific periods in comparison to each other. It would also 
help better specify the changing and constant parameters in Turkish foreign 
policy behavior.  
The most cutting edge debate about recent Turkish foreign policy 
concerns the new geographical focus of new Turkish foreign policy. The 
“new” focus of Turkey’s international relations has variously been defined 
as the Muslim World, the neo-Ottoman World, Eurasia, the neighbourhood, 
or the whole world.213 Often dubbed as “the axis shift,” the primary 
indication of a new focus has been Turkey’s changing bilateral dynamics 
with the Western countries214 and its increasing engagement with non-
                                                
212 Ersel Aydınlı, Gonca Biltekin, Musa Tuzuner “Time to Quantify Turkey’s Foreign 
Affairs: 
  Setting Standards for a Maturing International Relations Discipline” (forthcoming); 
Ersel Aydınlı, Gonca Biltekin and Musa Tuzuner “Quantification of Turkey's Foreign 
Affairs  via Event Data” (Paper presented at Workshop on Quantifying Security Studies 
and Foreign Policy Analysis in Turkey and the Greater Middle East, 2-4 December 2011, 
Istanbul)  
213 Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul “Understanding the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: 
Changes within Continuity, Is Turkey Departing From The West?” Uluslararası Hukuk ve 
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Western societies.215 The arguments as to whether such “axis shift” exists, 
and if so, explanations as to the primary characteristics and reasons for such 
change are numerous, but the collection of arguments are far from 
constituting a systematic, all-encompassing, thorough debate.   
While individual researchers focus on individual aspects of this 
activism, a comprehensive analysis is missing in Turkish foreign policy 
literature. The assumptions and findings of individual studies are based on 
idiosyncratic treatment of several fundamental questions, and there are 
disagreements over the reasons, the nature, the rationale, the sustainability, 
and the orientation of Turkey’s ‘new’ foreign policy. 216 All these questions 
require an integrative analysis, substantiated by a comprehensive 
description. Without answering those questiions, it would be impossible to 
generate viable theoretical frameworks, which would explain foreign policy 
activism. Such questions may be addressed by examining Turkish foreign 
policy and its presumed newness with previously neglected quantitative 
analysis methods, that would enable the theorist to look at the subject matter 
in a more longitudinal and holistic manner and provide opportunities for 
broad comparative analyses.  
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Qualitative methods, which are commonly used in Turkish foreign 
policy studies, would be best complemented with the introduction of some 
quantitative methods. When the scope of questions are considered, it is 
obvious that a quantitative methodology may help to tackle some of Turkish 
foreign affairs’ still pressing questions in a practical and efficient manner. A 
homegrown theory of Turkey’s international relations can be built to 
understand and explain Turkey’s recent activism in intenational relations. 
Event Data Analysis, which quantifies bilateral relationship between 
two actors, is one of the most appropriate methods for such concerns. 
Following chapter is a description and brief history of this method.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
EVENT DATA METHOD 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I provide a simple introduction to Event Data 
Analysis, a quantitative data collection and analysis approach that has been 
used extensively for compiling broad datasets of foreign policy and other 
international behaviors. In the second part, the steps taken in the building 
up of Turkish Foreign Affairs Event Dataset (TFAED) have been defined. 
TFAED is built by using a single news source (Agence France Presse) and 
covers a 23-year period (1991-2013) of Turkish foreign and domestic affairs.   
4.1. Event Data Research  
Event data are a formal method of measuring the foreign policy 
phenomena. “Event data are generated by examining thousands of 
newspaper reports on the day to day interactions of nation-states and 
assigning each reported interaction a numerical score or a categorical
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code.”217 As such, it is a form of content analysis, which analyzes the 
contents of a report by a news source, and transforms them into codes.  For 
each event datum, the coded output usually includes the date of action,  
the source of action (the actor who initiated the action), the target of the 
action (the actor at which the action is directed), the type of action (verbal, 
material, conflict, cooperation, economic, military, diplomatic, etc.).218 
Event data research has a long history in several academic 
disciplines,219 and has been used quite extensively in international relations 
research.220 The approach first saw a rapid growth in the 1960s and 1970s, 
leading to formation of major event datasets by late 1970s. Event datasets 
that has been built so far can be grouped under two categories. Actor-oriented 
datasets focus on all interactions among a set of actors in a specific period of 
time. Episode-oriented datasets on the other hand focus on a specific historical 
incident, such as an international crisis or use of force, and collect event data 
about all actors involved in that incident.  
McCleland and his collegues built World Event/Interaction Survey 
(WEIS) in 1978. 221  Their coding scheme classifies events into 22 general 
                                                
217 Philip A. Schrodt “Event Data in Foreign Policy Analysis” available at 
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categories such as "Consult", "Reward", "Protest" and "Force", which are 
further specified into 63 specific categories. The general categories form a 
very general cooperation-conflict continuum. WEIS coding was the de facto 
standard used by the U.S. government-sponsored projects during the 1970s, 
and consequently a number of the data sets available in the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) archive use the WEIS 
scheme. 
The WEIS dataset originally covered eleven years (1966-77) and 
contained approximately 90,000 events. Their source text is The New York 
Times. The dataset is later extended to cover events after 1977, most recently 
by Rodney Tomlinson at the US Naval Academy.222 
The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) dataset, developed by 
Azar in 1980,223 comprises about 350,000 international events for the period 
1948-78. The event records include the actions of approximately 135 
countries, both toward one another and domestically. COPDAB uses several 
news sources, including some regional sources to cover events outside of 
North America and Europe.224 Unlike WEIS, COPDAB uses an ordinal 
coding scheme that goes from 1 to 15. While “1” signifies the most 
cooperative behaviour, “15” means the most conflictual behavior. Azar and 
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Sloan also developed a scale which assigns numerical value to each code on 
a cooperation-conflict intensity scale.225 COPDAB scheme also classifies an 
event into one of eight issue-types, for example symbolic political relations; 
cultural and scientific relations; human environment, demographic and 
ethnic affairs. The Global Event Dataset (GEDS) project augmented the 
original COPDAB data in 1990s, using machine-assisted coding methods.226  
The Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) 
dataset227  is designed for the study of foreign policy interactions and 
processes. CREON’s event coding scheme is similar to that of WEIS, but it 
also codes 167 variables dealing with the context of the event, such as 
indirect targets, the resources used in the action, time required for the action 
or who announced the action. CREON does not code all the interactions that 
happened in a period of time: instead the data were coded for randomly 
selected quarter-years of the 1959-1968 period for 36 nation-states. Therefore 
CREON is more conducive to study the linkages between the foreign policy 
decision-making environment and the related foreign-policy outputs, but it 
is less suitable for longitudinal comparative studies of foreign policy 
behaviours of different countries.  
Protocol for the Analysis of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) 
Project, which focused on measring the frequency and impact of non-violent 
                                                
225 Edward E. Azar and Thomas Sloan. Dimensions of Interaction. Pittsburgh: University 
Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1975.  
226  John L. Davies “The Global Event-Data System: Coder’s Manual”, Revised in August 
1998, available at  http://www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/~alexseev/RussiaInAsia/GEDSCodebook800_3.pdf 
227 Charles Hermann, Maurice A. East, Margaret G. Hermann, Barbara G. Salmore, and 
Stephen A. Salmore. CREON: A Foreign Events Data Set. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
1973; Charles Hermann, Maurice A. East and Stephen A. Salmore (eds.). Why Nations 
Act.  Beverly Hills:  Sage Publications, 1978. 
 
114 
behavior globally, began in late 1980s in Harvard University. The main 
purpose of the study was to determine the conditions under which 
contemporary nonviolent struggle had been successful in effecting social, 
political, or economic change. Accordingly, PANDA Project included sub-
state and non-state actors. Since it focused on domestic affairs, it has 
developed a more nuanced system for coding actors and events, which 
culminated in Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) coding system in 
1997.  PANDA also helped spawn VRA Reader, an automated parsing 
program, which automatically coded the relevant news reports. Currently, 
the developers of VRA Reader operate as a private firm, and their data is not 
accesible to public. 
Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) Project began in early 1990s and 
focused on regions that have experienced protracted conflicts. KEDS Project 
also developed its own automated parsing software. Initially, the project 
developed a dataset for 12 years times-series dataset for Arab-Israeli conflict 
using WEIS coding scheme. Later it produced regional data sets for about 
thirty countries, including those in Levant, Balkans, Central Asia and West 
Africa. KEDS Project later improved its parsing software into TABARI (Text 
Analysis by Augmenting Replacement Instructions), and developed its 
coding scheme, CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations). Like 
IDEA, CAMEO coding scheme differentiates between sub-state actors and 
but it also develops specific event categories for third-party intervention to 
conflicts. Currently, the project continues in Penn State University and their 
data and software is open to free public access.  
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The most current global event dataset comes from the Global Data on 
Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) project by Kalev Leetaru of Georgetown 
University, Philip Schrodt and John Beieler of Penn State University, and 
Patrick Brandt of the University of Texas at Dallas.228  
GDELT dataset comprises almost 250 million georeferenced events, 
which captures behavior of actors from all around the world in more than 
300 event categories and covers 1979 to present.229 Based on a variety of 
cross-section of all major international, national and local news sources in 
both English and local languages. Largest dataset uptodate, GDELT also 
introduces georeferencing and provides numerical latitude and longidute 
coordinates for each actor and event.  It also employs an "importance" 
indicator, which signifies the tone for each event, ranging from -100(very 
negative) to 100 (very positive). GDELT is designed to help support new 
theories and describe global affairs in multiple levels. 
While WEIS, COPDAB, CREON, PANDA and GDELT are the largest 
actor-oriented data sets, other smaller sets exist. For example, the South 
Africa Event Dataset230 is a collection that focuses on southern Africa for the 
period 1977-88 and covers behaviors of non-state actors such as guerrilla 
movements. Ashley also developed a dataset, which comprises of the 
interactions of the USA, USSR and PRC between 1950 and 1972. It contains  
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about 15,000 events, which are coded in accordance with a scale similar to 
COPDAB. 231   
The Correlates of War Project was founded in 1963 by J. David Singer, 
a political scientist at the University of Michigan. The project aims to collect 
data on various facets of war and conflict all over the world. The Behavioral 
Correlates of War dataset 232 codes a sample of over 600 major international 
crises over the period 1816-2007. BCOW utilizes a version of the WEIS 
scheme containing about 100 categories and differentiate between verbal, 
economic and military behavior.233 BCOW uses different sources of 
information, including newspapers, diplomatic histories, and 
chronologies234. 
Other crisis-oriented datasets include CASCON (The Computer-
Aided System for the Analysis of Local Conflicts),235 SHERFACS, 236 The 
World Handbook,237 PRINCE Project data set238, The International Political 
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Interactions Project,239 The International Crisis Behavior dataset, 240 and 
European Protest and Coercion dataset.241 Other datasets have been built to 
focus on a specific type of conflict, such as global terrorism (ITERATE – 
International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events and TKB – Terrorism 
Knowledge Base), and domestic or regional terrorism (e.g. TWEED – 
Terrorism in Western Europe242 and PCSTERROR – Project Civil Strife-
Terror)243.  
Early event data studies made use of human coding. In other words, 
hundreds of undergraduate students coded data from open sources by 
hand. Human coding was both time-consuming and expensive. This 
problem was alleviated in the 1990s when machine coding computer 
programs were developed. The earliest such software program was the 
Kansas Event Data System (KEDS).244 KEDS is later upgraded and led to 
creation of TABARI (Text Analysis by Augmenting Replacement 
Instructions) and VRA CODER (Virtual Research Associates). All of these 
programs provide relatively easy ways of extracting data from international  
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wire news sources by coding the lead sentences in press releases – or in the 
case of VRA, coding the first few sentences.245  
The main purpose of most academic event data research is to find 
statistical regularities. To this end, some event datasets may be specifically 
designed to operate under assumptions of a pre-chosen theory. Major event 
data collection efforts point to a strong linkage between theory, coding and 
data collection. The early WEIS and COPDAB schemes, for example, were 
built at a time where realism was predominant and accordingly, placed 
major emphasis on diplomatic and military behavior. In contrast, the 
Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) dataset is inspired 
by the theories developed in James Rosenau's “Inter-University 
Comparative Foreign Policy Project”.246 As such, both datasets provide good 
indicators of conflict behavior, yet they mostly omit behaviors related to 
contemporary international economic or environmental issues. Therefore, 
when researchers want to broaden and change the scope and focus of their 
study, they usually need to update the coding schemes of previous studies, 
as happened when the PANDA project extended WEIS coding scheme, 
which was not conducive to study  “non-violent direct action” in domestic 
contexts. 
In TFAED, I tried to escape “theoretical jails” to the extent possible, 
therefore in terms of actors and their behaviours, I employed an extended 
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set of ontological assumptions. Not only state actors, but also non-state 
actors are included in this study. In terms of behavior type, I found that 
latest version of CAMEO coding scheme to be sufficient for my purpose, 
although further research may demand to build a more encompassing 
scheme similar to IDEA.  
4.2. Event Data about Turkey 
When we look at event data studies in general, we observe that some 
event data concerning Turkey has been gathered. These data were usually 
part of region-specific studies, generally focusing on conflicts. For example, 
under the KEDS project, while gathering data about conflicts in the Balkans, 
data about Turkey’s Kurdish conflict were also coded, and as part of the 
same project, a dataset about Turkey was established,247 focusing on conflicts 
between domestic actors in Turkey.248 The event data studies at Harvard 
University, which focused on profiling conflict zones in the world, have also 
generated data about Turkey.249  Nevertheless, there is no event dataset 
specifically designed for understanding Turkey’s foreign relations, neither in 
Turkey nor abroad.  
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The first event dataset research in Turkey (although not about 
Turkey) is done by Aydinli and Tuzuner, who focused on US international 
intelligence cooperation behaviours and generated the United States 
International Intelligence Behavior dataset (USIIB). USIIB is the first 
collection of event data specifically intended for exploring international 
intelligence cooperation in quantifiable manner.250 Using open sources, they 
coded 293,615 events, covering the years 2000–2009. The primary activity 
occurring with respect to event data research in Turkey is actually an 
ongoing attempt by Biltekin, Aydinli and Tüzüner to generate a Turkey 
dataset, which would cover behaviours of all actors in Turkey and their 
relationships both with each other and with foreign actors. Turkey's foreign 
affairs dataset (TFAED) will comprise of years 1991-2013 and will use 
Agence France Presse and Turkey-based Anatolia News Agency (AA) 
reports.251 The event dataset created in this dissertation is a pilot study of 
TFAED and is developed by the current author. It covers years 1991-2012 
and uses Agence France Presse news reports only.  
4.3. Steps to Build Event Datasets 
In event data method, before building a dataset, the researcher should 
decide whether human-coding or machine-coding will be employed. For the 
purposes of this study, machine-coding is used, since it is less costly and  
                                                
250  Musa Tüzüner, The State-Level Determinants of the United States’ !nternational Intelligence 
Cooperation, (Ph.D. Thesis), Kent State University Political Science Department, 2009. 
Ersel Aydinli and Musa Tüzüner “Quantifying Intelligence Cooperation: The United 
States International Intelligence Behavior (USIIB) Dataset”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 
48, No: 5, (2011):673-682. 
251 Musa Tuzuner and Gonca Biltekin “A Pilot Study of Quantifying Turkey’s Foreign 
Affairs: Data Generation, Challenges and Preliminary Analysis” All-Azimuth Vol.2, no.2 
(2013):47-70. 
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time-consuming. TABARI (Version 8.4b1), developed and provided by 
Schrodt, is a free access program and it is used in this study.252     
A second task is to decide on the news source that will be used as the 
source of raw/textual data.  Previous event datasets were generated using 
New York Times (WEIS), Reuters (IDEA and KEDS)253, and Agence France 
Presse (AFP) (CAMEO)254.  In this project, AFP news reports are used. This 
choice emanates firstly from limitations of the TABARI. TABARI can only 
parse English-language text and necessitates a certain format as text input, 
which can only be generated using additional formatting programs prior to 
coding by TABARI. While these formatting programs are not complex, 
programming expertise is required to make them out of scratch. Currently,  
free access formatting programs are found for news text by AFP 
downloaded from LexisNexis database and news text by Reuters News 
Agency downloaded from Factiva. However, several attempts to download 
Reuters news text from Factiva database have failed, probably due to 
Factiva's recent decision to provide .html links to news text, instead of 
providing the actual news text. This decision rendered Reuters news text as 
unavailable for reformatting and thus, coding by TABARI. Secondly, trials 
with Reuters and AFP showed that AFP is concentrated more on political 
                                                
252  Latest version of TABARI had been downloaded from Penn State Event Data Project 
Web site http://eventdata.psu.edu in April 2012. By August 2014, the site moved to 
http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/index.html. 
253 Philip A. Schrodt, A., Shannon G. Davis and Judy L. Weddle “Political Science: KEDS—
A Program for the Machine Coding of Event Data” Social Science Computer Review 12, no. 
3, (1994): 561-588; Deborah J. Gerner and Philip A. Schrodt, “Validity Assessment of a 
Machine-Coded Event Data Set for the Middle East, 1982-1992.”American Journal of 
Political Science 38, (1994): 825-854. 
254 Deborah J. Gerner, Philip A. Schrodt, Ömür Yilmaz, and Rajaa Abu-Jabr. “Conflict and 
Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO): A new event data framework for the analysis 
of foreign policy interactions.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
International Studies Association, New Orleans, March 2002.  
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events, whereas Reuters mainly reports events that are relevant for business 
and economics. For example, in USIIB project, the authors compared 
number of reports on intelligence from Reuters and AFP between 01.01.2009 
and 12.31.2009 and showed that AFP provided more news reports than 
Reuters, irrespective of the search term that is used.255   
Additionally, using Anadolu Agency (AA) news reports has also been 
considered. Since AA is the official news agency of Turkey, and provides 
English-language reports, using it might have been efficient for extracting 
Turkey-related news. Nevertheless, there is no reformatting program for AA 
news report format. Moreover, although AA was established in 1920s, it 
only made its news reports available online for the period after 2008. Contact 
with AA authorities revealed that there is an ongoing attempt to open all AA 
archives to online databases.  
Consequently, for the purposes of this study, AFP news reports, 
downloaded from LexisNexis database are used as the news source.  The 
following is the usual format of AFP News reports: 
                                                
255 Aydınlı and Tüzüner, “USIIB”. 
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Figure 8 Unformatted AFP News Record 
In the following section, steps to build an event dataset are defined. 
These steps consist of developing actor lists and search terms to find 
relevant news reports, to download relevant news and transform them into 
machine-readible forms, and lastly coding in terms of actors, events and 
target actors according to pre-established standards.  
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Figure 9 Steps to Build Event Data with TABARI 
4.3.1. Developing actor lists 
The first step of the project has been to determine all the government 
and non-state actors in Turkey. For this phase, actors that are active between 
the years 1990 and 2010 were determined by looking at websites of 
government organizations, websites, newspapers, and official documents. 
The list, which amounted to over 200 actors, covered both government 
actors and non-governmental actors. Once this phase was done, key search 
terms were developed by scanning AFP news through the LexisNexis 
database. Key search terms were different from original actor lists, since the 
phrases used in news reports to denote each actor are usually different from 
their official titles. For example, in the AFP reports, for the Prime Minister of 
the Republic of Turkey, following phrases were used: Turkish PM, Turkey's 
PM, Turkey PM, Turkish Premier, The Turkish and Iraqi premiers, Turkey's 
Poet Premier, Turkey's Prime Minister, Turkish Prime Minister, etc. 
Moreover, there are some recurrent spelling mistakes such as Tukey's Prime  
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Minister, Turkish Prime Mininster, Turkey's Premiere, etc. The different 
phrases, including the mistaken ones, have been identified for each actor.   
4.3.2. Search Terms and Downloading AFP news 
To find the appropriate search terms, several inquiries have been 
made in LexisNexis Academic with different options available in Advanced 
Search. For example, search term “Turk!” searches for all words that begin 
with “Turk”. When news source is selected as “Agence France Presse,” 
section search is determined as “LEAD”, date is specified as “between 1 Dec, 
2012 to 31 Dec 2012,” the query brings 458 news reports. These include, 
however, news reports about city of Turku in Finland, Turkana herdsmen in 
Kenya, Saudi Arabian writer Ahmed Turki, former Slovenian President 
Danilo Turk, Turkmens in Iraq and Turkmenistan. While all these actors can 
be given their proper codes in the TABARI coding process, downloading 
irrelevant news reports should be avoided due to considerations about 
conserving time and memory space. Therefore, after several trials, the 
following search line has been found as the most efficient “Turkey OR 
Turkish OR Turk OR Istanbul OR Ankara OR !zmir.”   
At this step, at the LexisNexis Academic database, I chose Advance 
Search and select Agence France Presse as news source, section search is not 
determined to allow every report about the search terms to be included, and 
search line “Turkey OR Turkish OR Turk OR Istanbul OR Ankara OR !zmir” 
is entered.  LexisNexis do not show full results for queries that bring more 
than 3000 news reports. To restrict the results to under 3000 for each query, 
date specifications were entered consisting of 3 to 6 month periods from 1 
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Jan 1990 to 31 Dec 2012.  LexisNexis allows for 500 news reports at most in a 
single document for download. For each period, the news reports found 
through search terms are downloaded as simple text documents, each 
containing approximately 500 news reports.  In addition, the following 
options have been selected for downloading; Format: text; Document View: 
Full document.  
4.3.3. Reformatting News Reports  
All documents are saved in a single folder. For reformatting them, the 
following three programs are also put in the same folder: nexisreverse.pl, 
NewNexisFormat.pl and LNAFP.seqsort.pl. Like TABARI, these addtitional 
programs were downloaded from Penn State Event Data Project Website.  In 
the Terminal (for Mac) or Command Prompt (for Windows), I moved to that 
folder. Since the Nexis downloads have a file name of the form 
“Agence_France_Presse_-_English2012-09-14_16-31.TXT” the command “ls 
Agence_Fr* > format.files” is entered to generate a list of all documents 
beginning with “Agence_Fr”. Then the command “perl NewNexisFormat.pl 
TFP” is entered to chop each downloaded document into separate 
paragraphs.  
 
Figure 10 AFP News Report Separated into Paragraphs 
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The formatting program chops news stories into separate paragraphs, 
excludes paragraphs that begin by quotation marks and give them a tag line:  
 
Figure 11 AFP Record Tag Line 
At this phase, program runs with the dates and headlines of the 
various stories scrolling past as they are processed. Sometimes, if there is a 
format problem in the original downloaded documents, the program stops 
working. The program assumes that the story begins two lines following a 
line containing “DATELINE:...” This is present in most but not all 
downloads. With an extensive search, I determined that various news stories 
in late 90s do not have it, so manually entered “DATELINE:...” to the proper 
place in the downloaded news reports. Additionally, although they included 
a “DATELINE:” the reformatting program did not filter several news reports 
about Turkey from July 1996 to January 1997.  I found out that the program 
also assumes that the very first line in each news report is “Agence France 
Presse -- English”.  In the aforementioned period, AFP decided to change 
this heading into "Agence France Presse” only. So heading of each news item 
has been manually changed into “Agence France Presse –English.”  By this 
change, 2088 news leads, which had previously been skipped, were added.  
Moreover, no AFP news articles about Turkey can be found in 
LexisNexis before April 1991 and there were no AFP news reports about any 
country in February 1992, March 1992, August 1992 and October 1995. Since 
they were missing in the original news source nothing can be done to restore 
them.   
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After chopping with NewNexisFormat.pl, a filelist of the newly 
generated files is made with “ls TFP* > filelist” command. The command 
“perl nexisreverse.pl” is entered to get only the first paragraph of the story, 
i.e. The “number of paragraph” in the story's tagline should be “-01”. The 
resulting TABARI input sentences are united in a single file called 
“reverse.output”. At this point, the separate paragraphs (records) are 
usually not ordered chronologically so the command “perl 
LNAFP.seqsort.pl reverse.output” is entered to sort the records if they are 
out of order. Sorted output is in “seqsort.reverse.output”. However, the last 
program still puts records of 2000s at the beginning of the document, 
followed by 90s. After the formatting, the news reports are reduced to the 
following form. 
 
Figure 12 AFP New Leads After Formatting 
Overall 91,542 news reports between April 1991 and 09 December 
2012, are reshaped into above format. Almost half of these reshaped records 
do not contain actors from Turkey because the parts that mentioned Turkey 
in some news reports had been in the later paragraphs, which were cut out 
in the filtering process. Since only the first paragraph of each story is taken 
to construct the TABARI input file, those records lack actors from Turkey.  
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4.3.4. Event Data Coding Categories 
TABARI, while coding relations between actors, used 22 Coding 
categories, developed by the WEIS project.  WEIS coding categories are 
reorganized by TABARI’s creator in  CAMEO project.256  With new upgrade, 
the number of main coding categories were reduced to 20, whereas overall 
number of event codes, including sub-categories, were 293.  As such, with 
CAMEO, some event categories, which are difficult to differentiate by the 
machine, are reduced, while number of subcategories is increased. For 
example, under ‘cooperation’ category there was ‘engage in diplomatic 
cooperation’ in WEIS coding scheme.  With CAMEO, it is possible to 
differentiate the type of event one step further, since there are subcategories 
like ‘grant diplomatic recognition’, ‘apologize’, and ‘sign formal agreement’ 
all of which are some sort of diplomatic cooperation. On the other hand, 
WEIS coding scheme had both “WARN” and “THREATEN” as high order 
categories, which are hard to distinguish in an individual sentence. With 
CAMEO, “WARN” category is eliminated.  
4.3.5. Updating CAMEO project Dictionaries 
TABARI recognizes the sentence structures in the lead sentences of 
the report in the subject-verb-object form. For TABARI to do this, it requires 
dictionaries for subjects, verbs, objects as well as adjectives.  With files that 
contain those dictionaries, TABARI distinguishes each element of the 
sentences as actors, events, and targets and codes them accordingly.  
                                                
256 Gerner et al. “Conflict and Mediation Event Observations”; Schrodt, “Twenty Years of 
the Kansas Event Data System Project.” 
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Since CAMEO dictionaries were originally generated for scanning all 
global actors, its actor dictionary contains terms for Turkey’s actors. But 
these terms are limited in number and differentiation for the purposes of this 
study. Therefore, additions to these dictionaries are required for TABARI to 
recognize all actors from Turkey.  Following is a table for comparison of 
previously generated datasets and TFAED:  
Table 6 Comparison of Event Data Sets 
 
For actor dictionaries, extensions are made by adding command lines 
for additional phrases to be coded as TUR***. Most of the phrases that begin 
with “Turkey's...” and “Turkish...” have been coded according to their roles, 
rather than simply coding them as “TUR.” This allowed us to differentiate 
between actors. For example, the phrase “A boy of Turkish origin” would 
previously be coded as “TUR,”- a code which is also given to “Turkey's 
artists” or “Turkish officials.” With expansion of actor dictionary, it is 
possible to give “A boy of Turkish origin” the code “TRK” (ethnically 
Turkish) whereas “Turkey's artists” are coded as “TURCUL” (Cultural 
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actors from Turkey) and “Turkish officials” as “TURGOV” (government of 
Turkey).  Different codes were also established for government agencies, 
ministries, associations and foundations, armed rebel groups, opposition 
parties, civilians, ethnic and religious groups, Turkish cities and different 
branches of the military.   
Because this study focuses on actors from Turkey or people of 
Turkish origin in other countries (both as targets and sources), we used 
specific and new codes for all actors from Turkey. For all other individuals, 
countries, and organizations, we retained the original CAMEO codes. For 
transnational actors affiliated with Turkey, however, we used a different 
scheme. All individuals, businesses, vessels with Turkish nationality, 
multinational corporations whose headquarters are in Turkey, non-
governmental transnational movements or organizations that originated in 
Turkey, Turkish branches of non-governmental organizations, members of 
ethnic or religious groups who are Turkish nationals, and refugees from 
other countries who have settled in Turkey are all coded as actors from 
Turkey, hence their respective codes begin with “TUR”. Their codes 
differentiate at the second tier; rather than assigning “NGO” to all non-
governmental actors, these organizations are further differentiated by their 
type: ASS if an association, FOU if a foundation, AID if a relief agency, RES 
if a think tank or research group, MED if private media, CVL if a non-
affiliated individual, etc. We also coded each Turkish city separately.  
For governmental actors, we differentiated between president, prime 
minister, and individual ministries, as well as between state-owned 
enterprises and media. Political parties in office or that take part in the 
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government are coded using their Turkish initials as the last three letters, for 
example, “TURGOVAKP” (Justice and Development Party) and 
“TURGOVDSP (Democratic Left Party).” Opposition parties are coded as 
“TUROPPMHP” (Nationalist Movement Party), “TUROPPDYP” (True Path 
Party), etc. “TURGOV” is only retained for general phrases, such as 
“Turkish officials” or “Turkish authorities,” which are created automatically 
from the agents’ dictionary.  
PHRASE TFAED CODE CAMEO CODE 
TURKISH_RED_CRESCENT [TURAID] [NGOTUR] 
TURKISH_GOVERNMENT [TURGOVDSP/TURGOVANP/TURGOVMHP 
980529-021101] [TURGOVAKP > 021102] 
 [TURGOV] 
Table 7 Comparison of Codes 
We expanded the verb dictionaries to include over 2000 new patterns 
and updated the verb codes to comply with the newest CAMEO Codebook 
standard.257 We also generated an agents file, which is composed of generic 
nouns like “police,” “student,” “woman,” etc., with each noun 
corresponding to a code. When TABARI finds an “agent” adjacent to an 
actor in a news report it combines both codes to specify it. For example, 
suppose there are codes for “Turkish” (TUR) and “Danish” (DNK) in the 
actor dictionary and for “police” (COP) in the agent dictionary. If the news 
report contains the phrase “Danish police and Turkish police will 
cooperate...” then TABARI codes the actors as DNKCOP and TURCOP 
respectively, even though the actor dictionary does not contain “Danish 
police” and “Turkish police.” For this purpose, we scanned the noun codes 
                                                
257 See Cameocodes Wiki Space, 2009, http://cameocodes.wikispaces.com. 
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from previous actor dictionaries and moved the relevant nouns into a 
separate document.  
4.3.6. Machine Coding of Lead Sentences 
After the necessary additions, thousands of reformatted news reports 
become ready for machine coding. For each input, TABARI generates 
corresponding event data. In some cases, the input does not contain all the 
items of the regular event data form: “who did, what, to whom, and when.” 
In such cases, no event data is generated from that record. In others 
however, a single record, like a multilateral meeting, contains more than one 
event data, since all the actors are interacting with each other. So, several 
event data can be generated from a single record.  
 
Figure 13 TABARI Input 
 
Figure 14 TABARI Output 
After machine coding, manual changes are made for “raw reports” 
which TABARI fails to read. These errors usually occur because either there 
are too many verbs (since TABARI only distingushes seven verbs at most in 
a single sentence) or dictionaries do not contain the relevant terms (for 
actors, verbs, etc.) With required manual additions, all reports are converted 
into event data.  
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4.3.7. Processing and Aggregating Event Data 
To process the resulting event data, we used an open-access R 
program, specifically, the Events package created by Will Lowe in January 
2012.258 This package allows the researcher to aggregate event data in terms 
of date, source or target type, and event type. It also enables the researcher 
to create scales by assigning numerical values to each event type or to use 
pre-established scales like CAMEO’s or WEIS’s Goldstein scale.  
Additionally, the package filters the data to exclude repeated reportings of 
the same event. If in the same day, the same interaction of the same two 
actors is reported more than once, only one of those reports is retained. 
There are various options to aggregate event data in terms of actor 
type, and the selection depends on one’s empirical object of study. For 
bilateral interstate relations, for example, data about a country’s relations 
with other countries in a particular region or continent are available. For  
intrastate relations, data about interactions among a country’s domestic 
actors are available. The data can be aggregated in terms of the actor’s 
initiative, that is, either who initiated the action (source) or who the action is 
directed at (target). Therefore, for any form of bilateral relationship, there 
are at least two groups of data: from Actor A to Actor B, and from Actor B to 
Actor A.  
 
 
                                                
258 Will Lowe Events: Store and manipulate Event Data. (R package, Version 
  0.5, 2012) http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=events 
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Data can also be aggregated in terms of time and event type.259 For the 
former, weekly, monthly, quarterly, and yearly aggregations can be made, 
and for the latter, there are basically two strategies. The first is to assign a 
number value to each event type, making a scale. The second is to 
differentiate between cooperative and conflictual events and between verbal 
and material actions. Then, for each dyad and time frame, the events that 
correspond to the resulting combinations (namely, “Verbal Conflict,” 
“Material Conflict,” “Verbal Cooperation,” and “Material Cooperation”) are 
counted. Other aggregation possibilities also exist, such as grouping event 
types in terms of content (namely, political, economic, or military).  
After the data are aggregated, various visualization options can be 
considered to display it. Time-series graphs are the most common form of 
display. In this study, time-series graphs, and correlation tables are used, 
utlizing visualizing options in Microsoft Excel. In a recent project, a dataset 
was created that also included actors’ geographical locations, making it 
possible to display the data in map form.260  
4.4. Validity and Reliability of Dataset    
The validity and reliability of event data, generated from open news 
sources for analyzing actors behavior is an important concern. Several 
                                                
259 James E. Yonamine, “Working with Event Data: A Guide to Aggregation Choices,” 
(unpublished paper), accessed 25 April, 2013, http://jayyonamine.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Working-with-Event-Data-A-Guide-to-Aggregation-
Choices.pdf . 
 
260 Kalev Leetaru and Philip A. Schrodt, “GDELT: Global Data on Events, Location and 
Tone 1979-2012” (paper presented at the International Studies Association meetings, San 
Francisco, April 2013).  
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studies has questioned the reliability and validity of datasets from 
newspapers, arguing that ‘”selection bias”(the subjective judgments of 
editors and reporters while deciding which events will be reported) and 
“description bias” (Representation of news in a manner that will invoke 
strong audience interest) may impede the study.261  
On the other hand, some of the past studies established validity of 
event data by designing tests. For example, Howell and Barnes (1993) and 
Schrodt and Gerner (1994) coded the US and Middle Eastern actors political 
cooperative behaviour through KEDS. In these studies, they illustrated the 
exhaustiveness of news from global resources in documenting their foreign 
policy cooperation and conflict by providing evidence.  A similar test has 
not been done for this study, yet it can be argued that news reports are a 
justified source for similar analyses.  
There are two basic concerns for reliability of the Turkey’s dataset.  
First one is about the reliability of machine coding system in general. Second 
one is about the reliability of coding categories. The studies established that 
there are no substantial differences in terms of reliability between machine 
coding and human coding of event data.262 Indeed, it may be argued that 
machine coding is more reliable because it is immune to exhaustion, political 
and cultural biases experienced by human coders. Moreover, it is consistent 
                                                
261 (Earl et al, 2004; McCarthy et al. 1996; Ortiz et al, 2005; Wilkes & Ricard, 2007). 
262  Hillard et al, "Computer-assisted topic classification for mixed-methods social science 
research," Journal of Information Technology & Politics 4, no.4 (2008): 31-46. Gary King and 
and Will Lowe, “An Automated Information Extraction Tool For International Conflict 
Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design,” 
International Organization 57, no.3 (2003): 617-642, 2003; Gerner and Schrodt, “Validity 
Assessment.”   
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about following the rules of coding across time and different contexts and it 
rules out differences that can emanate from different coders.  
4.5. Conclusion 
By building Turkey’s event dataset, this study seeks to shed light on 
several empirical questions about the subject matter, e.g. Whether and how 
is Turkey is more active in its foreign relations? Has Turkey has changed its 
foreign policy orientation?  Whether and how is Turkey more proactive? 
What is the role of non-state actors in foreign affairs? Does ideology 
(Islamism, Ottomanism, etc.) have an impact on Turkish foreign policy 
making? Providing answers to these empirical questions in a consistent 
manner, however, requires clarification of terms used (what is activism, 
proactivism, etc.) and present extant prevalent and rival positions on these 
matters. The following chapter provides a general overview to recent 
scholarship on Turkish foreign affairs pertaining to the arguments about 
recent developments in Turkey’s foreign affairs.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
DEFINING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
This chapter provides a broad overview to recent scholarship on 
Turkish foreign affairs pertaining to the arguments about Turkey’s axis shift 
in foreign affairs. Before any analysis, however, one should clarify why the 
primary focus of the chapter is the debate about axis shift in the first place.  
Firstly, the debate is highly controversial, which interests almost 
everybody who studies Turkish foreign affairs. Such high level of interest is 
particularly conducive to theory development. Secondly, the debate cuts 
across several disagreements, which is a productive ground for raising 
various theoretical questions.  Finally, it is rather a new phenomenon, with 
strong policy implications. Therefore, the debate is not only theoretically but 
also practically relevant. 
The chapter begins by a review of general arguments about the 
existence and nature of the axis shift. Three distinct views are presented. 
These views, however are not coherent within themselves since each 
observer may define various properties of the axis shift, even if they agree
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on whether there is an axis shift or not. Accordingly, the remainder of the 
chapter is allocated to such disagrrements. The second part deals with 
arguments about the reasons for an axis shift. The third part of this chapter 
is allocated to the discussion about Turkey’s supposed geographical 
orientation. The fourth part is concerned with the disaggrements over timing 
of the axis shift. In the fifth part, the question of activism and proactivism in 
Turkey’s bilateral relations are addressed. Finally, discussion of the role of 
sub-state actors in Turkish foreign affairs is addressed. The chapter 
concludes by pointing out the incongruences in Turkish foreign affairs 
literature about the basic features of Turkish foreign affairs and its 
implications for theory building as well as theory testing.  
5.1. What is the “Axis Shift”?  Three perspectives 
After the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s relations with its 
neighbourhood have been strained, especially with Armenia in 1992, Greece 
in 1996, and Syria in 1998. The conflicts occasionally took a military nature, 
as in the military operations in Northern Iraq in the pursuit of PKK, 
“dogfights” between Greek and Turkish air forces over the Aegean, and 
Turkish military build up on Turkish-Syrian border. Relations with Russia 
and Iran were also challenging due to a range of issues from Kurdish conflict 
to political Islam. Turkey’s relations with European countries were also 
problematic due to differences over Cyprus, human rights, democratization 
and civil-miltary relations. Relations with Israel and the USA were not 
devoid of problems, yet Turkey was adamant in pursuing closer cooperation 
with them. Turkey’s image in the wider Middle East was also not very 
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positive, as exemplified in strong criticisms against Turkey in 1997 Summit 
of Organization of Islamic Conference.263 In other regions, like sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America, Turkey had very limited, if any, interest. 
For many observers, the picture in 2000s was in sharp contrast to the 
above one.264 Beginning in 1999, Turkey’s relations with Greece and Syria 
gradually improved. In 2004 the Turkish government diverted from its 
status quo oriented policy on Cyprus and supported island’s unification in 
the context of Annan Plan. After years of distance, it established official 
relations with the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. From 
2009 onwards, more than twenty new Turkish embassies have been opened 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.265 Following a successful campaign at garnering 
majority of votes from sub-Saharan African countries, Turkey has been 
elected as non-permanent member at the UN Security Council first time after 
48 years.266 It has also taken the very first steps to renormalize relations with 
Armenia and ended visa requirements with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon 
reciprocally. On a broader plane, Turkey has taken an active interest in 
formerly neglected relations with states such as Costa Rica, Eritrea and 
Mongolia. Relations with Latin American states have also gained pace, and 
                                                
263 Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading 
State,” New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40 (2009): 31.  
264 Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy”. Juilette Tolay and Ronald H. 
Linden, “Understanding Turkey’s Relations with Its Neighbours,” in Turkey and Its 
Neighbours: Foreign Relations in Transition, Linden et al. (eds), Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2012, 2. Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey:Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building 
Sandcastles?”Middle East Policy 17, No.1, (2010):115-136; Bülent Aras, Turkey and the 
Greater Middle East, !stanbul:TASAM Yayınları, 2005; Çağaptay, " The misnomer of ‘Neo-
ottomanism’”; Öniş and Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Eurasianism”; Oğuzlu, 
“Middle Easternization of Turkish Foreign Policy”, !lker Aytürk, “The Coming of an Ice 
Age? Turkish-Israeli Relations since 2002”, Turkish Studies 12, no. 4, (2011): 675-687. 
265 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-
iliskileri.tr.mfa 
266 Kılıç Buğra Kanat, “AK Party’s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away from the West?” 
Insight Turkey 12, No.1(2010): 205-225, p.214.  
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the opening of two new diplomatic missions is currently being considered. 
Bilateral trade and investment surged with Russia and Iran, culminating in 
improved relations with both.  
Turkey’s relations with the world increased in volume, but it also 
embodied a change of mindset and vision. Concept of “rhythmic 
diplomacy,” which refers to the willingness of Turkish government to 
augment Turkey’s involvement with the world, prioritized the sheer volume 
of interactions. Concept of “zero-problem neighbourhood” was used to 
define Turkey’s willingness to be more cooperative with its immediate 
region. Accordingly, in most cases, Turkey’s engagement was cooperative, it 
emphasized common interests, shared values and involved instruments like 
bilateral visits or treaties, multilateral platforms, negotiation, and mediation. 
With respect to Russia, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu stated that the 
government considers no barriers or limits to bilateral cooperation267 and 
looking towards the Arab world, Prime Minister Erdoğan has proclaimed 
that intensifying cooperation with Saudi Arabia is as important as EU 
membership.268 In other cases though, Turkey did not refrain from 
confrontation: denounciations, refusals, threats, reducing level of diplomatic 
and economic relations have also been used. Erdoğan openly and 
deliberately confronted Israel about its treatment of Gaza. Turkey also 
defied its Western allies with its position on Iran’s nuclear program by 
rejecting any policy options that include embargo or military intervention.  
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In the Turkish foreign policy literature, this admixture of cooperative 
and conflictual interactions led to a puzzle. Scholars, who try to discern 
patterns in Turkey’s positions and behaviours, have been divided over 
whether Turkey’s cooperative and conflictual interactions are confined to 
specific regions of the world. It is possible to identify three positions out of 
such arguments: The first proposition is that there is an axis shift, in the 
sense that relations with Western allies have deteriorated whereas relations 
with others (Muslim World, the Middle East except Israel, neighbours) have 
become more cooperative. The second proposition is that Turkey’s relations 
with the West did not change significantly; what appears to be axis shift is 
just Turkey’s increasing level of activity, not just with the Middle East, but 
with other non-Western parts of the world. Third proposition is that Turkey 
relations with both the West and the non-West have expanded in a mutually 
reinforcing manner.   
The first group of scholars argued that Turkey’s behavior show a 
specific delineation: bilateral dynamics between Turkey and the EU and/or 
the US has taken a downturn, whereas Turkey intensified its relations with 
the “non-West.” Some of the observers argue that such reorientation was 
mainly caused by the frustration and disappointment that Turkey faced with 
respect to its Western allies.269 The stagnation of the EU membership process, 
the suggestions for a specialized status instead of full membership, coupled 
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with the differences of opinion among member states about defense, 
enlargement and a common constitution, paved the way for alienation from 
the EU by both the Turkish public and elite. Similarly, the disagreements 
over Northern Iraq, the Middle East, and Iran’s nuclear program served to 
further estrange Turkey and the US. These disturbances with respect to 
Turkey’s long-term and historically valued relations with the West may help 
explain the reasons for Turkey’s tendency to strengthen its relations with 
non-Western societies.270 Some of the observers, however, think there is more 
to reorientation than so-called disappontment with the West: they think that 
there is an ideological reason for Turkey’s reorientation. Whether it is an 
“Islamist backbone,” 271 or more specific ideology based on worldviews of 
the AKP leaders,272 these scholars think Turkey’s reorientation shows a 
definite preference for one group of states over others. Therefore, for all 
proponents of the first view, there is actually an “axis shift” in the sense that 
Turkey has less cooperative relations with the Western countries and more 
cooperative relations with the states in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. 
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The second group of scholars however, argued that there is not a 
direct relationship between Turkey’s seeming departure from the West and 
its concurrent attraction towards “the Rest”. For example, Oğuzlu argues 
that responding and preventing security threats from the Middle East, is one 
of the most important reasons for Turkey’s active interest in the region.273 
Particularly, growing concern over Kurdish separatism brought Ankara 
closer to the governments of Iran and Syria. 274  Similarly, Larabee argues 
that “Turkey's new activism is a response to structural changes in its security 
environment since the end of the Cold War.”275 Realization of the current 
system as a multipolar one, rather than a unipolar one, eased the hands of 
the Turkish political elite and encouraged them to take bolder steps. 276 Kalın 
also points to a geopolitical mindset underlined by a realpolitik attitude, 
which triggers the new TFP activism.277 He argues that while Turkey’s 
former reluctance towards Middle Eastern affairs was due to ideological 
preferences, currently, “geo-political considerations are inviting it back to 
the backyard of the Ottoman Empire.”278 He argues that amidst accelerating 
globalization, Turkey’s foreign policy has acquired a decentralized, 
multidirectional and, most importantly, interest-based nature. The 
dynamism of eastern economies in general, and the developments in the 
Middle East, together with pessimism over the economy and demography in 
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Europe, might have led Turkish leaders to beileve that chances in becoming 
a more powerful actor lay in Turkey’s relations with the non-West.279  
This view, therefore, implies that there is not a trade-off between 
Turkey’s relations between the West and “the Rest.” Self-confidence and 
autonomy on the part of Turkish foreign policy makers might have led to 
deviations “from transatlantic political agenda”280 as Turkey determines its 
priorities independently from its Western allies.281 Nevetheless, there is not a 
pattern which is identified as having more conflictual relations with one 
group and more cooperative relations with the others. Basically, Turkish 
government embraced realpolitik.282 Each foreign policy decision is made and 
implemented with certain priorities and interests in mind, which may or 
may not involve steering relations with other regions. In other words, 
Turkish government does what needs to be done, based on individual 
circumstances and environment surrounding a foreign policy issue.  In some 
cases, such circumstances necessitate a friction with certain Western actors, 
such as Turkey’s refusal to allow US troops on its soil in 2003; in other cases 
they lead to cooperation, such as EU-Turkish energy security cooperation in 
the Caspian region.283   
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This alternative view also implies that Turkey is in the process of 
establishing itself as a major regional, even maybe “global power”284: the 
Middle East or Arabs are just part of the equation. For example, Öniş states 
that the claims about Turkish foreign policy’s Middle Easternization are 
exaggerated since “there has been a very strong impetus throughout this 
period to develop bilateral relations with, in particular, the Russian 
Federation, as well as other key countries in the Caucasus, as well as 
opening up to the African continent and Latin America.”285 Kınıklıoğlu also 
argues “there is no difference for Turkey between the Balkans, the Black Sea, 
the Caucasus or the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. They are all 
equally significant for Turkey as they all represent different vectors or 
dimensions of its multidimensional foreign policy.”286 In a conference, 
Davutoğlu also said “There is no diplomacy axis, but a diplomacy plane, 
and that plane is the whole world,”287 referring to government’s interest in 
establishing contact with every part of the world. Gul also reiterated 
Turkey’s global outlook: “Turkey, surely, is moving in every direction, 
towards East and West, North and South.”288   
 The third view is an amalgam of the previous two views: Like the 
first view, it perceives Turkey’s relations with the West and its relations with 
“the Rest” as interrelated, but like the second view, it proposes that they are 
not antagonistic. Indeed, they complement and boost each other. Similar to 
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earlier accounts of Turkish foreign policy, which often apply metaphors 
such as “barrier”, “bridge”, or “model,” this view does not propose a trade-
off between Turkey’s Western alliance and its engagement with others, they 
are seen as mutually reinforcing.  
This seems to be mindset of a group of Turkish foreign policy makers, 
who regard an admixture of conflict and cooperation in various parts of the 
world as not only normal, but even European.289  Despite the claims that a 
more Middle East oriented policy contradicts Turkey’s Western orientation; 
the government’s primary goal is furthering relations with the West, because 
“a proactive and visionary approach towards the Middle East … is the only 
way for Turkey to increase its credibility in the eyes of both the West and the 
Islamic world. The goal now is to demonstrate Turkey’s relevance to the 
West by helping contribute to Western efforts to deal with the security 
threats emanating from the Middle East.”290  
Such a mindset is probably best exemplified in bow and arrow 
analogy of Turkish foreign policy.291 The more Turkey expands its Eastern 
outreach, the more leverage and impact it will have over the West. 
Therefore, Turkey’s engagement with both East and West are, as Foreign 
Minister Davutoğlu put it, “complementary not in competition.”292  
In 1990s, Turkey’s relations with Central Asia, the Caucasus and 
Caspian Sea, or the Middle East was seen as complementary to Turkey’s 
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Western orientation. 293 In the 2000s, a similar view is put forward: Turkey 
was a “bridge,”  “a model” or “spearhead” of Western liberal ideas and 
practices, in other part of the world.294 It has been argued that “Turkey is a 
natural key to any plan or concept that aims to promote democracy and raise 
living standards, thanks to having both European and Middle Eastern 
identities, political and social modernization, and rising democratic 
standards.” 295	 As such, Turkey is seen as an “unequivocal asset for the EU’s 
external policies.”296  
While “Turkey as a model” did not lose its appeal for some observes, 
others criticized such a perspective for portraying Turkey as an instrument 
of others’ foreign policy, rather than as an autonomous actor.297 Even when 
Turkey’s agency is highlighted as in the bow-arrow analogy, it still perceives 
the non-West as secondary and relations with them as instrumental to 
European connection, which is the ultimate goal.298  
Yet, it is possible that the reverse is also true: Turkey’s relations with 
West might have a positive impact on Turkey’s relations with the rest of the 
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world. For example, Turkey’s democratization and Europeanization 
processes ”have had commercial and diplomatic effects into its relations 
with its Central Asian neighbors.”299 A public opinion survey by TESEV in 
Arab countries also showed that majority (39%) of the respondents support 
Turkey’s EU accession process.300 When asked, why they think Turkey could 
be a model for the region, Turkey’s economic capacity, democracy ad 
secularism are the first three reasons. Accordingly, many believe that “the 
success in the greater re-engagement with the East depends to a large extent 
on the firmness of Turkey’s European vocation.”301 Altunisik also stipulates 
that decision to start EU accession negotiations in December 2004, have had 
a positive impact in Arab public opinion on Turkey.302  
For some observers, the positive effect of Turkey’s Western 
connection to its relations with “the Rest” is not necessarily welcome: 
Turkey is still playing the role it has been given by the West: “Frenzied 
activity abroad points not to active or new foreign policy, but to loss of 
priorities.” One scholar argues that even the most-celebrated foreign policy 
principle of the AKP government, the “zero-problem with neighbours” 
principle, is a new term for old foreign policy actions. She states that talking 
with neighbours “with whom the US officially does not talk or with those 
over which Washington no longer has leverage” has been something Turkey 
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used to do under previous governments. Hence, Turkish foreign policy is 
neither new, nor more independent, only “the parameters of Turkish foreign 
policy have been broadened in tandem with American strategic interests.”303 
Therefore, three distinct approaches to Turkey’s foreign policy 
orientation can be summarized as follows: 1) Turkey’s relations with the 
non-West and Turkey’s relations with the West are negatively correlated, 2) 
that they are not correlated at all, or 3) that they are positively correlated. Of 
course, this categorization is an abstraction and simplification of more 
sophisticated positions. Disagreements over several other parameters of new 
foreign policy cut across positions: reasons for supposed axis shift, 
definitions of “the West” and ”the Rest,” the timing of the supposed axis 
shift, how to define activism and proactivism in Turkey’s foreign affairs, as 
well as nature and volume of involvement by sub-state actors in foreign 
affairs. The following parts deal with these issues, so as to provide a 
guideline for further empirical comparisons of the positions.  
5.2. Why is the “Axis Shift”? 
One of the major disagreements over Turkey’s new foreign policy is 
the reasons behind the supposed “axis shift.” Those who think Turkey’s 
deteriorating relations with “the West” improving relations with “the West” 
are not particularly interrelated, state that some systemic factors generated 
the impulse behind any seemingly new directions. They argue that the 
realization of the current system as a multipolar one, rather than a unipolar 
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one, eased the hands of the Turkish political elite and encouraged them to 
take bolder steps in foreign affairs. The dynamism of eastern economies in 
general, and the developments in the Middle East, together with pessimism 
over the economy and demography in Europe, showed that Turkey’s 
chances in becoming a more powerful actor lay in its relations with the 
East.304 In particular, developments such as replacement of the G-8 with the 
G-20 shows “the key organizational nexus in debates concerning the future 
of global finance and global economic governance” has become more non-
Western,305 and Turkey is simply responding to such global developments. 
Other scholars, who think the reasons for change are international 
rather than global, look at the bilateral dynamics between Turkey and the 
EU/US. They argue that while systemic changes in general can account for 
new activism, the “shift” is mainly caused by the frustration and 
disappointment that Turkey faced with respect to its Western allies.306 The 
stagnation of the EU membership process, the suggestions for a specialized 
status instead of full membership, coupled with the differences of opinion 
among member states about defense, enlargement and a common 
constitution, paved the way for alienation from the EU by both the Turkish 
public and elite. Similarly, the disagreements over Northern Iraq, the Middle 
East, and Iran’s nuclear program –which are given precedence over Western 
alliance because of their immediate effect on Turkey’s security—served to 
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further estrange Turkey and the US. These disturbances with respect to 
Turkey’s long-term and historically valued relations with the West may help 
explain the reasons for Turkey’s tendency to strengthen its relations with 
non-Western societies.307  
There is a third group of scholars who claim that there are some sub-
state actors in Turkey, whose dynamic interaction with each other have 
repercussions for Turkey’s foreign affairs. The AKP’s identity as a 
“conservative democratic” party along with its basic economic and 
ideological values, were important factors in bringing society’s various 
demands to the foreign policy arena. Since the AKP’s main electorate 
consists of a culturally conservative, trade-oriented group of local Anatolian 
capital holders, it is likely that the AKP give their demands a due 
consideration in shaping foreign policy. The emphasis on Turkey’s relations 
with its immediate neighbours, and policies like border trade and lifting of 
visas with most of those neighbours, may point to such domestic demands 
in particular, and an economic mindset in general.  
The interrelationships between not only the government, NGOs, or 
Anatolian-based conservative economic actors, but also Islamic groups308 
and Turkish military,309 ethnic and religious minorities in310 and outside 
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Turkey311 as well as Turkish rebel groups312 had important effects on 
Turkey’s foreign policy. Especially the dramatic change in civil-military 
relations under the AKP and the resulting balance, led to a reconsideration 
with respect to definitions of national security. A new security 
conceptualization that is less military-based and more focused on economy 
and diplomacy have begun to shape Turkish foreign policy. With the help of 
the institutional and normative adjustments that Turkey has gone through 
during its EU membership process, the civilian elite has gained a more 
assertive voice with respect to matters concerning security and foreign 
policy. Coupled with a growing civil society, whose resource and influence 
generating mechanisms have strengthened during the process, Turkey’s 
foreign policy making has been shaped more in line with a broader 
definition of national interests. The capture of Öcalan, decreasing PKK 
violence, and the launching of the Kurdish-Turkish peace process might 
have helped Turkey’s relations with its neighbours.  The change in the law 
on non-Muslim minority foundations’ property rights, as well as 
government’s Alevi Opening are domestic processes with links to Turkey’s 
EU accession and neighbourhood policies. 
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Therefore, global, international and domestic factors are variously 
given as reasons for why Turkey has experienced an “axis shift” in its 
foreign affairs. 
5.3. Definitions of the “West” and the “Rest” 
Before making any arguments about the “axis shift,” each observer 
has to make a working definition of both of the ends: Shift from where to 
where? In the Turkish foreign policy literature, “the West” -the “previous” 
target of Turkish foreign policy- usually includes the US, the EU and Israel.  
Such a definition implies that “non-West” is composed of non-EU European 
countries, all Africa, South America, Asia, as well as English-speaking 
countries such as Australia, New Zeland and Canada. At other times, “the 
West” is only the US and Israel, and excludes the EU. For instance, Çağaptay 
states that Turkey reorientation involves cooperating more with the EU, less 
with the US.313 A recent study by Tezcür and Grigorescu seems to confirm 
this argument.314 “Indeed a EU-centered foreign policy seemed to be an 
alternative to a Washington centered one for a while but realizations fell 
short of expected benefits.”315 Whether more recent members of the EU 
should be included in the definition of “the West” is usually left untouched.  
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The supposed new target of Turkish foreign policy is also variously 
defined.  Taking clue from concept of “zero-problem with neighbours”316 , 
some of the scholars think that Turkey’s relations with its neighbours is the 
new focus.317 Studies on foreign trade data confirm this hypothesis.318  Yet 
there are discussions as to the outcomes of this policy:  stalling of Turkish-
Armenian rapproachment, Turkey’s distancing with Azerbaijan, and more 
recently Turkey’s souring relations with Syria.319    
Others state that Turkey’s foreign policy has been more focused on 
the previously Ottoman territories,320 whereas others challenge this view and 
argue that Turkey new focus is the intersection of predominantly Muslim 
states321 and formerly Ottoman states, or even the Islamists.322 They state that 
Turkey’s increasing relations with its neighbors is an ideological and 
identity-based restructuring of Turkish foreign policy principles. They point 
to the sources of this identity restructuration as Islamist ideology and a 
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revived interest in Ottoman past, and argue that in practice, such a mindset 
has led to solidarity with neighbours on the basis of Islamic values.323134  
Based on a study of high-level visits by AKP officials to the Middle 
East, Balkans and Caucasus, Çağaptay argues that “the [AKP] party focuses 
asymmetrically on Islamist Arab countries and Iran, while it ignores Israel, 
the Balkans and the Caucasus.”324  He argues that the AKP has indeed a 
“two-pronged strategy” towards Muslim actors: Writing before the shake-
ups of the Arab Spring, he claimed that the AKP has been expressing 
solidarity with Islamist and anti-Western regimes like Qatar and Sudan, 
while dismissing the secular, pro-Western Muslim governments like Egypt, 
Jordan and Tunisia. Therefore, it is not “being Muslim” per se, but “being 
Islamist” which underlies the AKP’s choices in the foreign policy arena. A 
similar view is shared by Türkeş, who states that the outlook behind the axis 
shift in Turkey’s foreign relations is shaped by Davutoğlu’s idea of an 
“Islamic backbone,” which was lacking in previous Western-oriented, 
secular foreign policy.325He argues that the AKP’s political elite is 
deliberately trying to insert this new “backbone” to Turkey’s new foreign 
policy anatomy.  
Similarly, Pipes attributes the new activism and shift in Turkish 
foreign policy to the Islamist ideology of AKP.326137Referring back to the 
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Turkish parliament’s refusal to permit American troops to traverse Turkish 
territory in the war against Iraq, he states that from the very beginning of 
AKP rule, it was evident that the new Turkish government would choose a 
different path in its relations with the West. He argues that “Turkish foreign 
policy became increasingly hostile to the West in general,” and especially 
turned against the United States, France, Israel. As evidence, he cites the 
warming of relations with governments in Syria, Iran, and Libya, along with 
Turkey’s refusal to name Iran as the adversary in NATO documents 
concerning the missile defense program.  
While most of the observers who point to an ideology-based rationale 
are critical of the AKP’s foreign policy, a few others are less so. For example, 
Tremblay argues that the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, especially 
after they surpassed the most important obstacles and reached an agreement 
over military cooperation, is due to the impact of religious ideas/identity on 
foreign policy.327 She states that even the “elitist world of diplomats is not 
insulated from religious ideational influence.” Consequently she claims that 
religious ideas, i.e. Islam, are deeply entrenched in Turkish mentality and 
have direct implications for Turkish foreign policy. 
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Finally, “the Middle East”328 or Eurasia329 are also offered as the new 
focus, although they are defined differently by different authors. The 
definitions of the Middle East, usually include states with predominantly 
Arabic-speaking populations and Iran, and exclude Israel, whereas Eurasia 
refers to a large and very heteregenous group of states. Therefore, it is 
imperative to deconstruct what is meant by both “the West” and “the Rest” 
in order to determine to what extent each proposition is empirically 
accurate.  
5.4. When is the “Axis Shift”? 
One of the most debated questions in the study of Turkish foreign 
policy activism has been its historical antecendents in Turkish foreign 
affairs. The international circumstances of the Second World War and the 
Cold War together with Turkey’s domestic social, economic and political 
problems limited Turkey’s outreach to non-Western societies.330 Nonetheless, 
Turkish foreign policy has witnessed brief periods of attempts at a more 
active and multidimensional foreign policy. Especially after the Cold War, 
countries in North Africa, newly independent states of Former Soviet Union 
and the Middle Eastern countries have emerged as a new focus of interest 
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for Turkish foreign policy. For example, discussions about “Turkey as a 
model” started in early 1990s: shortly after the end of the Cold War, Turkey 
was willing to facilitate Western penetration into the Black Sea, Caucasus 
and Central Asia.331 Therefore, several studies point to similarities of vision 
and practice in Özal’s foreign policy in late 1980s/early 1990s and AKP’s 
foreign policy.332 Martin and Altunisik also argue that Turkish activism in 
foreign policy can be dated back to late 1980s and early 1990s.333 Evidently, 
discussions about Turkey’s “new” activism are far from being novel.334  
For some observers, Turkey’s newest activism in 2000s has actually 
begun in late 1990s.335 Turkey’s attempts at opening to its neighbours and 
other parts of the world have been dated back to late 1990s, to the policies 
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and vision of then Foreign Minister !smail Cem.336  For example, Turkey’s 
active involvement in Alliance of Civilizations Initiative337, Turkey’s 
raproachment with Greece and Syria, and Turkey’s initial attempts to 
strengthen relations with sub-Saharan Africa338 are dated back to his term as 
Foreign Minister.339  
Others argue that AKP’s foreign policy represents departures from 
the past periods of activism. Özal’s neo-Ottomanism never stressed Islam or 
the Middle East in particular340, nor !smail Cem’s policies downplayed 
Turkey’s Western orientation.341 Another view suggests that there are 
specific periods within AKP’s term, each of which resembles the past 
practices in differing degrees: Between 2002-2007 AKP has pursued more 
pro-European attitude similar to previous governments, whereas after 2007 
it pursued a more Eurasian orientation.342 Still others detect another shift in 
the aftermath of Arab uprisings.343   
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Several other turning points are also suggested: “the tectonic 
changes” that occurred after September 11, 2001,344 immediate aftermath of 
AKP’s electoral victory in November 2002,345 or “transformational 
moment,”346 of March 1, 2003. Tezcür and Grigeorescu look back since 1980, 
and propose different turning points for Turkey’s Foreign Policy Affinity 
(FPA-based on UNGA voting patterns) with different countries. Turkey and 
the US seem to be growing apart in 1996-2008 period, whereas lowest FPA 
with Israel has been in 2001. Turkey’s FPA with Iran has slightly decreased 
since 2003, whereas it has been pretty steady with the Middle East as a 
region since 1993.  
Since each of three propositions about Turkey’s axis shift may be 
relevant for different time frames, any empirical study should take into 
account several turning points to determine 1) to what extent Turkish “new” 
policy is actually new 2) what kind of historical precedents can be found.  
5.5. Proactivism and Activism in Turkish Foreign Affairs 
Another much-debated characteristic of the “axis shift” is the 
supposed activism and proactivism in Turkish foreign affairs. The 
controversy about these concepts is more like a point of confusion than a 
disagreement. Usually the concepts are used interchangeably, and without 
clear definitions.  
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Davutoğlu defines proactivism as “pre-emptive peace diplomacy, 
which aims to take measures befor crises emerge and escalate to a critical 
level. ”347 He claims that the main foreign policy purpose of proactivism is 
not only averting crises but also actively seek to strengthen “prosperity, 
stability and security in a neighborhood which spans the Balkans, the 
Caucasus and the Caspian basin, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, 
the Middle East, from the Gulf to North Africa.”348 Therefore, in a sense, 
proactivism is intimately related to expansion of interest to wider regions. 
In Turkish foreign policy literature, Davutoğlu’s remarks on Turkish 
foreign policy proactivism is widely accepted, yet understood differently.349  
For Keyman, “proactive”, “constructive” and “multidimensional” are all 
interrelated terms, as they are defined in contrast to Turkey’s  “reactive, 
passive, bilateral and security-oriented” policies in the Cold War.  
Nevetheless, he tends to equate proactivism with activism, failing to refer to 
the inherent meaning of the word, “acting in advance.”  He argues that as 
opposed to before, “Turkey’s new foreign policy behavior now tends to be 
more active, more multi-dimensional, as well as more constructive and 
problem-solving-oriented”(emphasis-added). 350 For Yılmaz and Öniş,  
proactivism also seems to be a mixture of constructive attitude and 
                                                
347 Ahmet Davutoğlu “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy.” 
348 Ahmet Davutoğlu “Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010” Turkish Policy Quarterly 8, 
no.3 (2009):11-17, 12. 
349 Ziya Meral, and Jonathan Paris. "Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity." The 
Washington Quarterly 33.4 (2010): 75-86; Fuat Keyman, "Globalization, modernity and 
democracy: in search of a viable domestic polity for a sustainable Turkish foreign 
policy." New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 40, (2009):7-27; Yılmaz and Öniş, “Between 
Europeanization and Eurasianism.” 
350 Fuat Keyman "Globalization, modernity and democracy: in search of a viable domestic 
polity for a sustainable Turkish foreign policy." New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 40, 
(2009):7-27. 
 
163 
activism.351 Combined with proposed cooperativeness, this activism –it has 
been argued- results in being proactive, i.e. Turkey being initiatior or 
instigator of several processes of dialogue, from Alliance of Civilizations to 
Syria-Israel indirect negotiations.352  
However, activism, on its own, refers to an increase in the sheer 
volume of interaction. Conceptually, activism necessitates neither a 
cooperative attitude, nor an intentional pursuit for heightened level of 
activity: a country’s activism may just be a response to foreign behavior. 
Moreover, when it is intentional, activism can be pursued with respect to 
certain foreign actors on multiple grounds, but not toward others. Therefore, 
it does not automatically mean a geographical expansion of interest in 
foreign affairs, nor does it mean expansion of interest in all spheres of 
conflict or cooperation. 
Proactivism can also be understood differently, and not necesarrily 
multilateral or cooperative. In 1990s, Turkish assertive -and sometimes 
aggressive- policies towards Syria were also defined as “proactive.”353 
Turkey’s recent bahaviors concerning Arab Uprisings has also been defined 
as “self-attributed unilateral over-pro-activism”354 It has been argued that its 
proactivism has led Turkey to a “worthy solitude” in its surrounding 
region.355 Proactivism can also be associated with unpredictability and crisis: 
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“In recent decades, reflecting the proactive and independent course of its 
foreign policy, Ankara’s relationship with Washington has also started on an 
unpredictable course and has been characterized by a growing number of 
differences of opinion and occasional crises.”356  
Therefore, activism, defined as an increase in foreign interaction, is 
analytically different from proactivism. Activism is analytically 
dichotomous to passivism, which means reduced level of interaction. 
Passivism has usually negative connotations, as it implies risk-avoidance, 
isolation and ineffectiveness in conducting foreign policy.357 Reduced level 
of interaction usually makes countries isolated and problems protracted. For 
example, European countries were criticized for their lack of action in the 
face of Bosnian war, the US and European countries are criticized for not 
taking action to stop genocide in Rwanda, “appeasement” policy in 1930s 
was nothing but a policy of non-action.  
Proactivism, on the other hand, is conceptually different from 
activism and refers to “acting in advance”, whether it has been pursued 
bilaterally or multilaterally. Proactivism is taking action beforehand, in 
anticipation of crises or in simply establishing relations. Therefore, it is the 
analytical opposite of reaction.   
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Proaction is preferred over reaction, because averting crises reduces 
costs and harms to human life. However, majority of crises in international 
politics are hard to predict, forcing countries choose between inaction and 
reaction after the fact. Therefore, reaction, on its own, is not negative. 
Conversely, reaction to a bilateral rapproachment, a particular event or 
crisis, is the second best choice after proaction. Reaction, in this sense, may 
be better defined as responsiveness, which is far from being passive, risk-
avoidant or ineffective. 
Turkey’s foreign behavior with respect to proactivism may be 
investigated by looking at whether Turkey’s behavior surpasses those of 
others to Turkey, or precedes them when it comes to bilateral relations. 
Other states behavior before and after the “turning points,” as discussed in 
the previous part, can help to gauge Turkey’s responsiveness to other actors, 
and their responsiveness to Turkey’s foreign policy behaviors. Such an 
analysis may help to determine to what extent Turkey’s level of activity 
increase because of Turkey’s independent will (proaction), or whether it was 
simply responding to the increasing level of activity from outside 
(responsiveness). Moreover, Turkey’s involvement in third party mediation, 
as well as Turkey’s behavior prior to international crises can also be 
investigated to understand Turkey’s proactivism.  
As such, proactivism, activism, and responsiveness (reactivism) 
would not be necesarrily dichotomous and questions with respect to them 
can be investigated individually in a more clear way. 
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5.6. Sub-State Actors and Foreign Policy  
In most studies on foreign policy, what “a state” does is usually 
defined by government or bureaucratic elite behaviour. Hence, for many 
analysts, the change in Turkish foreign policy is mainly instigated by Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül and Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. The underlying assumption is that the political 
elite decides on and makes foreign policy, and they direct the bureaucratic 
elite accordingly. In such studies, the leaders’ character, vision, personal 
history and background are taken as the main factors which shape the 
country’s foreign policy.358 
On a behavioral level, a state centered approach would mean, Turkish 
foreign policy is mainly composed of behaviours of bureaucrats and 
politicians, pursuing government policies. Turkey’s increasing activity in 
IOs, the number of high-level international visits, the vigorous attempts at 
mediation over several conflicts, new bilateral talks and agreements, all of 
which are components of a “rhythmic diplomacy” as pursued by Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, can all be regarded as behavioural reflection of new activism in 
Turkish foreign policy.359  
Still, government officials stress that one of the key components of 
Turkey’s new activism is “to encourage more people-to-people contact 
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between [Turkey] and its neighbours.”360 Kalın states that the new foreign 
policy outlook is not only discussed or questioned but also “formulated and 
eventually shared by a growing number of domestic and foreign policy 
circles, diplomats, analysts, academics, journalists, businessmen, NGOs, 
community leaders, and others.”361 
In this scheme, not only the government, but also ordinary citizens 
became implementers of Turkish foreign policy. For Davutoğlu “Turkey’s 
success is not only the result of state policies, but also the activities of civil 
society, business organizations, and numerous other organizations, all 
operating under the guidance of the new vision. The state’s macro strategy is 
in conformity with the micro strategies of individual people, corporations, 
and civil society organizations.” 362 Sports, tourism, trade, humanitarian aid, 
and culture are the main venues to which non-state actors involvement in 
Turkish foreign policy is encouraged. “Turkish football teams, singers, soap 
operas, and movies have wide resonance throughout the neighbourhood.”363 
Tourists from Russia and the Ukraine in particular, and now increasingly 
from the Middle East (with the exception of Israel) are growing in number.  
Accordingly, several studies point to increasing involvement of non-
state actors in Turkish foreign policy,364 and argue that in many cases 
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Turkish foreign policy efforts are a mixture of formal initiatives by the 
government and the informal activities of NGOs. The issue of disagreement 
however, is to what extent civil society’s foreign behavior is -not just 
encouraged- but shaped by the Turkish policy makers. While some 
analysists argue that non-state activism in Turkish foreign policy is mainly 
instigated by increasing capabilities of business and civil society 
organizations in Europeanization process, others point to suspicious level of 
congruity between government’s and civil society’s policies, which amounts 
to “guidance” by the government. 
Kirişçi traces the first instance of cooperation among Turkish foreign 
policy authorities and civil society organizations to the time of the signing of 
the Customs Union Treaty, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought the 
support of civil society organizations. 365 The business elite was especially 
adamant in promoting Turkey’s EU accession process, often beacuse they 
find Turkey’s economic intergration with the union would be beneficial for 
their private interests.366Atlı argues that business associations have begun to 
assume a more active role in Turkey’s economic life, which has translated 
into their formal participation in policy making. The liberalization wave of 
the 1980s and the EU membership process has greatly enhanced the leverage 
that civil society has, not just through transfer of know-how but also 
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through considerable amounts of funds and grants. While maintaining its 
role as the policy maker, the state has gradually made room for the private 
sector to play a role in the process, “because it is deemed to be capable of 
administering specific functions more efficiently than the state.” Öniş also 
points to the transnationalization of small- and medium-sized businesses in 
Turkey, popularly known as the “Anatolian tigers”. These firms from rising 
centers of Anatolian capital, are also often labeled as ‘Green Money’ (a 
reference to their conservative roots) and argued to be a primary basis of the 
AKP’s political support.367 The enthusiasm of these firms for finding new 
markets has made them increase their activity in foreign policy matters. Öniş 
states that “key civil society organizations representing the aforementioned 
rising centers of industrialization and capital accumulation in Turkey, such 
as TOBB, MÜS!AD and TUSKON, have emerged as central actors in 
Turkey’s foreign policy initiatives.” He goes on to argue that foreign policy 
is increasingly being driven from below, so much so that it is “no longer the 
monopoly of politicians and diplomats.” 368 In this line of argument, the 
involvement of non-state actors is instigated by their increased capacity and 
independent will, which translated into a hightened activism in foreign 
affairs. Turkish government’s worldview, variously defined as economy 
minded369 or “globalizationist”370 might have accelarated the process, but it 
                                                
367 Burhanettin Duran, “JDP and Foreign Policy as an Agent of Transformation," in The 
Emergence of A New Turkey, ed. Hakan Yavuz, (Utah: Utah University Press, 2006). 
368 Öniş, “Multiple Faces.”  
369 Dincer et al.Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası, 314. 
370 Dincer et al.Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası, 300. 
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does not directly steer non-state actors’ foreign affairs. Accordingly, such 
congruence has been depicted as “the best expression of domestic peace.”371 
Others find such congruence not as genuine as depicted: Some argue 
that Turkish NGOs operating in foreign countries are handpicked for 
financial support by the government to legitimate official foreign policy. 372 It 
has been argued that “allegiance” has become the guiding feature in the 
selection of which actors would benefit from governmental support such as 
providing necessary legal and infrastructural background, exemption from 
prior permission for fundraising, as well as giving them Public Benefit 
Status, which leds to tax deductions or exemptions.373 Moreover, their 
actions may be operationally steered by governmental agencies like Diyanet, 
TIKA or Kizilay. Hence, the activism of non-state actors is instigated by not 
their independent will, but they follow the footsteps of the government.  
Despite the differences, both views claim that there would be high 
parallelism between government’s and civil society foreign affairs on a 
behavioral level.  
When we look at the studies on foreign policy with the question of 
agency in mind, sub-state actors has play an important role, depending on 
the issue, domain or geographical region in question. Given their evidence, 
                                                
371 Mehmet Özkan, “Turkey’s Religious and Socio-Political depth in Africa” Emerging Powers 
in Africa, LSE IDEAS Special Report 016 (2013): 45-50. 
372  Diba Nigar Göksel, “Can Turkey Inspire?”; Erhan Doğan “AB Katılım Süreci, Neo-
Korporatizm ve Türk Siyasetindeki Korporatist Kalıntılar” in Sivil Toplum ve Dış Politika, 
ed. Semra Cerit-Mazlum and Erhan Doğan, (!stanbul: Bağlam, 2006). 
373 Yaşama Dair Association, “Cluster Analysis for Improving Co-operation between the 
NGOs and the Public Sector in Turkey,” 2008, available at  
http://www.yasamadair.org/Adminjkl/2.pdf 
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each perspective and study has merit in pointing to the importance of 
various actors, and their links to certain foreign policy initiatives. 
Nevertheless, comprehensive historical comparisons between activities of 
conventional and non-conventional actors are missing.  
5.7. Conclusion 
Above review of recent Turkish foreign policy literature reveals that 
the observers do not agree on fundamental questions regarding Turkish 
foreign policy. Some argue that Turkey’s geographical orientation has 
expanded, whereas others assert that it shifted from the West to “the Rest”, 
whatever these terms indicate. Some argue that Turkey’s increasing activity 
was a reaction to its changing environment, whereas others see Turkey as 
being “proactive” rather than reactive.  While a group of scholars perceive 
Turkey’s axis shift as a consequence of its deteriorating relations with the 
West, others point to domestic processes as shaping foreign policy. Some see 
that Turkey’s foreign policy transformation began in 1990s, others attribute 
it to ruling AKP, which came to power in 2002, still others see 2007 or 2009 
as a turning point. Finally, there has been disagreement over whether 
Turkey’s sub-state actors played an independent role in Turkish foreign 
policy activism, or they were merely following footsteps of the government.  
 The review of literature suggests that, there is an abundance of 
concepts, as well as propositions about the relations between them. 
Nevetheless, there is not a systematic elimination or confirmation of these 
propositions, which stems from two reasons. Firstly, the evidence posited by 
each perspective, is too different from each other to allow for cross 
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comparisons: some illustrate Turkey’s increasing activism with reference to 
a series of high profile undertakings mainly by Turkish government, others 
use foreign trade or immigration data. At other times, their evidence refers 
to different time frames. TFAED, which is composed of day-to-day 
behaviours of all Turkish actors across 21 years, may help remedy this 
problem as it provides longitudinal and common foundation against which 
such claims can be tested.  
The second reason relates to the wide discrepancy in the literature 
about definitions of fundamental concepts such as  “the West”, “axis shift,” 
proactivism, activism, “rhytmic diplomacy”, which are sometimes used 
interchangeably. Lack of agreed-upon definitions is a major problem for 
testing their claims against each other. More importantly, it hinders 
theoretical development. Without explicit definitions, the relationship 
between concepts (the supposed explanation) also becomes blurry. Building 
large N datasets may help remedy this lack of clarification. Trying to 
operationalize the concepts used the literature helps to understand and 
better define them, and when they are found to inoperationalizable, to 
redefine them. The following chapter attempts to do that by investigating 
claims about Turkey’s foreign affairs and draws a descriptive, yet 
quantitative map.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
FINDINGS 1: MAPPING TURKISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 
 
 
The primary motivation for this project was a widely perceived 
change in Turkish foreign policy in the past decade. This chapter tries to 
build a map of Turkish foreign affairs by presenting data concerning the 
most contested phenomena of Turkey’s foreign affairs: axis shift.  Since axis 
shift is defined as reorientation of Turkey’s foreign affairs from one group of 
actors to another, the chapter is organized as a detailed presentation of 
Turkey’s foreign affairs with respect to several regions.  
The first part of this chapter is an attempt to define and measure 
Turkey’s foreign policy activism. It compares different time periods in terms 
of the volume of all Turkey’s affairs, as well as foreign affairs. The second 
part looks more closely to the geographical orientation of Turkish foreign 
policy, both before and after AKP governments. It also provides answers to 
the question of reciprocity and proactivity in Turkey’s relations with specific 
regions, by using correlational and time series tools to analyze patterns in 
time, actors, event volume and event type. The chapter concludes by a 
summary of the findings. 
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6.1. Measuring “Activism” 
The most fundamental question regarding Turkish foreign policy is 
the level of activism in foreign policy. The initial step to answer to such 
question is to measure the overall volume of Turkish foreign behaviour, 
irrespective of the nature (state/non-state) of the agency, direction (foreign 
policy target) or the nature of the behaviour (conflictual/cooperative). The 
following graph ahows the number of events related to Turkey per year.  
 
Figure 15 Turkey Event Counts 
On average, there are 1814 events about Turkey per year 
(aproximately 5 events per day). The number of Turkey-related events 
shows a steep rise after 1994, reaches a regional peak around 1999, continues 
to rise until 2003, where it reaches an all time peak; gradually declines until 
2008, and stabilizes thereafter just below average. Overall, it seems that 
Turkey has been more active from 1996 to 2007. However, it is possible that 
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apparent rises of Turkey related event counts may not be because of 
Turkey’s activism, but simply because reporters of the Agence France Presse 
worked hard, i.e. there were more news reports about everyone in those 
years. Actually, overall number of AFP reports shows variation, both per 
year and per month.374 Except a downturn in 2000,  AFP news articles 
steadily increases from 1992 to 2001, then shows a slow decline until 
December 2012.  
 
 
Figure 16 Number of AFP News Articles per Year 
 
                                                
374 Within the confines of this project, only a small part of all AFP news items –which 
mention Turkey, Turks or major Turkish cities in full text- have been downloaded. So, an 
independent estimation about volüme of all AFP news reports has been made by 
randomly selecting two 3-5-10 day intervals per month in LexisNexis, which amounted 
to more than 500 blank queries. My estimations are found to be congruent with an 
independent review of monthly variations in AFP News Reports, although their queries 
were not blank. They limited the  number of results by eliminating several sports and 
finance news: Leetaru and Schrodt “GDELT: Global Data on Events, Language, and 
Tone, 1979-2012” International Studies Association Annual Conference, April 2013. San 
Diego, CA. 
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Therefore, a better assessment of Turkey’s affairs would require a 
comparison of Turkey’s event counts with number of articles by AFP.375 
Figure 14 shows Turkey’s combined foreign and domestic affairs as 
percentages of overall AFP news articles per year. On average 1,13 events 
are generated about Turkey per 100 AFP article. In all years between 1995-
2000, and 2002-2006 events generated about Turkey surpasses that average 
(1,36 % and 1,23 % respectively). The lowest points are 1994 (0,76 %) and 
2008 (0,77 %). Therefore, these two periods are the more likely canditates for 
periods of “Turkey’s activism.” 
 
Figure 17 Volume of Turkey's Affairs (As % of all AFP News Reports) 
 
                                                
375 I choose number of Turkey related events, not Turkey related news reports to compare 
with all AFP news reports because my original search query did not eliminate Turkey 
related news reports that do not generate events ,such as natural disasters, accidents, 
news about turkey (the animal), and other happenings which either do not have a 
perpetrator or  a target or a relevant action. They may be reported, but they are not 
instrumental to measuring Turkey’s activism. Leetaru and Schrodt report that 1.21 % of 
all AFP news report mention Turkey, making it the 19th most mentioned country by 
AFP. 
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However, several domestic and international circumstances, which do 
not necesarily underline an “activist” attitude,  may account for the rise and 
fall of Turkey’s volume of activity. For example, the lowest points 
correspond to major economic crises: 1994 and 2001 domestic, and in 2008 
global. 1998 economic crisis in Asia-Russia, also seems to have repercussions 
for Turkey. Conversely, coverage of Turkey’s domestic terrorism, rise of 
political Islam, or coalitional politics may account for peaks in 1990s.  
Therefore, a better way to depict “Turkish foreign policy activism” 
would be to analyze Turkey’s foreign behaviour (TFB), foreign behaviour to 
Turkey (FBT) and Turkish domestic affairs (TDA) separately (Figure 15). On 
average, TFB, FBT and TDA correspond to 0,46 , 0,44 , and 0,22 events  of all 
AFP News respectively.  
 
Figure 18 Volume of Turkey's Foreign and Domestic Affairs 
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In 1995-2000 period, TFB (0,50 %) was higher than average but less 
than FBT (0,56 %). TDA was also higher than average (0,31 %). In 2002-2006 
period, however, TFB (0,53 %) makes up the majority of “Turkey’s activism,” 
whereas FBT is 0,49 %. Coverage of TDA was slightly less than average 
throughout the period (0,21 %). In this regard, although overall activity level 
of Turkey was higher in 1995-2000, Turkey-initiated foreign behaviour (TFB) 
were more prominent than ever in 2002-2006.  
A closer look at the interrelationship between Turkey’s foreign and 
domestic affairs may reveal more. There is a strong correlation between TFB 
and FBT , r(252) =0.76, p <.001, which suggests a high FBT would predict 
high TFB. Therefore, changing FBT/TFB ratio in 1998-2000 begs an 
explanation. TFB and TDA are also moderately correlated, r(252)=0.40, 
p<.05. Interestingly, correlation between FBT and TDA is even stronger, 
r(252)=0.56, p< .001. Moreover, volume of Turkey’s domestic affairs in year 
t, and volume of foreign actors’ behaviour in year t-1, are also moderately 
correlated, r(19)=0.435, p< .05, which suggests TDA increases and decreases 
in response to FBT, not vice versa.  Therefore, whenever there is high FBT, 
there would also be a high TDA not only in the same year, but probably next 
year also.  How all of this would reflect on TFB, however, remains unclear 
since all three type of behaviours seems to correlate with each other.  It is 
imperative to remove the effect of the third on the pair in question. Table 9, 
compares simple and partial correlation coefficients376  for Turkey’s foreign 
and domestic affairs for 1991-2012.  
                                                
376 Partial correlation is the correlation of two variables while controlling for a third or more 
other variables on both. Semi-Partial correlation controls for the third or more other 
variables on only the second variable. Events are counted on a monthly basis and adjusted 
to monthly AFP news output.  Months with missing data  are removed. 
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Table 8 Partial and Semi-partial correlations between TFB, FBT and TDA 
Var1	   Var2	  
Semi-­‐Partial	  Cor.	  1991-­‐2012	  n=251	  
Partial	  Cor.	  1991-­‐2012	  n=251	  
Semi-­‐Partial	  Cor1991-­‐1998	  n=73	  
Partial	  Cor	  1991-­‐1998	  n=73	  
Semi-­‐Partial	  Cor	  1999-­‐2012	  n=178	  
Partial	  Cor	  1999-­‐2012	  n=178	  FBT	   TFB	   0,578***	   0,698***	   0,459***	   0,601***	   0,664***	   0,754***	  TDA	   TFB	   -­‐0,028	   -­‐0,033	   0,143	   0,187	   -­‐0,120	   -­‐0,136	  TFB	   FBT	   0,638***	   0,698***	   0,491***	   0,601***	   0,721***	   0,754***	  TDA	   FBT	   0,388***	   0,424***	   0,322**	   0,395***	   0,393***	   0,411***	  TFB	   TDA	   -­‐0,022	   -­‐0,033	   0,124	   0,187	   -­‐0,086	   -­‐0,136	  FBT	   TDA	   0,278***	   0,424***	   0,262*	   0,395***	   0,261**	   0,411***	  
 
Relationship between FBT and TDA is strong when FBT’s variation 
by TFB is controlled for. Relationship is still strong when TDA’s variation by 
TFB is controlled for, too. When TFB’s effect on both is removed, there is an 
even more significant correlation between TDA and FBT. Similarly when 
TDA’s effect was removed on FBT, there would still be s strong correlation 
between TFB and FBT.  Again, when TDA’s effect were removed on TFB, 
there would still be strong correlation between TFB and FBT. When FBT’s 
effect is removed, however, the apparent correlation between TDA and TFB 
disappears, (even turns negative) suggesting FBT’s independent relationship 
to both makes it appear as if they are correlated.  The argument that there is 
a strong positive relationship between FBT and TDA is valid for all periods.  
In 1998-2000, when FBT stabilized just above average, and TDA 
begun to decline, Turkey was able to show greater initiative in its foreign 
affairs. The boost continued until 2004, where FBT and TFB balanced each 
other. The increasing TDA in 2007, coupled with decreasing FBT due to 
global economic crisis, though not disturbing the FBT/TFB balance, 
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decreased Turkey’s foreign policy activity. From 2009 onwards, although not 
particularly active, Turkey’s seems to hold on to the greater initiative 
pattern. This dynamic between Turkey’s and foreign actors’ initiative may 
also account for the perceived similarity between Turkish foreign policy 
under Özal’s presidency (1991-1993) and under AKP.  
In conclusion, 1999-2000 seems to be a turning point for Turkey’s 
foreign affairs. From that point on, volume of others’ behaviour to Turkey 
almost never surpasses Turkey’s foreign behaviour. Even 2001 crisis seems 
to decrease foreign actors behaviour to Turkey more than Turkey’s 
behaviour to them. Changing levels of Turkey’s domestic affairs did not 
make much difference on TFB before 1998. After 1998, however, TFB become 
more reflective of domestic repercussions of FBT, which suggests that the 
mediating factor of FBT has increased.  
6.2. New Geographical Orientation 
There is a discrepancy when it comes to definitions of Turkey’s 
geographical focus in foreign policy. Most of these definitions inherently 
carry value judgements about what constitutes “the West.” To have a closer 
look at Turkey's geographical focus, I have aggregated countries and global 
actors into nine geographical/political groups to present Turkey's 
geographical orientation in the past twenty-two years. Following rules are 
followed while categorizing. Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) is composed of all 
African countries except Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Libya, all of 
which are included under North Africa and the Middle East (MEA). MEA 
also includes all other Arab countries; Iran and Israel are excluded. Western 
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Europe (WEU) consists of all EU member states377, as well as Norway and 
Switzerland. Eastern Europe (EEU) is composed of all other non-EU member 
European countries, Turkish Cyprus, Caucasia and Russia. Asia (ASA) 
includes from Iran to Japan: Central Asia, China, India, and all Southeast 
Asia. Latin America (LAM) includes all South and Central American 
countries as well as the Carribbean. Ocenia, the US, Canada, and Israel are 
grouped under non-European West. (WST). If an intergovernmental or 
transnational organization's membership is region-specific (like the EU), the 
organization has been included in the corresponding region. If not (like 
NATO or IMF), it is grouped under intergovernmental organizations (IGO). 
The ethnic or religious groups whose nationalities were not identified in the 
news reports, and transnational organizations/movements (both armed and 
peaceful) are grouped under non-state actors (NST).  All individuals, 
businesses, vessels with Turkish nationality, multinational corporations 
whose headquarters are in Turkey, non-governmental transnational 
movements or organizations and members of ethnic or religious groups who 
are identified as Turkish nationals in the news report, Turkish branches of 
non-governmental international organizations, and refugees from other 
countries who have settled in Turkey are all grouped under Turkey (TUR).  
Although less political definitions, such as UN geoscheme, could have 
been considered. However, grouping Israel under “Western Asia” with Arab 
countries or grouping Arab-speaking North African countries separately 
from “Western Asia”, as UN geoscheme suggests, would be less effective in 
                                                
377 As of 2013. Same definiton has been kept for different time frames, to ease comparison. 
i.e. any change between two time periods, should not be attributable to changing 
composition of regions.  
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testing arguments. Grouping foreign actors in terms of their 
political/historical affinity as well as geographical proximity is found to be 
more compatible with prevalent definitions in the Turkish foreign policy 
literature. 
First part is a general overview of Turkey’s relations with nine groups 
of foreign actors. Volume of events with these groups, proactivism towards 
them, reciprocity in relations, as well as how Turkey’s relations with one 
group affects the other is given consideration. Several methods are used to 
test them against each other, to see whether which groups are more 
prominent with respect to Turkish foreign policy activism, proactivism or 
reciprocity. 
In the following table, events (irrespective of their nature as 
conflictual or cooperative) are counted on a yearly basis and adjusted to 
yearly AFP news output. Table shows averge number of events per 10.000 
by region in 1991-2012.  
Table 9 Event Count by Region per 10.000 AFP Reports  
per Year (1991-2012) 
 
 
Region	  
Event	  count	  per	  
10.000	  AFP	  per	  year	  Western	  Europe	   28,30	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	   18,10	  West	  (non-­‐European)	   11,12	  Non-­‐state	  Actors	   8,74	  Asia	   8,72	  Eastern	  Europe	   8,61	  Intergovernmental	  Organizations	   4,25	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	   1,39	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	   0,56	  Total	   89,79	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Western European countries have long been important in Turkey’s 
foreign affairs. Almost one third of all Turkey-related international event is 
between Turkey and a Western European country. Second most important 
region is the Middle East and North Africa, comprising of one fifth of 
Turkey’s international affairs. Other Western countries comprise of 12 %, 
whereas relations with Asia, Eastern Europe and non-state actors are each 
one tenth. One twentieth of Turkey international affairs were with 
intergovernmental organizations. Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America comprise 2%, and 1% respectively. Therefore, on average 
Turkey’s international affairs has been predominantly Western oriented 
(44%). To determine whether there have been changes under AKP 
governments in that regard, the time frame is divided into two parts; 1991-
2002 and 2003-2012.  
	  
Figure 19 Volume of Affairs with Regions Before AKP 
AFR	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   ASA	  11%	   EEU	  11%	  IGO	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Pre-­‐AKP	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Figure 20 Volume of Affairs with Regions under AKP 
Both before and after AKP, the primacy of Western European 
countries remained constant, despite a 3% decrease in the latter period. 
Middle East and North Africa, still occupy the second place despite a 5 % 
increase.  The third place changed however: in the pre-AKP period, relations 
with Asia, non-European West and and Eastern Europe each comprised 11 
% of all Turkey’s international affairs. Under AKP, non-European West 
came the third with 14 %, followed by Asia (9%) and Eastern Europe (8%). 
Non-state actors and Sub-Saharan Africa decreased by 1 %, relations with 
intergovernmental organizations and Latin America rose by 1 %.  
A comparative look at first and second halves of the AKP rule can 
shed some light on the different arguments about the timing of Turkey’s 
shifting geographical orientation. In the first and more “activist period” of 
AKP foreign policy, Turkish foreign affairs seems to be even more Western 
oriented than the previous governments. More than half of Turkey’s 
international relations were with Western countries. Relations with the 
Middle East was also prominent, yet not significantly more than before. 
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Relations with Eastern Europe and Asia were significantly less intense than 
previous governments.   
Table 10 Turkey’s Foreign Affairs with Regions by Period 
%	   1991-­‐
2002	  
2003-­‐
2007	  
2008-­‐
2012	  
AFR	   2	   1	   2	  
ASA	   11	   7	   10	  
EEU	   11	   6	   10	  
IGO	   5	   5	   5	  
LAM	   1	   0	   1	  
MEA	   18	   19	   29	  
NST	   10	   10	   9	  
WEU	   33	   38	   20	  
WST	   11	   15	   14	  
TOTAL	  	   100	   100	   100	  
 
The second five year of AKP, however shows a restoration of interest 
with both Eastern Europe and Asia. While relations with Western Europe 
lost prominence, relations with the non-European Western(WST) countries 
remain the same. Relations with Middle East and North Africa become 
denser than ever, comprising almost one third of Turkey’s foreign affairs. 
Therefore, arguments about a shift in Turkey’s geographical orientation after 
2007 seem to be confirmed.  
Nevertheless, prominence of one set of relations over the others may 
not be reflective of Turkey’s initiative but other actors’ initiative or 
international circumstances. Following table shows how much of relations 
with each region is initiated by Turkey or a foreign actor.  FBT indicates 
foreign behavior to Turkey by corresponding region, as percentages of all 
international behavior by or to Turkey in the time period. TFB indicates 
Turkey’s foreign behavior to each corresponding region as percentages of all 
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international behaviour by or to Turkey in the time period. Table shows that 
increasing prominence of MEA compared to others in the later periods is 
mostly due to Turkish behavior. In both AKP periods, Turkish behavior 
superseded that of MEA behavior, which was not the case in pre-AKP 
period. A comparison of two AKP periods reveals that Turkish preference 
for MEA as the primary foreign policy target was not due to Arab uprisings 
because even before uprisings began, Turkey was more proactive towards 
MEA.  
Turkey’s behavior to WEU was never above WEU behavior to 
Turkey, yet after 2002, Turkey’s behavior was significantly lower than 
WEU’s behavior to Turkey. Considering Turkey was more proactive in the 
last period (TOTAL TFB > TOTAL FBT), the prominence of MEA, and loss of 
importance of WEU are more highlighted.   
Table 11 Turkey’s Foreign Behaviour and Foreign Behaviour to Turkey by 
Period 
	  %	   1991-­‐2002	   2003-­‐2007	   2008-­‐2012	  	  	   TFB	   FBT	   TFB	   FBT	   TFB	   FBT	  AFR	   0,5	   1,2	   0,5	   0,3	   1,3	   0,9	  ASA	   5,5	   5,1	   3,4	   3,6	   5,2	   5,2	  EEU	   6,1	   5,0	   3,1	   3,0	   5,2	   4,6	  IGO	   2,0	   2,5	   2,2	   2,7	   2,4	   2,7	  LAM	   0,2	   0,3	   0,2	   0,2	   0,7	   0,6	  MEA	   7,9	   9,9	   10,8	   8,3	   16,7	   12,1	  NST	   6,1	   4,0	   5,8	   3,8	   5,7	   3,3	  WEU	   16,1	   16,7	   17,2	   20,4	   9,2	   10,4	  WST	   5,2	   5,7	   7,5	   7,0	   7,1	   6,8	  TOTAL	   49,6	   50,4	   50,7	   49,3	   53,5	   46,5	  
Turkey has become more proactive with some other regions, as well. 
Although still occupying 2% of all international behavior, Turkey has 
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become more proactive towards sub-Saharan Africa under AKP. Similarly, 
Turkey’s behavior toward Latin America has also increased in 2008-2012. 
Relations with Non-European West, not only become more prominent under 
AKP, but Turkey has shown more initiative than previous periods. With 
EEU, Turkey has already been more proactive since the end of the Cold War, 
and continued to be so, although it has less prominence in Turkey’s foreign 
affairs compared to the past, as is the case with non-state actors. 
Of course, the volume of activity does not show whether the actions 
were conflictual or cooperative, or spefic targets and sources of these actions. 
Neither intensity nor proactivity means more cooperation or more conflict. 
Therefore, it is necessary to look at cooperative and conflictual nature of 
Turkey’s relations with regions in comparison to others. To assess Turkey’s 
cooperation with each region, all events with that region are divided into a) 
Turkey’s behavior to the region, (e.g., TUR.MEA) and b) region’s behavior to 
Turkey (e.g. MEA.TUR). Then with each dyad, event types are aggregated 
into four categories: Firstly, as conflict or cooperation, then as verbal and 
material. Then, each type of event is assigned a numerical value; Material 
Cooperation 2, Material Conflict 2, Verbal Cooperation 1 and Verbal Conflict 
1. For each dyad, separate scores are obtained for cooperation and conflict 
within a quarter year. Following two charts show quarterly average 
cooperation and conflict scores for each dyad.  
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Figure 21 Average Quarterly Conflict Score By Dyad 
 
Figure 22 Average Quarterly Cooperation Score By Dyad 
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To assess reciprocity in cooperation and conflict with different 
regions, partial correlations have been computed for each region’s behaviour 
to Turkey and Turkey’s behaviour to each region. Variations by all other 
dyads have been controlled for. Following table shows the partial correlation 
values and ranking. Overall, Turkey’s cooperation reciprocity with all 
regions is higher than than its conflict reciprocity. The only exception is 
foreign non-state actors, with whom Turkey’s cooperation reciprocity is 
lower than its conflict reciprocity. 
Table 12 Reciprocity in Turkey’s Affairs 
	   Dyad	  1	   Dyad	  2	   Partial	  Correlation	  (n=87)	   Coop	  rec.	  rank	   Conf	  rec.rank	  
COOPE
RATIO
N	  
Weu.Tur.COOP	   Tur.Weu.COOP	   0,9031	   1	   	  Eeu.Tur.COOP	   Tur.Eeu.COOP	   0,8512	   2	   	  Asa.Tur.COOP	   Tur.Asa.COOP	   0,8496	   3	   	  Igo.Tur.COOP	   Tur.Igo.COOP	   0,8045	   4	   	  Wst.Tur.COOP	   Tur.Wst.COOP	   0,7867	   5	   	  Mea.Tur.COOP	   Tur.Mea.COOP	   0,7406	   6	   	  Lam.Tur.COOP	   Tur.Lam.COOP	   0,5985	   7	   	  Afr.Tur.COOP	   Tur.Afr.COOP	   0,5768	   8	   	  Nst.Tur.COOP	   Tur.Nst.COOP	   0,4393	   9	   	  
CONFL
ICT	  
	  
Weu.Tur.CONF	   Tur.Weu.CONF	   0,6021	   	   1	  Asa.Tur.CONF	   Tur.Asa.CONF	   0,5977	   	   2	  Mea.Tur.CONF	   Tur.Mea.CONF	   0,5749	   	   3	  Nst.Tur.CONF	   Tur.Nst.CONF	   0,4550	   	   4	  Igo.Tur.CONF	   Tur.Igo.CONF	   0,3906	   	   5	  Wst.Tur.CONF	   Tur.Wst.CONF	   0,3680	   	   6	  Eeu.Tur.CONF	   Tur.Eeu.CONF	   0,2026	   	   7	  Afr.Tur.CONF	   Tur.Afr.CONF	   -­‐0,0655	   	   8	  Lam.Tur.CONF	   Tur.Lam.CONF	   -­‐0,0045	   	   9	   9	  
6.2.1. Western Europe 
Based on averages, the most cooperative dyad is WEU to TUR, 
followed by TUR to WEU. This holds true for both pre-AKP and AKP 
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periods. Indeed, cooperation-wise, Turkey and Western Europe is also the 
most reciprocal couple. Turkey’s cooperation to Western Europe is strongly 
correlated with Western Europe’s cooperation to Turkey, (TUR.WEU.COOP 
and WEU.TUR.COOP, r(85)= 0.903, p<.001). However, Turkey and Western 
Europe is also the most conflictual dyad; WEU.TUR.CONF and 
TUR.WEU.CONF ranks first and second in conflict scale, compared to other 
dyads. This is also true for both pre-AKP and AKP periods. There is also 
conflict reciprocity in Turkey-Western Europe relations: Turkey’s conflictual 
behavior to Western Europe is strongly correlated with Western Europe’s 
conflictual behavior to Turkey, (TUR.WEU.CONF and WEU.TUR.CONF, 
r(85)= 0.602, p<.001).  
Both Turkey and Western Europe osciliates with respect to each other. 
(Tur.Weu.CONF, Tur.Weu.COOP r(85)= 0,4458 and Weu.Tur.CONF, 
Weu.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,3733). Yet there are positive feedbacks with in 
bilateral relations (Tur.Weu.CONF, Weu.Tur.COOP, r(85)=-0,3158 and  
Tur.Weu.COOP, Weu.Tur.CONF. r(85)= -0,2689). In other words, When 
Turkey cooperates more with Western Europe, Western Europe conflicts less 
with Turkey, when Western Europe cooperates more with Turkey, Turkey 
conflicts less Western Europe.  
6.2.2. The Middle East 
Based on averages, the third most cooperative dyad is TUR to MEA, 
followed by MEA to TUR. The ranking is slightly different in pre-AKP and 
AKP periods. In pre-AKP period, MEA.TUR was the third, whereas 
TUR.MEA was the fourth, indicating Middle Eastern cooperation to Turkey 
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was more than Turkey’s cooperation to the Middle East in the pre-AKP 
period.  Cooperation-wise, Turkey and MEA is a reciprocal couple, 
(Mea.Tur.COOP, Tur.Mea.COOP r(85)=0,7406, p< .001) yet level of 
cooperative reciprocity is lower than TUR-WEU(0,9031), TUR-EEU(0,8512)  
TUR-ASA (0,8496), TUR-IGO (0,8045) or TUR-WST(0,7866).  
In terms of volume of conflictual behavior between Turkey and the Middle 
East; TUR.MEA.CONF and MEA.TUR.CONF ranks fourth and fifth in 
conflict scale, after Turkey’s average conflict towards non-state actors. In 
both pre-AKP and AKP periods, TUR.NST.CONF was the third. In pre-AKP 
period however, NST conflict to Turkey was higher than either 
TUR.MEA.CONF or MEA.TUR.CONF, which fell back to fifth and sixth 
place respectively.  
Accordingly there is also conflict reciprocity in Turkey-Middle East 
relations: Turkey’s conflictual behavior to the Middle East is strongly 
correlated with the Middle East’s conflictual behavior to Turkey, 
(TUR.MEA.CONF and MEA.TUR.CONF, r(85)= 0.5749, p<.001). Conflict 
reciprocity with the Middle East is the third highest, lower than with 
Western Europe (0.602), or with Asia (0,5977). 
Neither Turkey nor the Middle East osciliates with respect to each 
other. (Tur.Mea.CONF, Tur.Mea.COOP r(85)= -0,0321 and Mea.Tur.CONF, 
Mea.Tur.COOP r(85)= -0,0334). There are no positive feedbacks in bilateral 
relations (Tur.Mea.CONF, Mea.Tur.COOP, r(85)= 0,1454) but actually a 
negative feedback loop on Middle Eastern side. Tur.Mea.COOP, 
Mea.Tur.CONF. r(85)= 0,3302). In other words, when Turkey cooperates 
more with the Middle East, Middle East conflicts more with Turkey, 
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whereas there is no association between Turkey’s conflict to the Middle East 
and Middle Eastern cooperation to Turkey. Coupled with a rather average 
cooperation reciprocity compared to other regions, Turkey’s cooperation to 
the Middle East is met with mixed responses.	  
6.2.3. Non-European West 
In terms of cooperation volume, Non-European Western behavior to 
Turkey and Turkey’s behavior to non-European West comes the fifth and 
sixth, respectively. The ranking is slightly different in pre-AKP and AKP 
periods. In pre-AKP period, WST.TUR was the sixth, whereas TUR.WST was 
the seventh, both coming after Turkey’s cooperative behavior to Eastern 
Europe, which occupied the fifth place. In other words, on average, Turkey’s 
cooperation to Eastern Europe was more than WST cooperation to Turkey, 
as well as Turkey’s cooperation to WST in the pre-AKP period. Whereas in 
AKP period, Turkey’s cooperation to Eastern Europe fell back to ninth place.   
In terms of cooperative reciprocity, TUR.WST.COOP is strongly correlated 
with WST.TUR.COOP (0,7867), yet it is only the fifth highest among other 
dyads.	  	  
TUR.WST.CONF and WST.TUR.CONF ranks seventh and eighth in 
conflict scale. In both pre-AKP and AKP periods, TUR.WST.CONF has been 
higher than WST.TUR.CONF, but in the pre-AKP period, WST.TUR.CONF 
was even lower, occupying the ninth place after Turkey’s conflictual 
behaviour to Asia. 	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There is also conflict reciprocity in Turkey/non-European Western 
relations: Turkey’s conflictual behavior to the Non-European West is 
strongly correlated with the Non-European West’s conflictual behavior to 
Turkey, (TUR.WST.CONF and WST.TUR.CONF, r(85)= 0,3680, p<.001). 
Conflict reciprocity with the Non-European West is only is the sixth highest, 
lower than with Western Europe (0.602), or with Asia (0,5977), Mea (0,5749), 
Nst(0,4550) and IGO (0,3906). 
Turkey’s behaviour osciliates with respect to Non-European West, but 
Non-European West’s oscilliates only slightly. (Tur.Wst.CONF, 
Tur.Wst.COOP r(85)= 0,4212, and Wst.Tur.CONF, Wst.Tur.COOP r(85)= 
0,1804). There are is one weak positive feedback in bilateral relations 
(Tur.Wst.CONF, Wst.Tur.COOP, r(85)= -0,1935) but no negative feedback 
loops. (Tur. Wst.COOP, Wst.Tur.CONF. r(85)= -0,0086). In other words, 
when Non-European West cooperates more with Turkey, Turkey conflicts 
slightly less with Non-European West, whereas there is no association 
between Non-European West’s conflict to Turkey and Turkey’s cooperation 
to Non-European West.  
6.2.4. Eastern Europe  
In terms of cooperation volume, Turkey’s behavior to Eastern Europe 
comes the seventh, whereas Eastern Europe’s cooperation to Turkey comes 
tenth. There is a difference in pre-AKP and AKP periods. In pre-AKP 
periods, Turkey’s cooperation to Eastern Europe was the fifth largest, under 
AKP it fell to ninth. Eastern Europe’s cooperation to Turkey was the ninth in 
pre-AKP period, under AKP it fell to tenth position. In other words, Turkey 
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has always been more cooperative to Caucasian and Eastern European 
regions then they were to Turkey, yet the discrepancy inbetween decreased 
under AKP, because Eastern Europe lost prominence in Turkey’s foreign 
agenda under AKP. Cooperation reciprocity with Eastern Europe is the 
second highest, Eeu.Tur.COOP, Tur.Eeu.COOP r(85)=0,8512, p< .001.  
In terms of conflict volume, Turkey’s conflict to EEU is the eleventh, 
EEU’s conflict to Turkey is the twelveth. In Pre-AKP period, both of them 
were one rank higher, compared to AKP periods. In terms of conflict 
reciprocity, Eastern Europe and Turkey is one of the least reciprocal dyads. 
(Eeu.Tur.CONF, Tur.Eeu.CONF r(85)=0,2026, p< 0.1.  
Turkey’s behaviour does not osciliate with respect to Eastern Europe, 
but Eastern Europe’s oscilliates. (Tur.Eeu.CONF, Tur. Eeu.COOP r(85)= -­‐
0,0953	  and Eeu.Tur.CONF, Eeu.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,3700). There are is one 
positive feedback loop in bilateral relations  (Tur. Eeu.COOP, Eeu.Tur.CONF 
r(85)= -­‐0,2209), and no negative feedback loops (Tur. Eeu.CONF, 
Eeu.Tur.COOP, r(85)= 0,0686). In other words, when Turkey cooperates 
more with Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe conflicts less with Turkey, 
whereas there is no association between Eastern Europe’s cooperation to 
Turkey and Turkey’s conflict to Eastern Europe. 	  
The relationship patterns between Turkey and Eastern Europe shows 
an important potential for cooperation since cooperation reciprocity is high, 
conflict reciprocity is low, cooperation volume is high and conflict volume is 
low. Turkey’s post-cold war opening to Caucasia and Eastern Europe seems 
to have paid off: although their cooperation volume fell short of Turkey’s 
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(which means Turkey invested more than it got) the investment proved to be 
not risky, because Turkey most certainly receives some cooperation back, 
whereas conflict was not as reciprocal. 
6.2.5. Asia 
On average, Turkey’s cooperation volume to Asia is the eighth, 
whereas Asia’s cooperation to Turkey is the ninth. In pre-AKP, Turkey’s 
cooperation to Asia was the eighth, under AKP it raised to seventh place. 
Asia’s cooperation to Turkey was tenth in pre-AKP, under AKP it raised to 
eighth. Under AKP then, overall cooperation with Asia has increased. 
Cooperation reciprocity with Asia is the third highest after Eastern Europe:  
r(85)=0.8496, p< 0.001. 
In terms of conflict volume, Turkey’s conflict to Asia came ninth, 
whereas Asia conflict to Turkey came the tenth. In pre-AKP, average conflict 
score from Asia to Turkey was twelth, whereas from Turkey to Asia was 
eighth. Under AKP, Turkey conflictual behavior to Asia fell to the tenth 
position, whereas Asia’s conflict to Turkey rose to ninth. Conflict reciprocity 
with Asia is also high, the second highest after Western Europe.  
Asa.Tur.CONF, Tur.Asa.CONF, r(85)=0.5977, p< .001.   
Asia’s behaviour does not osciliate with respect to Turkey 
(Asa.Tur.CONF, Asa.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,0063) whereas Turkey’s oscilliates 
slightly (Tur.Asa.CONF, Tur.Asa.COOP r(85)= 0,2018, p<0.1) There are 
neither positive nor negative feedback loops in bilateral relations  
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(Tur.Asa.CONF, Asa.Tur.COOP, r(85)= 0,0154, Tur.Asa.COOP, 
Asa.Tur.CONF. r(85)= -0,1627).  
Like relations with Western Europe, Turkey’s both cooperation and 
conflict reciprocity with Asia are high. The relations are less dense, though. 
Although both cooperation and conflict is met in kind and in volume, the 
lack of positive feedback loops implies a compartmentalized, tit-for-tat type 
of relations unlike with Western Europe. Under AKP, cooperation volume 
increased due to Turkey’s initiative. Conflict volume has also increased in 
the same period, because of Asia’s initiative. Yet under AKP, conflict from 
Asia rose more than cooperation from Asia, although Turkey’s conflictual 
behaviour decreased in the same period.  
6.2.6. Non-State actors 
The eleventh most cooperative dyad in terms of volume is TUR.NST, 
whereas foreign non-State actors’ cooperative behavior to Turkey is only the 
fourteenth. In terms of ranking, Non-State actors’ cooperative behavior did 
not change under AKP, whereas Turkey’s cooperative behavior was twelth 
in pre-AKP periods. Therefore, overall cooperation level with Non-state 
actors increased because of Turkey’s cooperative behavior under AKP 
period.  Nevertheless, Turkey/Non-State actors is the least reciprocal dyad 
in terms of cooperation. Nst.Tur.COOP, Tur.Nst.COOP, r(85)= 0,4393, p< 
.001.  
Overall conflict volume with Non-State actors also decreased under 
AKP due to NST behavior: whereas Turkey’s conflict level remained the 
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third in both pre-AKP and AKP periods, Non-State actors conflictual 
behaviour to Turkey was the fourth highest before AKP, and fell to sixth 
place under AKP. Conflict reciprocity with Non-State actors is the fifth 
highest, Nst.Tur.CONF Tur.Nst.CONF, r(85)=0,4550, p< 0.001. 
Neither Non-State actors’s behaviour nor Turkey’s osciliate with 
respect to each other (Nst.Tur.CONF, Nst.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,0098	  and	  Tur. 
Nst.CONF, Tur. Nst.COOP r(85)= 0,1163) There is no positive feedback 
loops, but one negative feedback loop  in bilateral relations (Tur.Nst.CONF, 
Nst.Tur.COOP, r(85)= 0,2120, Tur.Nst.COOP, Nst.Tur.CONF. r(85)=	  -­‐0,0628). 
In other words, non-state actors’ cooperate more with Turkey, when Turkey 
conflicts more with non-state actors’. There is no association between non-
state actors’ conflict to Turkey and Turkey’s cooperation to non-state actors’. 
Coupled with a rather average cooperation reciprocity compared to other 
regions, Turkey’s cooperation to the Middle East is met with mixed 
responds.	  
6.2.7. Intergovernmental Organizations 
On average, intergovernmental organizations’ cooperation to Turkey 
is the twelfth highest, whereas Turkey’s cooperation to intergovernmental 
organizations is the thirteenth.  Turkey’s cooperation volume was the same 
for both pre-AKP and AKP periods. IGO’s cooperation volume was the 
eleventh in pre-AKP period, whereas it is the twelveth under AKP. 
Therefore, overall cooperation volume decreased due to decreasing IGO 
cooperation, not Turkey’s. 
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In terms of cooperation reciprocity, Turkey and intergovernmental 
organizations is the fourth most reciprocal dyad. Igo.Tur.COOP,  
Tur.Igo.COOP r(85)= 0,8045, p< 0.001. Overall conflict volume with 
intergovernmental organizations did not change. Both before and after AKP, 
intergovernmental organizations’ conflict to Turkey is one rank higher than 
Turkey’s conflict to intergovernmental organizations’, which occupy 
thirteenth and fourteenth rank respectively.  Conflict reciprocity with 
intergovernmental organizations is the fifth highest Tur.Igo.CONF, 
Igo.Tur.CONF r(85)=0,3906, p<0.001. 
Neither intergovernmental organizations’ behaviour nor Turkey’s 
oscilliate with respect to each other (Igo.Tur.CONF, Igo.Tur.COOP r(85)= 
0,0052 and	  Tur.Igo.CONF, Tur.Igo.COOP r(85)= 0,0651) There are no positive 
or negative feedback loops in bilateral relations (Igo.Tur.CONF, 
Tur.Igo.COOP r(85)= 0,0404	  and Tur.Igo.CONF, Igo.Tur.COOP r(85)=	  
0,1587).	  
6.2.8. Sub-Saharan Africa  
In terms of cooperation volume, Turkey’s behavior to sub-Saharan 
Africa is the sixteenth, whereas Sub-Saharan Africa’s cooperation to Turkey 
is the fifteenth. Under AKP, the ranking is reverse. Turkey’s cooperation was 
less than Africa’s cooperation to Turkey before AKP, whereas under AKP 
Turkey’s cooperation is more than Africa’s cooperation. In terms of 
cooperation reciprocity, Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa is the 8th most  
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cooperative dyad, surpassing only Turkey/non-state actors dyad 
(Tur.Afr.COOP, Afr.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,5768, p< 0.001) 
Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa is also the least conflictual dyad. 
Turkey’s conflict to Africa is sixteenth highest, whereas Africa’s conflict to 
Turkey is the fifteenth highest. There is no difference in rankings between 
pre-AKP and AKP periods. There is no conflict reciprocity between Turkey 
and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Afr.Tur.CONF Tur.Afr.CONF, r(85)= -0,0655. 
Turkey’s behaviour does not osciliate with respect to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but Sub-Saharan Africa’s oscilliates. (Tur.Afr.CONF, Tur. Afr.COOP 
r(85)= -0,1756 and Afr.Tur.CONF, Afr.Tur.COOP r(85)= 0,4680). There is no 
positive feedback loop (Tur.Afr.COOP, Afr.Tur.CONF. r(85)= -­‐0,1380), but 
one negative feedback loop in bilateral relations. (Tur.Afr.CONF, 
Afr.Tur.COOP, r(85)= 0,2580). In other words, when Sub-Saharan Africa 
cooperates more with Turkey, Turkey conflicts more with Sub-Saharan 
Africa. There is no association between Turkey’s cooperation to Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa’s conflict to Turkey.	  
6.2.9. Latin America and the Caribbean 
Cooperation volume with Latin America is the lowest among regions. 
Turkey’s cooperation to Latin America is the eighteenth, whereas Latin 
America’s cooperation to Turkey is the seventeenth. The rankings do not 
differ before and after AKP. In terms of cooperation reciprocity, Turkey and 
LAM dyad is the seventh, higher than sub-Saharan Africa and Non-state 
actors.( Lam.Tur.COOP, Tur.Lam.COOP r(85)= 0,5985, p< .001) 
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 In terms of conflict volume, Turkey’s conflict to LAM is the 
seventeenth, whereas LAM conflict to Turkey is eighteenth. Under AKP, the 
ranking was reverse: Turkey’s conflict to LAM is the eighteenth, whereas 
LAM conflict to Turkey is the seventeenth.  The change suggests that, 
Turkey’s conflictual behavior to LAM has decreased in AKP period. There is 
no conflict reciprocity between LAM and Turkey (LAM.Tur.CONF, 
Tur.LAM.CONF r(85)= -0,0045.  
Turkey’s behaviour osciliates with respect to Latin America, but Latin 
America’s does not. (Tur.Lam.CONF, Tur.Lam.COOP r(85)= 0,3604 and	  
Lam.Tur.CONF, Lam.Tur.COOP r(85)= -­‐0,1596). There is no positive 
feedback loop (Tur.Lam.CONF, Lam.Tur.COOP, r(85)=	  -­‐0,0459) but one 
negative feedback loop in bilateral relations. (Tur.Lam.COOP, 
Lam.Tur.CONF. r(85)= 0,4797), In other words, when Turkey cooperates 
more with Latin America, Latin America conflicts more with Turkey. There 
is no association between Turkey’s conflict to Latin America and Latin 
America’s cooperation to Turkey. 
6.2.10. Inter-relationships Between Dyads  
Considering the debates about Turkey's diminishing relations with 
“the West” and improving relations with “the Rest”, a correlational analysis 
of associations between Turkey’s cooperation and conflict with each region 
against the others may reveal more. Analysis of this type may help to 
understand whether and to what extent Turkey sees a trade-off between its 
relations with one region and another.  
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The following table shows trade-offs in Turkey’s foreign behavior. A 
trade-off between Region A and Region B exists a) When Turkey’s 
cooperation to region A is negatively correlated with Turkey’s cooperation 
to Region B. b) Turkey’s conflictual behavior to region A is negatively 
correlated with Turkey’s conflictual behavior to Region B. c) When Turkey’s 
cooperation to region A is positively correlated with Turkey’s conflictual 
behavior to Region B. a) and b) are true trade-offs whereas c) points to a less 
direct but probably deeper negative relationship. 
Table 13 Trade-offs in Turkey’s Foreign Behavior 
Dyad1	   Dyad2	   P.Cor	   Sign.	  Level	  Tur.Afr.COOP	   Tur.Igo.COOP	   -­‐0,2952	   P<0.01	  Tur.Afr.COOP	   Tur.Nst.CONF	   0,3332	   P<0.01	  Tur.Afr.COOP	   Tur.Weu.CONF	   0,2189	   P<0.05	  Tur.Afr.COOP	   Tur.Wst.COOP	   -­‐0,4074	   P<0.001	  Tur.Asa.CONF	   Tur.Eeu.CONF	   -­‐0,2387	   P<0.05	  Tur.Asa.COOP	   Tur.Eeu.CONF	   0,2859	   P<0.01	  Tur.Asa.COOP	   Tur.Mea.COOP	   -­‐0,2548	   P<0.05	  Tur.Eeu.CONF	   Tur.Asa.CONF	   -­‐0,2387	   P<0.05	  Tur.Eeu.CONF	   Tur.Asa.COOP	   0,2859	   P<0.01	  Tur.Eeu.COOP	   Tur.Igo.CONF	   0,2612	   P<0.05	  Tur.Eeu.COOP	   Tur.Lam.CONF	   0,2421	   P<0.05	  Tur.Igo.CONF	   Tur.Eeu.COOP	   0,2612	   P<0.05	  Tur.Igo.COOP	   Tur.Wst.COOP	   -­‐0,2812	   P<0.01	  Tur.Igo.COOP	   Tur.Afr.COOP	   -­‐0,2952	   P<0.01	  Tur.Lam.CONF	   Tur.Eeu.COOP	   0,2421	   P<0.05	  Tur.Mea.COOP	   Tur.Asa.COOP	   -­‐0,2548	   P<0.05	  Tur.Nst.CONF	   Tur.Afr.COOP	   0,3332	   P<0.01	  Tur.Nst.CONF	   Tur.Wst.COOP	   0,2434	   P<0.05	  Tur.Nst.COOP	   Tur.Weu.CONF	   0,2204	   P<0.05	  Tur.Weu.CONF	   Tur.Afr.COOP	   0,2189	   P<0.05	  Tur.Weu.CONF	   Tur.Nst.COOP	   0,2204	   P<0.05	  Tur.Wst.COOP	   Tur.Nst.CONF	   0,2434	   P<0.05	  Tur.Wst.COOP	   Tur.Afr.COOP	   -­‐0,4074	   P<0.001	  Tur.Wst.COOP	   Tur.Igo.COOP	   -­‐0,2812	   P<0.01	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In general, there is not a trade-off between Turkey relations with the 
West (Weu and Wst) and the East (Asa, Eeu, Mea).  
Turkey’s cooperation to sub-Saharan Africa however, is negatively 
correlated with Turkey’s cooperation to Non-European West, and more 
importantly, positively correlated with Turkey’s conflictual behaviour to 
W.Europe. The associations imply, Turkey increases its cooperation to sub-
saharan Africa, when it does not cooperate as much with non-European 
West, and when it actually behaves conflictually against W.Europe.  
There is another trade-off between the non-European West and 
foreign non-state actors. When Turkey conflicts more with non-state actors, 
it cooperates more with the Non-European West. Moreover, when Turkey 
cooperates more with foreign non-state actors, it conflicts more with 
W.Europe.  
There is also a trade-off between Turkey’s cooperation to non-
European West and its cooperation to intergovernmental organizations. 
When it cooperates more with one, it cooperates less with the other. There is 
not a trade-off between Turkey relations with W.Europe and Non-European 
West.  
When we look at “the East”, the trade-offs are mostly between 
E.Europe and Asia. Turkey’s conflict to E.Europe is not only positively 
correlated to its cooperation to Asia, but also negatively correlated to its 
conflict to Asia. Although cooperation to one does not hinder cooperation to 
the other, Turkey tries not to have conflictual relations with them at the 
same time. Moreover, either Turkey behaves less conflictually against 
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E.Europe and less cooperatively to Asia, or behaves more conflictually 
against E.Europe and more cooperatively to Asia.   
Turkey’s cooperation to Asia is also negatively correlated with 
Turkey’s cooperation to the Middle East. Whenever Turkey cooperates more 
with one, it cooperates less with the other.  
Turkey’s cooperation to intergovernmental organizations also 
positively correlates with Turkey’s conflict to the Middle East. In other 
words, when Turkey cooperates with IGOs more, it behaves more 
conflictually against the Middle East. The reverse, however, is not true: there 
is not a positive relationship between Turkey’s cooperation to the Middle 
East and its conflictual behavior to the IGOs. 
Lastly, Turkey’s cooperation to Eastern Europe is positively 
correlated with conflict against Latin America. Yet, since data concerning 
Turkey’s conflictual relations with Latin America is very sparse, the 
association may not be as reliable.   
There are also mutually reinforcing associations in Turkey’s foreign 
behavior. A mutually reinforcing association exists between Turkey’s 
relations with Region A and Region B a) When Turkey’s cooperation to 
region A is positively correlated with Turkey’s cooperation to Region B. b) 
Turkey’s conflictual behavior to region A is positively correlated with 
Turkey’s conflictual behavior to Region B. c) When Turkey’s cooperation to 
region A is negatively correlated with Turkey’s conflictual behavior to 
Region B. a) and b) are true mutually reinforcing associations where as c) 
points to a more indirect association.   
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Table 14 Mutually Reinforcing Associations in Turkey’s Foreign Behavior 
Tur.Afr.CONF	   Tur.Mea.CONF	   0,3884	   P<0.001	  Tur.Afr.COOP	   Tur.Mea.COOP	   0,7542	   P<0.001	  Tur.Asa.CONF	   Tur.Igo.CONF	   0,2263	   P<0.05	  Tur.Asa.CONF	   Tur.Lam.COOP	   -­‐0,2912	   P<0.01	  Tur.Asa.CONF	   Tur.Nst.COOP	   -­‐0,3171	   P<0.01	  Tur.Asa.CONF	   Tur.Eeu.COOP	   -­‐0,4242	   P<0.001	  Tur.Asa.COOP	   Tur.Weu.COOP	   0,3696	   P<0.001	  Tur.Asa.COOP	   Tur.Nst.COOP	   0,2593	   P<0.05	  Tur.Asa.COOP	   Tur.Weu.CONF	   -­‐0,2162	   P<0.05	  Tur.Eeu.CONF	   Tur.Weu.CONF	   0,43	   P<0.001	  Tur.Eeu.CONF	   Tur.Nst.COOP	   -­‐0,2521	   P<0.05	  Tur.Eeu.COOP	   Tur.Weu.COOP	   0,2177	   P<0.05	  Tur.Eeu.COOP	   Tur.Asa.CONF	   -­‐0,4242	   P<0.001	  Tur.Igo.CONF	   Tur.Asa.CONF	   0,2263	   P<0.05	  Tur.Igo.CONF	   Tur.Wst.COOP	   -­‐0,2215	   P<0.05	  Tur.Igo.COOP	   Tur.Weu.COOP	   0,2743	   P<0.05	  Tur.Igo.COOP	   Tur.Mea.COOP	   0,219	   P<0.05	  Tur.Lam.CONF	   Tur.Wst.CONF	   0,3483	   P<0.001	  Tur.Lam.CONF	   Tur.Wst.COOP	   -­‐0,2534	   P<0.05	  Tur.Lam.COOP	   Tur.Mea.COOP	   0,2113	   P<0.05	  Tur.Lam.COOP	   Tur.Asa.CONF	   -­‐0,2912	   P<0.01	  Tur.Mea.CONF	   Tur.Afr.CONF	   0,3884	   P<0.001	  Tur.Mea.COOP	   Tur.Afr.COOP	   0,7542	   P<0.001	  Tur.Mea.COOP	   Tur.Wst.COOP	   0,3638	   P<0.001	  Tur.Mea.COOP	   Tur.Weu.COOP	   0,3071	   P<0.01	  Tur.Mea.COOP	   Tur.Igo.COOP	   0,219	   P<0.05	  Tur.Mea.COOP	   Tur.Lam.COOP	   0,2113	   P<0.05	  Tur.Mea.COOP	   Tur.Nst.CONF	   -­‐0,2364	   P<0.05	  Tur.Mea.COOP	   Tur.Weu.CONF	   -­‐0,2877	   P<0.01	  Tur.Nst.CONF	   Tur.Mea.COOP	   -­‐0,2364	   P<0.05	  Tur.Nst.COOP	   Tur.Asa.COOP	   0,2593	   P<0.05	  Tur.Nst.COOP	   Tur.Eeu.CONF	   -­‐0,2521	   P<0.05	  Tur.Nst.COOP	   Tur.Asa.CONF	   -­‐0,3171	   P<0.01	  Tur.Weu.CONF	   Tur.Eeu.CONF	   0,43	   P<0.001	  Tur.Weu.CONF	   Tur.Asa.COOP	   -­‐0,2162	   P<0.05	  Tur.Weu.CONF	   Tur.Mea.COOP	   -­‐0,2877	   P<0.01	  Tur.Weu.COOP	   Tur.Asa.COOP	   0,3696	   P<0.001	  Tur.Weu.COOP	   Tur.Mea.COOP	   0,3071	   P<0.01	  Tur.Weu.COOP	   Tur.Igo.COOP	   0,2743	   P<0.05	  Tur.Weu.COOP	   Tur.Eeu.COOP	   0,2177	   P<0.05	  Tur.Wst.CONF	   Tur.Lam.CONF	   0,3483	   P<0.001	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Table 14 (Cont’d) 
Tur.Wst.COOP	   Tur.Mea.COOP	   0,3638	   P<0.001	  Tur.Wst.COOP	   Tur.Igo.CONF	   -­‐0,2215	   P<0.05	  Tur.Wst.COOP	   Tur.Lam.CONF	   -­‐0,2534	   P<0.05	  
Turkey’s behavior to the Middle East is the most interconnected dyad 
to Turkey’s relations with other regions in a mutually reinforcing manner. 
Turkey’s cooperation with Middle East positively correlates with 
cooperation to five other regions, (Afr, Igo, Lam, Weu, Wst) and negatively 
correlates with conflict towards non-State actors and W.Europe. Moreover, 
Turkey’s conflict to Middle East positively correlates Turkey’s conflict to 
sub-Saharan Africa: whenever Turkey cooperates with one, it also 
cooperates with the other, whenever it conflicts one it also conflicts with the 
other.  
The second most interconnected dyad is Turkey and W.Europe. 
Turkey’s cooperation to W.Europe is positively correlated with Turkey’s 
cooperation to Asia, the Middle East, E.Europe and IGOs. Similary, conflict 
to W.Europe is positively correlated with conflict to E.Europe, and 
negatively correlated with cooperation to Asia and the Middle East. 
The third most interconnected dyad is Turkey and Asia. In addition to 
its association to the Middle East and W.Europe, Turkey’s cooperation to 
Asia is positively correlated with Turkey’s cooperation to non-state actors. 
Turkey’s conflict to Asia is negatively correlated with cooperation to Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and foreign non-state actors, positively correlated 
with Turkey’s conflict to IGOs. In general, whereas Turkey’s affairs with 
other regions are more related to Turkey’s cooperation to W.Europe and 
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M.East than its conflict towards them, Turkey’s affairs with other regions are 
more related to Turkey’s conflict to Asia than its cooperation to Asia. ın 
other words, whereas cooperating with the Middle East and Western Europe 
is associated with more cooperation or less conflict with several other 
regions, whereas conflict to Asia is associated with more cooperation or less 
conflict to other regions. 
The level of mutual reinforcing of other regions are more or less 
similar. In addition to its association with the cooperation towards the 
Middle East, Turkey’s cooperation to non-European West is negatively 
correlated with Turkey’s conflict to IGOs and Latin America. Turkey’s 
conflict to non-European West is also positively correlated with Turkey’s 
conflict to Latin America.  
Turkey’s conflict to E.Europe is negatively correlated with 
cooperation to non-state actors and positively correlated with conflict to 
W.Europe. Turkey’s cooperation to Eastern Europe is positively correlated 
with its cooperation to Western Europe, and negatively with conflict to Asia. 
Turkey’s cooperation to non-state actors is positively correlated with 
Turkey’s cooperation to Asia, and negatively correlated with Turkey’s 
conflict to Asia and E.Eastern Europe. Turkey’s conflict to Non-State actors 
is negatively correlated with Turkey’s cooperation to the Middle East. 
6.3. Conclusion 
In all years between 1995-2000, and 2002-2006 events generated about 
Turkey surpasses the average (1,36 % and 1,23 % respectively). Therefore, 
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these two periods are the more likely candidates for periods of “Turkey’s 
activism.” The lowest points are 1994 (0,76 %) and 2008 (0,77 %).  
However, some of “Turkey’s activism” is composed of Turkey’s 
domestic affairs. In terms of foreign relations, only the periods 1995-1998, 
2000 and 2003-2006, Turkey is especially active in foreign affairs.  
Turkey’s proactivism, (defined as showing more initiative than 
foreign actors) was prominent in 2000-2003, 2006, and 2008-2012. Combined, 
Turkey is both active and proactive in foreign affairs in years 2000, 2003 and 
2006 only. 
Almost one third of all Turkey-related international event is between 
Turkey and a Western European country. Second most important region is 
the Middle East and North Africa, comprising of one fifth of Turkey’s 
international affairs. Other Western countries comprise 12 %. Therefore, 
historically Turkish foreign affairs have been mostly Western oriented (44% 
in total). 
In the first five years of AKP rule, more than half of Turkey’s 
international relations were with Western countries. Relations with the 
Middle East were also prominent, yet not significantly more than before. 
When Turkey focused on its relations with Western Europe, relations with 
Asia and Eastern Europe seem to have lost prominence, but relations with 
the Middle East have not. Relations with non-European West and the 
Middle East were also not particularly dichotomous.  
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In the second five years of AKP rule, prominence of Western Europe 
in Turkey’s foreign affairs decreased, but it still occupied the first position. 
The Middle East has still been the second, but its prominence increased 
significantly.  
The findings suggest that there is not a trade-off between the Middle 
East and Western Europe, or between the Middle East and the non-
European West. There is not a trade-off between Turkey’s relations with 
W.Europe and Non-European West, either.  
There seems to be a trade off between sub-Saharan Africa on the one 
hand and WST/WEU on the other however. There is also a trade-off 
between Eastern Europe and Asia, on the one hand Asia and the Middle 
East, on the other.
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
FINDINGS 2: DOMESTIC PROCESSES AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, a general picture of Turkey’s foreign afairs 
was given. This chapter deals with more domestic level explanations about 
Turkey’s axis shift. The first part deals with Turkey’s restructuration of its 
foreign affairs on the basis of its historical and religious identity and focus 
on Turkey’s relations with previously-Ottoman countries and Muslim 
countries. The second part looks at foreign affairs by Turkey’s non-state 
actors, and compares them across geographical regions and specific 
countries. Third part deals with changing Turkish civil-military relations 
and its association with Turkey-Israeli affairs. The fourth part deals with 
domestic terrorism and its relationship to Turkey’s foreign affairs with 
specific regions. The chapter concludes by a summary of the findings. 
7.1. Islam and Neo-Ottomanism in Foreign Policy 
In Turkish foreign policy literature, some observers claimed that 
religion and a common (Ottoman) identity is the most important
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determinant in explaining Turkey’s foreign relations. They state that 
Turkey’s increasing relations with its neighbors is an ideological and 
identity-based restructuring of Turkish foreign policy principles. They point 
to the sources of this identity restructuration as Islamist ideology and a 
revived interest in Ottoman past, and argue that in practice, such a mindset 
has led to solidarity with neighbours on the basis of Islamic values.378They 
point to two groups of actors, which are defined as the focus of Turkey’s 
religion-identity based activism: predominantly Muslim entities and 
countries that were previously under Ottoman rule.  
Therefore, testing religion/identity based arguments necessitates 
looking into two groups of states separately and comparing them against 
each other. The following table shows Turkey’s volume of interaction with 
predominantly Muslim379 countries and non-state groups in AKP and pre-
AKP periods. 
Table 15 Turkey’s Affairs with Predominantly Muslim entities 
%	   PRE-­‐AKP	  (1991-­‐2002)	   AKP	  	  	  	  (2003-­‐2012)	   TOTAL	  	  	  	  (1991-­‐2012)	  MOS.TUR	   20,5	   16,8	   18,51	  TUR.MOS	   20,5	   22,3	   21,50	  NMOS.TUR	   29,9	   31,2	   30,62	  TUR.NMOS	   29,1	   29,6	   29,37	  TOTAL	   100,0	   100,0	   100,0	  
 
                                                
378 Soner Çağaptay “Is Turkey Leaving the West?” Foreign Affairs, available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65661/soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-
west?page=show 
379 Based on UN data. MOS includes a) states whose population is at least 50 % 
Muslim(e.g.Nigeria), b)sub-state ethnic groups who are at least 50% 
Muslim(e.g.Chechens in Russia, Turks in Germany), c) un-affiliated ethnic groups who 
are at least 50% Muslim (e.g.Kurdish, Arab) d) sub-state Muslim groups (e.g. Muslims in 
France). NMOS includes all other ethnic, religious groups and states. 
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On average, 60% of Turkey’s all foreign interactions occurs between 
Turkey and a Non-Muslim group or state, whereas 40% occurs between 
Turkey and a Muslim group or state.  Before 2002, the ratio was 59% to 41%, 
and after 2003, approximately 61% to 39%. Therefore, there is no major 
difference in terms of Turkey’s overall interaction with Muslim entities 
compared to its interactions with Non-Muslim entities between AKP and 
pre-AKP periods. Turkey’s behavior to both Non-Muslim and Muslim 
entities increased under AKP, whereas Muslims’ behavior to Turkey 
decreased, and Non-Muslims’s behaviour increased.  
Table 16 Turkey’s Affairs with predominantly Muslim and Non-Muslim 
Entities 
%	   2003-­‐2007	   2008-­‐2012	  MOS.TUR	   14,94	   20,00	  TUR.MOS	   19,23	   27,45	  NMOS.TUR	   34,07	   26,51	  TUR.NMOS	   31,75	   26,05	  TOTAL	   100,00	   100,00	  
A comparative look at first and second half of AKP periods shows a 
more differentiated picture. In both periods, more than half of all Turkey’s 
foreign interactions were with Non-Muslim entities. However, in the first 
half, 34 % of Turkey’s all foreign interactions were with a Muslim entity (6 
points less than average). This lower level of interaction was mostly due to 
decreasing Muslim entity behavior (3,5 points less than average). But, 
Turkey’s behavior to Muslim entities was also approximately 2 points less 
than average. In the second half, 47% of Turkey’s all foreign interactions was 
with a Muslim entity (7 points higher than average). In this second half 
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Muslim entity behavior superseded the average by 1,5 points, whereas 
Turkey’s behavior to Muslim entities superseded the average by 6 points. 
Turkey’s relations with Muslim entities are highly reciprocal both in 
terms of conflict and cooperation. (TUR.MOS.COOP, MOS.TUR COOP 
r(85)= 0.5940, p< 0.001 and TUR.MOS.CONF, MOS.TUR CONF r(85)= 
0.5077, p< 0.001.) Nevertheless, Turkey’s behavior to Muslim entities 
oscilliates more than Turkey’s behavior to Non-Muslim entities. 
(TUR.MOS.CONF TUR.MOS COOP r(85)= 0.4748 p<0.001, 
TUR.NMOS.CONF TUR.NMOS COOP r(85)=0.3254 p< 0.01). Turkey’s 
cooperative behavior to Muslim entities also positively correlates with 
Turkey’s cooperative behavior to Non-Muslim entities (TUR.MOS:COOP, 
TUR.NMOS.COOP, r(85)= 0.4981, p<0.001) which suggests that Turkey tries 
to balance its cooperative relations with respect to them. Turkey conflictual 
behaviors to two groups are not associated. (TUR.MOS.CONF, 
TUR.NMOS.CONF r(85)= 0.1631.)  
Muslims’ cooperative behavior to Turkey is negatively correlated 
with Turkey’s cooperation to Non-Muslim entities, (MOS.TUR.COOP, 
TUR.NMOS.COOP r(85)= -0.3316, p<0.01.  A partial cross-correlation 
analysis shows that 3 quarters after Muslim cooperation to Turkey increases, 
Turkey’s cooperation to Non-Muslim entities decreases.380 But, Turkey’s  
                                                
380 Cross correlational analysis is the correlation between two time series. The cross-
correlation test of two time-series data involves calculating the coefficient r by time-shifting 
the one data set relative to the other data set (correlating past values of one data-set with 
current values of the other). Each shift is called a "lag." As such, it helps to identify, to what 
extent one time-series data set can predict the future variation in the other set.  
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decreasing cooperative behavior to Non-Muslim entities increases Muslim 
cooperative behavior after 8 quarters.   
But Muslims’ cooperative behavior to Turkey positively correlates 
with Non-Muslim entities cooperation to Turkey MOS.TUR.COOP, 
NMOS.TUR.COOP r(85)= 0.2970. A cross-correlation analysis shows that 
Non-Muslim entities cooperative behavior follows Muslim entities 
cooperation after 3 quarters, not vice versa.  
Moreover, Turkey’s cooperation to Muslim entities is positively 
correlated with Non-Muslims’ cooperative behavior to Turkey. TUR. 
MOS.COOP, NMOS.TUR.COOP r(85)= 0.3880.  
When Muslims cooperate with Turkey, this leads to increasing 
cooperation from Turkey to Muslims, as well as increasing cooperation from 
Non-Muslims to Turkey. Turkey, trying to balance its cooperation levels, 
increases its cooperation to Non-Muslims as well. However, positive 
feedback from Muslim entities makes Turkey less interested in cooperation 
with non-Muslim entities. Moreover, Turkey’s increasing cooperation to 
Non-Muslims negatively effects Muslim cooperation to Turkey in 2 years. 
The whole cycle is a 3 years-long negative feedback loop. While initial 
Muslim cooperation to Turkey boosts Turkey’s all foreign relations in less 
than a year, the negative feedback on Muslim cooperation happens 2 years 
after the initial boost. 
There is a strong relationship between Turkey’s behaviour to Muslim 
countries and countries that were previously under Ottoman rule. Part of 
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this, of course, relates to the fact there are 30-countries which are both 
previously Ottoman and Muslim.381  Since these two groups strongly 
overlap, one way to test them is to separate previously Ottoman countries 
into predeominanly Muslim and non-Muslim, to see the effect of religion. 
Table 17 Turkey's Behaviour to Previously Ottoman Countries vs. 
Predominantly Muslim Countries Partial	  Correlation	   Tur.Ott.Conf	   Tur.Ott.	  Coop	   Tur.Mos.Conf	   Tur.Mos.Coop	  Tur.Ott.Conf	  	   1	   0.3332	   0.8682	   -­‐0.1898	  Tur.Ott.Coop	  	   0.3332	   1	   -­‐0.3239	   0.8486	  Tur.Mos.Conf	   0.8682	   -­‐0.3239	   1	   0.3249	  Tur.Mos.Coop	   -­‐0.1898	   0.8486	   0.3249	   1	  
To understand whether Turkey focuses more on Muslim countries 
within previously Ottoman countries or not, Turkey’s overall activity level 
(both cooperative and conflictual) with respect to Non-Muslim and Muslim 
countries are comparatively analyzed. 
On average, 45 % of Turkey’s all foreign interactions occur between 
Turkey and a previously Ottoman state. In 1991- 2002, the ratio was 47 %, 
whereas after 2003, it is 44 %. Therefore, although there is no major 
difference, compared to its interactions with other countries, Turkey’s 
overall interaction with previously Ottoman countries were higher in pre-
AKP periods. Nevertheless, Turkey’s behavior to previously Ottoman-
                                                
381 Countries previously  under Ottoman rule are defined as countries whose current 
territories -in part or as a whole -were under direct or indirect Ottoman rule for a period. 
As such, they are Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Turkish Cyprus, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Nagorno Karabakh, Omman, Palestine, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudia Arabia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Sudan, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen 
and Yugoslavia as well as North Africa and ethnic Arabs.  
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Muslim countries increased by 3 points under AKP, whereas its behavior to 
Non-Muslim previously Ottoman countries decreased by 2,5 points. 
Previously Ottoman/Muslim countries’ behavior to Turkey however, 
decreased by 2 % under AKP, compared to pre-AKP period. In consequence, 
Turkey has become more proactive towards previously Ottoman/Muslim 
countries, whereas it became less proactive towards previously Ottoman 
Non-Muslim countries. 
Table 18 Turkey's Behaviour to Previously Ottoman and non-Ottoman 
Countries before and after AKP 
%	   PRE-­‐AKP	  [1991-­‐2002]	   AKP[2003-­‐2012]	   1991-­‐2012	  Non-­‐Ottoman	  to	  Turkey	   26,19	   27,79	   27,06	  Turkey	  to	  non-­‐Ottoman	   26,98	   28,46	   27,78	  Ottoman/Muslim	  to	  Turkey	   14,16	   12,02	   12,99	  Turkey	  to	  Ottoman/Muslim	   12,02	   15,32	   13,82	  Ottoman/Non-­‐Muslim	  to	  Turkey	   10,05	   8,26	   9,07	  Turkey	  to	  Ottoman/Non-­‐Muslim	   10,61	   8,15	   9,27	  TOTAL	   100	   100	   100	  
Turkey’s foreign affairs with previously Ottoman countries shows a 
stark change from the first half to the second half of AKP rule. In the first 
period, only 37.45 % of Turkey’s all foreign interactions are with a 
previously Ottoman country, 60% of which was with a Muslim one. In 2008-
2012, 54.14 % of all foreign interactions are with a previously Ottoman 
country, 65 % of which was with a Muslim one. Therefore, in the second 
half, relations with previously Ottoman Non-Muslim countries also  
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increased compared to the first period, yet the increment in relations with 
Muslim countries were more than non-Muslim ones.  
Table 19 Turkey's Behaviour to Previously Ottoman Countries under AKP 
%	   2003-­‐2007	   2008-­‐2012	  Non-­‐Ottoman	  to	  Turkey	   31,34	   21,93	  Turkey	  to	  Non-­‐Ottoman	   31,20	   23,93	  Ottoman/Muslim	  to	  Turkey	   10,01	   15,34	  Turkey	  to	  Ottoman/Muslim	   12,50	   19,98	  Ottoman/Non-­‐Muslim	  to	  Turkey	   7,66	   9,24	  Turkey	  to	  Ottoman/Non-­‐Muslim	   7,28	   9,58	  TOTAL	   100	   100	  
 
 
Figure 23 Volume of Turkey's Behaviour to Previously Ottoman Countries 
1991-1995 shows a limited engagement with previously Ottoman 
countries, yet Turkey had balanced its attention between both Muslim and 
non-Muslim countries. 
0	  50	  
100	  150	  
200	  250	  
300	  
Apr	  19
91	   Oct	  199
1	  
Apr	  19
92	   Oct	  199
2	  
Apr	  19
93	   Oct	  199
3	  
Apr	  19
94	  
Oct	  199
4	  
Apr	  19
95	   Oct	  199
5	  
Apr	  19
96	   Oct	  199
6	  
Apr	  19
97	   Oct	  199
7	  
Apr	  19
98	   Oct	  199
8	  
Apr	  19
99	   Oct	  199
9	  
Apr	  20
00	   Oct	  200
0	  
Apr	  20
01	   Oct	  200
1	  
Apr	  20
02	   Oct	  200
2	  
Apr	  20
03	   Oct	  200
3	  
Apr	  20
04	  
Oct	  200
4	  
Apr	  20
05	   Oct	  200
5	  
Apr	  20
06	   Oct	  200
6	  
Apr	  20
07	   Oct	  200
7	  
Apr	  20
08	   Oct	  200
8	  
Apr	  20
09	   Oct	  200
9	  
Apr	  20
10	   Oct	  201
0	  
Apr	  20
11	   Oct	  201
1	  
Apr	  20
12	   Oct	  201
2	  
VOLUME	  OF	  TURKEY'S	  BEHAVIOUR	  TO	  PREVIOUSLY	  
OTTOMAN	  COUNTRIES	  (quarterly	  event	  counts)	  
Turkey	  to	  Ottoman/Muslim	   Turkey	  to	  Ottoman/Non-­‐Muslim	  
 
217 
In 1996, 2003 and 2007 there are dramatic increases in Turkey’s level 
of activity towards previously Ottoman/Muslim countries. The surge in 
2003 is probably due to war in Iraq, marking this period as the one in which 
Turkey is most active with respect to previously Ottoman Muslim countries. 
From 2011 onwards Turkey consistently focused more on Muslim countries, 
probably due to Arab unprisings in the wider region. Turkey’s behavior to 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries previously under Ottoman rule have 
been balanced in all other periods.   
Overall, it can be argued that there are a few differences with respect 
to Turkey’s relations with previously Ottoman countries between AKP and 
pre-AKP periods. Although Turkey’s behavior level was more or less in 
parallel to other countries’ behavior to Turkey in all periods, AKP 
governments have been more responsive to behaviours from the Muslim 
countries. A cross-correlation between number of monthly behaviours from 
previously Ottoman countries to Turkey and number of monthly behaviours 
from Turkey to previously Ottoman/Muslim Countries, shows that an 
increase in Turkey’s volume of behavior mostly follows an increase in their 
behavior, not vice versa. In other words, increasing level of interaction is 
mostly initated by previously Ottoman/Muslim countries, not Turkish 
government. During the AKP period, however, the responsiveness of 
Turkey has increased, compared to pre-AKP period. This is especially true 
for post-2011. 
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Figure 24 Cross correlation between the volume of Previously 
Ottoman/Muslim countries behaviour to Turkey and the volume of 
Turkey’s behaviour to previously Ottoman/Muslim countries under AKP
 
Figure 25 Cross correlation between the volume of Previously 
Ottoman/Muslim countries behaviour to Turkey and the volume of 
Turkey’s behaviour to previously Ottoman/non-Muslim countries under 
AKP 
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As stated previously, Turkey’s cooperative behaviour to Non-Muslim 
countries, and Muslim cooperation to Turkey constitutes a 3 years-long 
negative feedback loop. To see whether there is a similar pattern in volume 
of behaviors in Turkey’s affairs with Non-Muslim and Muslim countries, 
which were both previously under Ottoman rule, further analysis is needed. 
When Turkey’s volume of behavior to previously Ottoman-Non-Muslim 
countries increases, the volume of behavior by previously Ottoman-Muslim 
countries decreases in 3 months. Tur.OttNMos.n (t), OttMos.Tur.n (t+3), 
r(253)  = -0.208, p<0.001). After 29 months, the impact turns into positive and 
the volume of behavior by previously Ottoman-Muslim countries increases. 
(Tur.OttNMos.n (t), OttMos.Tur.n (t+29), r(227)  = 0.243, p<0.001). The 
impact of increasing volume of behavior by previously Ottoman-Muslim 
countries on Turkey’s behavior to previously-Ottoman non-Muslim 
countries is positive and much stronger, (Tur.OttNMos.n (t+24), 
OttMos.Tur.n (t), r(232)  = 0.361, p<0.001).  
Turkey’s relations with previously Ottoman/Muslim countries are 
reciprocal both in terms of conf!ict and cooperation. (TUR.OTTMOS.COOP, 
OTTMOS.TUR COOP r(85)= 0.5945, p< 0.001 and TUR.OTTMOS.CONF, 
OTTMOS.TUR CONF r(85)= 0.4930, p< 0.001.) Turkey’s relations with 
previously Ottoman/non-Muslim countries are more reciprocal in terms of 
cooperation. (TUR.OTTNMOS.COOP, OTTNMOS.TUR COOP r(85)=	  0,8631, 
p< 0.001) yet less reciprocal in terms of conflict (TUR.OTTNMOS.CONF, 
OTTNMOS.TUR CONF r(85)= 0,3430, p< 0.001.),  
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Turkey’s behavior to previously Ottoman/Muslim countries 
oscilliates more than Turkey’s behavior to previously Ottoman/Non-
Muslim countries (TUR.OTTMOS.CONF TUR.OTTMOS COOP r(85)= 0.4722 
p<0.001, TUR.OTTNMOS.CONF TUR.OTTNMOS COOP r(85)= 0.3788 p< 
0.001). Turkey’s cooperative behavior to previously Ottoman/Muslim 
countries also positively correlates with Turkey’s cooperative behavior to 
previously Ottoman/non-Muslim countries, which again suggests that 
Turkey tries to balance its cooperative relations with respect to them. 
(TUR.OTTMOS COOP, TUR.OTTNMOS COOP r(85)= 0.3025 p< 0.01) 
Table 20 Partial Correlations for Turkey’s Relations with Previously 
Ottoman Countries 
	  
OttMos.T
ur.COOP	  
OttMos.T
ur.CONF	  
OttNMos.
Tur.COOP	  
OttNMos.
Tur.CONF	  
Tur.OttM
os.COOP	  
Tur.OttM
os.CONF	  
Tur.OttN
Mos.COO
P	  
Tur.OttN
Mos.CON
F	  
OttMos.T
ur.COOP	   1	   0,2593	   0,2257	   0,1234	   0,5945	   -­‐0,1473	   -­‐0,2621	   0,0953	  
OttMos.T
ur.CONF	   0,2593	   1	   0,0329	   0,0839	   -­‐0,0094	   0,4930	   -­‐0,1055	   0,0367	  
OttNMos.
Tur.COOP	   0,2257	   0,0329	   1	   0,3492	   -­‐0,1939	   0,0710	   0,8631	   -­‐0,2378	  
OttNMos.
Tur.CONF	   0,1234	   0,0839	   0,3492	   1	   -­‐0,0862	   0,1063	   -­‐0,1121	   0,3430	  
Tur.OttM
os.COOP	   0,5945	   -­‐0,0094	   -­‐0,1939	   -­‐0,0862	   1	   0,4722	   0,3025	   -­‐0,0404	  
Tur.OttM
os.CONF	   -­‐0,1473	   0,4930	   0,0710	   0,1063	   0,4722	   1	   -­‐0,1473	   0,0643	  
Tur.OttN
Mos.COO
P	   -­‐0,2621	   -­‐0,1055	   0,8631	   -­‐0,1121	   0,3025	   -­‐0,1473	   1	   0,3788	  
Tur.OttN
Mos.CON
F	   0,0953	   0,0367	   -­‐0,2378	   0,3430	   -­‐0,0404	   0,0643	   0,3788	   1	  
 
Time-lagged analysis (partial cross correlation) shows that when 
previously Ottoman/non-Muslim countries increase their cooperation to 
Turkey, Turkey’s cooperation to previously Ottoman-Muslim countries 
increase in 3,5 years.  Although Turkey and Ottoman/Muslim countries are 
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cooperatively reciprocal within the same quarter, over long run (2-4 years), 
Turkey’s increasing cooperation to them leads to decreasing cooperation 
from them. Their decreasing cooperation leads to decreasing cooperation 
from Turkey to Non-Muslim Ottoman countries in 3 years, which leads to 
decreasing previously Ottoman/Non-Muslim cooperation to Turkey in 0,5-
1,5 years. The whole cycle is a negative feedback loop, composing of another 
feedback loop between previously Ottoman/Non-Muslim cooperation, 
Ottoman/Muslim cooperation and Turkey’s cooperation to previously 
Ottoman/Non-Muslim countries (see figure). Apparently, Turkey is less 
able to balance its relations with Non-Muslim and Muslim countries within 
previously Ottoman territories, than it is with the whole world. 
Predominantly Muslim countries’ negative reaction to Non-Muslim 
coooperation to Turkey restricts Turkey’s cooperation to Non-Muslim 
countries.  
 
     OttNMos.Tur  
            14 quarters 
  6 quarters   2-6 quarters  
                       7-15 quarters         12 quarters 
Tur.OttMos   OttMos.Tur     Tur.OttNMos  
                      13-14 quarters 
 
Figure 26 Negative feedback loops in Turkey’s cooperation with 
previously Ottoman/Muslim countries and previously Ottoman/non-
Muslim countries 
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In sum, there is a change in Turkish foreign affairs under AKP with 
respect to Muslim and Ottoman countries. However, the timing of change is 
around 2007-2008, rather than at the beginning of AKP rule. Turkey has been 
more engaged with previously Ottoman countries after 2007, and it was 
more engaged with Muslim countries within previously Ottoman countries. 
This increase is only partially a result of growing interest on the part of 
Muslim countries interest in Turkey. Although triggered by Muslim entities 
cooperation, Turkey seeked their cooperation more than they seek Turkey’s. 
In sum, Turkey has become more responsive to Muslim entities, both within 
and outside of previously Ottoman geography in the second half of AKP 
rule.  
7.2. Sub-State Actors and Foreign Policy  
There is a growing literature about the increasing prominence of 
Turkey’s civil society in foreign affairs. The recent literature suggests that 
the non-state actors have gained a more prominent place in Turkey's foreign 
affairs.382 It has been argued that with the democratization and 
Europeanization process, the business, research centers and other domestic 
non-state actors have become increasingly active in foreign matters. 
Nevertheless, the extent and depth of non-state involvement in foreign 
                                                
382 Sedat Laçiner, “Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikasının Felsefesi, Fikri Altyapısı ve 
Hedefleri” in Osman Bahadir Dincer, Habibe Özdal and Hacali Necefoğlu (eds) Yeni 
Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri 
(Ankara:USAK, 2010). Altay Atlı, “Businessmen as Diplomats: The Role of Business 
Associations in Turkey’s Foreign Economic Policy”Insight Turkey 13,  no.1 (2011): 109-
128; Öniş, “Multiple Faces” ; Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign 
Policy: The Rise of the Trading State,” New Perspectives on Turkey 40 (2009): 29-57; 
!brahim Kalın, “Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or Geo-politics?”,  Private View 
(2008): 29.Mustafa Kutlay, “Economy as the ‘Practical Hand’ of ‘New Turkish Foreign 
Policy’: A Political Economy Explanation”, Insight Turkey 13 no. 1 (2011): 67-88.  
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policy matters has not been definitively laid out and their independence 
from state behavior has been questioned.383 
To see their overal weight in Turkish foreign affairs, I have 
aggregated all events in four actor groups: Turkish government, Turkish 
rebels, Turkish civil actors and foreign actors. The following graph shows 
Turkish rebels’ and Turkish civil actors share in Turkey’s foreign behavior. 
Events are not aggregated in terms of type, but counted on a quarterly basis 
to see overall initiative taken by Turkish non-state actors towards the world. 
On average, Turkish civil actors’ foreign behaviour consitutes 13,0 % 
of Turkey’s all foreign behaviour, whereas Turkish rebels behaviour 
constitutes 3,1 %. Before AKP, the ratio was 11,6 % and 3,6 % respectively. 
Under AKP (2003-2012), civil actors’ share rose to 14,7 %, Turkish rebels 
share decreased to 2,6 %. Therefore, arguments about an increasing 
prominence of Turkey’s civil actors in Turkey’s foreign affairs are confirmed 
by data. Nevertheless, a comparative look at first and second half of AKP’s 
term reveals that the increasing prominence of civil actors compared to 
Turkish government and rebels is more visible in the first five years: 
Between 2003-2007 the average civil actor share in Turkey’s foreign behavior 
was 16,5%, whereas Turkish government’s and rebels’ were 81,7 % and 1,9 % 
respectively. In the second half, the shares were closer to the average:  83,6 % 
by Turkish government, 13,0 % by Turkish civil actors and 3,3 % by Turkish 
rebels.	   
                                                
383  Semra Cerit-Mazlum and Erhan Doğan, eds., Sivil Toplum ve Dış Politika (!stanbul: 
Bağlam, 2006) 
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In general, there is a high level of congruence between Turkish 
government’s and Turkish civilians’ behavior to foreign actors. There is a 
very strong positive correlation between Turkish civilians conflictual 
behavior to foreign actors and Turkish government’ conflictual behavior to 
foreign actors, r(85)= 0,3587, p <0.001 , and there is a strong positive 
correlation between Turkish civilians' cooperative behavior to foreign actors 
and Turkish government's cooperative behavior to foreign actors, r(85)= 
0,2969 , p<0.01. 
 
Figure 27 Turkey’s Non-State Actors in Foreign Affairs 
To compare Turkish civil actors geographical orientation with 
Turkish government’s orientation, behaviour by each is grouped under nine 
geographical/political regions. The primary target of Turkish civil actors 
foreign behaviour is Western Europe. Compared to Turkish government, 
civil actors are more engaged with Western Europe, foreign non-state actors, 
intergovernmental organizations, and Latin America, less engaged with the 
Non-European West, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.  
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Figure 28 Foreign Behaviour by Turkish Civil Actors 
 
Figure 29 Foreign Behaviour by Turkish Government 
To see whether there is congruence between Turkey’s civil actors’ 
behavior and Turkish government’s behavior, cooperative and conflictual 
behaviors of both to regions are compared. When all other dyads are 
controlled for, civil actors’ cooperative behavior is positively correlated with 
Turkish government’s cooperative behavior to foreign non-state actors, sub-
Saharan Africa, Intergovernmental organizations and Western Europe.  
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Turkey’s civil actors’ conflictual behavior to foreign actors is also 
positively correlated with Turkish government’s conflictual behavior to the 
Middle East, Latin America, intergovernmental organizations, non-
European West and foreign non-state actors. An interesting association is 
found with respect to relations with Western Europe and Africa: in both 
cases, Turkish government’s conflictual behavior to these regions is 
negatively correlated with Turkish civil actors’ conflictual behavior to them. 
In other words, whenever Turkish government’s conflictual behavior to 
Western Europe increases, Turkish civil actors’ conflictual behavior to 
Western Europe decreases, and whenever Turkish government’s conflictual 
behavior to sub-Saharan Africa increases, Turkish civil actors’ conflictual 
behavior to sub-Saharan Africa decreases. Therefore, against these two 
groups of foreign actors, Turkish government and civil actors’ act in 
harmony when it comes to cooperation, yet behave particularly differently 
in terms of conflict. Whenever they cooperate, they cooperate together, 
whenever one of them conflicts, the other decreases its conflict. Turkish 
government’s and civil actors’ behavior are most harmonious against 
intergovernmental regions and foreign non-state actors. There is no 
relationship between their behaviors to either Asia or Eastern Europe. 
Whenever one of them behaves conflictually against Non-European West, 
the Middle East or Latin America, the other also behaves conflictually to the 
same foreign actor, while there is no such association in terms of 
cooperation. 
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Table 21 Congruence in Turkish Government's and Turkish Civil Actors' 
Behaviour384 
Dyad1	   Dyad2	   Partial	  correlation	  (n=87)	  Turgov.Nst.COOP	   Turoth.Nst.COOP	   0,7094***	  Turgov.Igo.COOP	   Turoth.Igo.COOP	   0,5545***	  Turgov.Afr.COOP	   Turoth.Afr.COOP	   0,3018**	  Turgov.Weu.COOP	   Turoth.Weu.COOP	   0,2368*	  Turgov.Mea.COOP	   Turoth.Mea.COOP	   0,1805	  Turgov.Asa.COOP	   Turoth.Asa.COOP	   0,1373	  Turgov.Wst.COOP	   Turoth.Wst.COOP	   0,07	  Turgov.Lam.COOP	   Turoth.Lam.COOP	   0,0246	  Turgov.Eeu.COOP	   Turoth.Eeu.COOP	   -­‐0,1817	  Turgov.Mea.CONF	   Turoth.Mea.CONF	   0,4323***	  Turgov.Lam.CONF	   Turoth.Lam.CONF	   0,4223***	  Turgov.Igo.CONF	   Turoth.Igo.CONF	   0,4168***	  Turgov.Wst.CONF	   Turoth.Wst.CONF	   0,3748***	  Turgov.Nst.CONF	   Turoth.Nst.CONF	   0,2873**	  Turgov.Eeu.CONF	   Turoth.Eeu.CONF	   0,0457	  Turgov.Asa.CONF	   Turoth.Asa.CONF	   -­‐0,0757	  Turgov.Weu.CONF	   Turoth.Weu.CONF	   -­‐0,3245**	  Turgov.Afr.CONF	   Turoth.Afr.CONF	   -­‐0,3375**	  
 
In conclusion, in terms of activity level, the share of civil actors in 
foreign affairs has increased particularly in years 2003-2007 compared to 
later and previous periods. In terms of congruence between civil actors and 
government, there is cooperative congruence with respect to foreign non-
state actors, sub-Saharan Africa, Intergovernmental organizations and 
Western Europe, whereas there is conflictual congruence with respect to the 
Middle East, Latin America, intergovernmental organizations, non-
European West and foreign non-state actors. 
                                                
384  *** p< 0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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According to data, despite the occasional peaks in late 2003 and 2004, 
Turkish non-state actors have not been particularly active in foreign affairs. 
While their impact on government's policy formulation might have 
increased, their foreign behavior did not significantly increase. 
7.3. Civil Military Relations and Turkey-Israel Relations 
Recently, Turkey's relations with Israel have taken significant turns 
compared to the trend in late 1990s. Observers argued that Turkish-Israeli 
relations have been deteriorated especially after AKP came to power. 
Turkey’s relationship with Israel has always been cumbersome, but with the 
military cooperation agreements in late 1990s, cooperation reached an all 
time peak. However the relations took an all time low when Israeli military 
tried to stop Turkish flagged Mavi Marmara aid flotilla to Gaza, an 
operation ended up with death of nine Turkish nationals in June 2011. 385 
Prime Minister Erdoğan's criticisms concerning Israeli policy in the West 
Bank and Gaza and Israeli attack on Gaza aid flotilla have created setbacks 
between the countries. 386 Consequently, Turkey-Israeli relations have been 
regarded as where the most dramatic shifts in Turkish foreign policy can be 
witnessed. 387  
Several explanations have been made about the reasons for this shift.  
Some pointed out that the positive public opinion in Turkey towards 
                                                
385 Tarık Oğuzlu “The Changing Dynamics of Turkey–Israel Relations: A Structural Realist 
Account” Mediterranean Politics 15, no 2, (2010): 273-288 
386 Stephen F. Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovers Middle East” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (2007): 
110 
387 Joshua Walker “Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy 
Doctrine” Insight Turkey 9, no.  3 (2007): 32- 47 
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Palestinians makes Turkish decision-makers especially sensitive to level of 
conflict between Israel and Palestine, which makes its mark on Turkish-
Israeli relations.388  Therefore, these studies imply that on a behavioural 
level, whenever Israeli aggression towards Palestinian actos increases, 
Turkish government’s conflict with Israel would increase. Other scholars 
however, look at other -Turkey’s domestic- dynamics in explaining volatility 
in Turkey-Israel relations. Bacik claims that Israel-Turkey relations lack 
material (economic) infrastructure: “The history of bilateral relations 
between Turkey and Israel shows no significant level of interdependence.” 
389 He claims that this lack leads to a lack of social basis: Turkey-Israeli 
relations suffer from insufficient number and capacity of domestic actors 
who favor better and deeper relations with Israel. 390 Therefore, Turkey-
Israeli relations take place in a mostly discursive sphere.  
Some other analysts however argued that there were indeed domestic 
actors who favored deeper relations with Israel: Turkish military, secularists, 
Kemalists. etc.391 Accordingly, the decreasing prominence of military in 
Turkish politics was linked to Turkey’s increasing tensions in its relations 
with Israel. It has been argued that Turkey’s cooperation with Israel, has 
been engineered and cultivated by Turkish military, who were willing to 
acquire Israeli military technology, and Israeli authorities who are in search 
                                                
388 Saziya Burcu Giray “Turkish Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” in Muslim 
Attitudes to jews and Israel:The Ambivalences of Rejection, Antagonism, Tolerance and 
Cooperation, Moshe Maoz ed. (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012): 174. 
389 Gökhan Bacık “Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey” Insight 
Turkey 11,  No. 2 (2009): 31-41  
390 Gökhan Bacık, “The Limits of an Alliance: Turkish-Israeli Relations Revisited,” Arab 
Studies Quarterly Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2001), p. 33, 52.  
391  Hakan Yavuz “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity 
Debate” Journal of Palestine Studies  27, No. 1 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 22-37. 
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of more friendly and secular nation in a hostile neighborhood.392 Therefore, a 
less prominent role for Turkish armed forces in Turkish politics might have 
led to a reduced level of cooperation between Turkey and Israel, and later to 
revival of formerly underplayed grievances. 
On a behavioral level, such an argument would mean that relations 
between Turkish government, Turkish military and Israel are interrelated. 
To understand the precise nature of this interrelationship, Turkish actors are 
grouped under three headings: Turkish government, Turkish military and 
others. Others are excluded from the analysis to focus on behaviours 
between/by the government and the military. All actors from Israel are 
grouped under single category. 
Event types are aggregated in four categories on a quarterly basis: 
Firstly, as conflict or cooperation, then as verbal and material. Then, each 
type of event is assigned a numerical value; Material Cooperation 2, Material 
Conflict 2, Verbal Cooperation 1 and Verbal Conflict 1. For each dyad, 
separate scores are obtained for cooperation and conflict within a quarter 
year. 
Figure 30 shows behaviours of all Israeli actors towards Turkish 
government. On average, Israel’s quarterly cooperation score is 4,4, 
quarterly conflict score is 0,9. Turkish government’s cooperation score is 5.0, 
conflict score is 1.9. Therefore, on average Turkish government is both more 
cooperative and more conflictual towards Israel, than Israel is to Turkish 
                                                
392  Amikam Nachmani “The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie” The Middle East Quarterly 5, 
no.2 (1998):19- 29. 
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government. There is not much difference in Turkish government’s 
cooperative behavior to Israel before and after AKP (4,78 and 5,35), as well 
as between AKP’s first and second five year in rule (5,05 and 5,65). Both 
Israel’s and Turkish government’s conflictual behavior towards each other 
increased under AKP, particularly in the 2007-2012 period.  
Table 22 Turkey-Israel Relations 1991-2012 
Average quarterly 
scores 
Isr.Turgov.
COOP(W) 
Turgov.Isr.
COOP (W) 
Isr.Turgov.
CONF (W) 
Turgov.Isr.
CONF (W)  
AVERAGE 1991-2012 4,45 5,05 0,93 1,94 
AVERAGE 1991-2002 4,48 4,78 0,57 1,39 
AVERAGE 2003-2012 4,43 5,35 1,35 2,58 
AVERAGE 2003-2007 4,25 5,05 0,75 1,25 
AVERAGE 2007-2012 4,60 5,65 1,95 3,90 
  
 
Figure 30 Israel's Behaviour to Turkish Government 
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Figure 31 Turkish Government's Behaviour to Israel 
Table 23 provides a closer look at the material and verbal actions from 
Turkish government to Israel. In 1991-2012, 83,1 % of Turkish government’s 
all behavior to Israel has been verbal, whereas 16,9 % was material. In the 
same period, 20,6 % of Turkish government’s all behavior to Israel was 
conflictual, 79,4 % was cooperative. Under AKP, composition of material 
and verbal actions did not change very much (85,1 % and 14,9 %), yet 
conflictual behavior rose to 28,6 %, and cooperative behavior decreased to 
71,4 %.  	  
In the first five years of AKP rule, material behavior was 11,5 % and 
only 19,5% of all TFB to Israel was conflictual, making the period most 
cooperative period since 1991. In other words, there was more cooperation, 
yet it was mostly discursive. In the second five year, material behavior rose 
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to 17,5 %, whereas conflictual behavior also rose to 35,0 %, making it the 
most conflictual period. Most of the conflict was again discursive, yet share 
of material conflict was more than ever.	  
Table 23 Material and Verbal Actions from Turkish government to Israel 
%	   CONF.MAT	   CONF.VERB	   COOP.MAT	   COOP.VERB	   TOTAL	  1991-­‐2012	   7,3	   17,5	   8,5	   66,7	   100,0	  1991-­‐2002	   5,8	   14,8	   11,1	   68,3	   100,0	  2003-­‐2012	   8,7	   19,9	   6,2	   65,2	   100,0	  2003-­‐2007	   2,7	   16,8	   8,8	   71,7	   100,0	  2008-­‐2012	   12,9	   22,1	   4,3	   60,7	   100,0	  
 
To probe whether changing dynamics of Turkey-Israel relations is 
related to Turkish civil-military relations, two types of analysis are made: 
Firstly, partial correlations between Turkish government’s and Turkish 
military’s relations with Israel are computed to see level of congruence 
between Turkish government and Turkish military in their behavior to 
Israel. Secondly, partial correlations between Turkish civil-military relations 
and Turkish government-Israel relations are computed to see to what extent 
Turkish government’s relations with Israel are related to Turkish civil-
military relations.393  
The two Turkish actors’ behaviors to Israel are not very congruent. 
Turkish government’s conflictual behaviour to Israel is positively correlated 
with Turkish military’s cooperative behavior to Israel (Turgov.Isr.CONF, 
Turmil.Isr.COOP, r(84)= 0,3466). Partial cross correlation analysis shows 
Turkish government’s conflictual behaviour to Israel follows Turkish 
                                                
393  All other possible dyads are controlled for, except Isr.Turmil.CONF, since this dyad did 
not have any events since 1991 (singular). 
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military’s cooperative behavior to Israel. Turmil.Isr.COOP (t), 
Turgov.Isr.CONF (t+3), r(81)= 0, 261). However, Turkish government’s 
conflictual behaviour to Israel is negatively correlated with Israel’s 
cooperative behavior to Turkish military, (Turgov.Isr.CONF, 
Isr.Turmil.COOP, r(84)= -0,3576). Turkish government’s decreasing 
conflictual behaviour to Israel follows Israel’s increasing cooperative 
behavior to Turkish military. (Turgov.Isr.CONF (t), Isr.Turmil.COOP(t-3) 
r(81)= -0.243.)  
Turkish government’s conflictual behavior to Israel seems to be 
related to cooperation between Israel and Turkish military. When Israel is 
more cooperative towards Turkish military, Turkish government becomes 
less conflictual towards Israel; when Turkish military is more cooperative 
towards Israel however, Turkish government becomes more conflictual to 
Israel. Therefore, Israel’s cooperative initiative towards the military seems to 
have a mollifying effect on Turkish foreign policy towards Israel. Turkish 
military’s initiative on the other hand, if it is not responded in kind and 
volume by Israel, has a negative effect. 
 The relationship between Turkish civil-military relations and Turkish 
government-Israel relations is also interesting. When Turkish government 
cooperates less with Israel, Turkish military cooperates more with the 
Turkish government, (Turmil.Turgov.COOP , Turgov.Isr.COOP r(84)= -
0,3791).	  The effect has a longitudinal dimension, too: Turkish government’s 
cooperation to Israel at quarter t is negatively corrrelated with Turkish 
military’s cooperation to Turkish government at quarter t+12, 
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Turgov.Isr.COOP (t), Turmil.Turgov.COOP (t+12),  r(62)= -0.243. In other 
words, Turkish military’s increasing cooperation to Turkish government 
follows Turkish government’s decreasing cooperation to Israel.  
Turkish military’s cooperation to Turkish government is also 
positively correlated with Israel’s cooperation towards Turkish government 
(Turmil.Turgov.COOP, Isr.Turgov.COOP r(84)=0,4202). There is no 
significant association between two dyads longitudinally. Therefore, with 
partial cross correlation alone, it is not possible to ascertain whether 
changing domestic behavior of Turkish military precedes or follows Israel’s 
international behaviour.	  
Turkish military’s conflict to Turkish government is also negatively 
(albeit not very significantly) correlated with Israel’s cooperation towards 
Turkish government (Turmil.Turgov.CONF, Isr.Turgov.COOP, r(84)= -­‐
0,1974,	  p<0.1). The association is stronger in the long run when Turkish 
military’s conflict to Turkish government is lagged. Isr.Turgov.COOP (t) 
Turmil.Turgov.CONF (t+13), r(71)=- -0.250; indicating domestic behavior of 
the military follows Israel’s behavior. But there is also a loop, a negative 
feedback of Turkish domestic affairs’ on Israel’s behavour at t-19. More 
precisely, 19 quarters after Turkish military increases it conflictual behavior 
to Turkish government, Israel decreases its cooperation to Turkish 
government. (Turmil.Turgov.CONF (t-19), Isr.Turgov.COOP (t) r(65)= -
0.234, p<0.05).  
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Figure 32 Turkish civil-miltary relations and Israeli cooperation 
Therefore, two dyads make a loop of 8 years in total: when Turkish 
military increases it conflictual behavior to Turkish government, this leads to 
Israel’s decreasing cooperation in 5 years. Israel’s decreasing cooperation to 
Turkish government, in turn leads to increasing conflict from Turkish 
military to Turkish government in 3 years.  
All in all, it can be argued that in Turkish military’s behavior in 
Turkish civil-miltary relations is not just a function of relations between the 
two. It is also shaped by Turkish government’s behavior towards Israel. 
Turkish government’s behavior to Turkish military however, is both shaped 
by Israel’s and Turkish military’s behavior. Two domestic actors behavior to 
Israel is not congruent, which explains the erratic association. Whenever 
Turkish military receives Israeli cooperation, Turkish government is more 
cooperative to both Israel and Turkish military. When Turkish military 
shows more initiative in cooperating with Israel, this disrupts Turkish 
government’s behavior to both Israel and Turkish military. 
 
Turmil.Turgov.CONF Isr.Turgov.COOP 
Approx. 5 years 
Approx. 3 years 
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When we look at the government side on Turkish civil-military 
relations, we see that Turkish government’s cooperation to Turkish military 
is negatively correlated with Israel’s conflictual behavior towards Turkish 
government. Turgov.Turmil.COOP(t), Isr.Turgov.CONF(t), r(85)= -0,2011, 
p<0.1. However, the partial cross correlation between dyads is 
longitudinally erratic. Changing domestic dynamic seems to precede Israel’s 
behavior by 4 years, yet the association is positive, rather than negative 
(Turgov.Turmil.COOPt Isr.Turgov.CONF (t+16), r(68)= 0.236, p<0.05). In 
other words, Turkish government decreases its cooperative behavior to 
Turkish military at the same time as Israel increases its conflict to Turkish 
government. Yet, 4 years after Turkish government decreases its cooperative 
behavior to Turkish military, Israel decreases its conflict to Turkish 
government, too. Israel’s decreasing conflictual behavior coincides with 
Turkish government’s increasing cooperation to Turkish military, and the 
loop continues in an up-down manner.  
 
 
 	  
              
 
 
 
Figure 33 Turkish civil-military relations and Israeli Conflict 
 
Turgov.Turmil.COOP Isr.Turgov.CONF 
Approx. 4 years 
In same quarter 
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7.4. Terrorism and Turkish Foreign Policy 
One of the domestic processes that most significantly affect Turkey’s 
foreign affairs is Turkey’s domestic terrorism.394 To understand this 
relationship, this part is divided into severeal sections.  
The first section provides a description of findings with respect to 
domestic terrorism in Turkey and identifies basic patterns. Since domestic 
terrorism refers to Turkish rebels’ relations with both civil actors and 
Turkish government, it focuses on Turkish rebels’ (all non-governmental 
armed groups) relations with Turkish government (including the military), 
on the one hand and Turkish civilians on the other.  
The second section deals with the relationship between Turkish 
government’s affairs with Turkish rebels and Turkish foreign policy in 
general. In other words, all foreign actors are aggregated under one group. 
The third section delves into the association between Turkey’s 
domestic terrorism and Turkey’s foreign affairs on a deeper level. Turkish 
government and Turkish civilians were treated as if they were one actor to 
ease analysis. Hence, the focus is on Turkey’s foreign affairs, rather than on 
Turkish foreign policy.   
In all sections, despite different actor and target aggregations, event 
types are aggregated in four categories on a quarterly basis: Firstly, as 
                                                
394 Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Larrabee “Turkey 
Rediscovers the Middle East”, Öniş, “Multiple Faces”, Kalın “Ideology or Geopolitics?”; 
Kemal Kirisci, "The Kurdish question and Turkish foreign policy,” 277-314. 
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conflict or cooperation, then as verbal and material. Then, each type of event 
is assigned a numerical value; Material Cooperation 2, Material Conflict 2, 
Verbal Cooperation 1 and Verbal Conflict 1. For each dyad, separate scores 
are obtained for cooperation and conflict within a quarter year. The scores 
are adjusted to overall AFP news output for each quarter. 
7.4.1. Domestic Terrorism in Turkey 
The following graphs show Turkish government’s and rebels’ 
conflictual and cooperative behaviours towards each other. Turkish 
government has been more conflictual to Turkish rebels than they were to 
Turkish government in 1995-1998 and 2007-2008. As shown in the previous 
sections, these periods are also where Turkish government is particularly 
less proactive in foreign affairs. Therefore, there seems to be a negative 
relationship between terrorism and foreign policy proactivism. The 
following two graphs show Turkish government’s and rebels’ conflictual 
and cooperative behaviour towards each other. Compared against Turkish 
civilians, most of Turkish rebels’ interaction is with Turkish government, 
and most of such interaction is of conflictual nature, as expected. 
Turkish government’s behaviour to Turkish rebels is not osciliatory: 
Turgov.Turreb.COOP, Turgov.Turreb.CONF r(85)= 0,1929, p<0.1 Turkish 
civilians’ behaviour to Turkish rebels is also not osciliatory: 
Turoth.Turreb.COOP, Turoth.Turreb.CONF r(85)= 0,1707, p>0.1. Turkish 
rebels’ are less osciliatory to Turkish government (Turreb.Turgov.COOP, 
Turreb.Turgov.CONF r(85)= 0,3524, p<0.001) than they are to Turkish 
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civilians: (Turreb.Turoth.COOP, Turreb.Turoth.CONF r(85)= 0,4402, 
p<0.001). Osciliation happens when the osciliating actor perceives the 
relationship as embedded with both grave risks and lucrative opportunities.  
 
Figure 34 Conflict between Turkish Rebels and Turkish government 
  
 
Figure 35 Cooperation between Turkish Rebels and Turkish government 
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The relationship between Turkish government and Turkish rebels is 
not conflictually reciprocal: Turgov.Turreb.CONF, Turreb.Turgov.CONF 
r(85) = 0.1688; but cooperatively reciprocal: Turgov.Turreb.COOP, 
Turreb.Turgov.COOP, r(85) =0.4363, p<0.001. There is no immediate conflict 
response from Turkish rebels to Turkish government’s aggressive 
behaviour, but the response is delayed by 7 quarters: Turgov.Turreb.Conf(t-
7) , Turreb.Turgov.Conft, r(78)=0.289, p<0.01. Interestingly, there is also a 
weak positive correlation between Turgov.Turreb.CONF  and 
Turreb.Turgov.COOP r(85)=0,2087, p<0.1. Partial cross correlation shows no 
longitudinal association, as to which dyad may precede the other.  
It is highy likely that coercive behaviour from Turkish government 
does not lead to further conflict from Turkish rebels immediately but 
actually induces  –albeit slightly- more cooperation from Turkish rebels at 
the time. In the longer run (app.2 years), however, Turkish rebels respond 
by conflict. 
The relationship between Turkish civilians and Turkish rebels shows 
a reverse pattern: it is not cooperatively reciprocal, Turoth.Turreb.COOP, 
Turreb.Turoth.COOP r(85)= 0,1568; but conflictually reciprocal, 
Turoth.Turreb.CONF, Turreb.Turoth.CONF r(85)= 0.4138, p<0.001. Partial 
cross correlation shows the association is negative between Turkish civilians 
conflict at quarter t-1 and Turkish rebels conflict at quarter t.  Turoth.Turreb. 
CONF(t-1), Turreb.Turoth.CONFt, r(84)= -0.372, p<0.001. In other words, 
within the same quarter, conflict from one side induces conflict from the 
other side; but one quarter after Turkish civilians increased their conflict,  
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Turkish rebels decrease their conflict. They do not escalate, but back down in 
the face of increasing adversity from Turkish civilians.  
 
Figure 36 Conflict between Turkish rebels and Turkish civilians 
Although there is no contemporaneous cooperative reciprocity 
between Turkish civilians and Turkish rebels, partial cross correlation shows 
longiditunal effects of each on another. Their cooperative behaviour to each 
other constitute a 3 year loop: Turkish civilians’ cooperation to Turkish 
rebels induces Turkish rebels’ cooperation in 8 quarters (Turoth.Turreb. 
COOP(t-8), Turreb.Turoth.COOP(t), r(77)= 0.239, p<0.05. However, 3 
quarters after Turkish rebels’ increasing cooperation, Turkish civilians 
reduce their cooperation to Turkish rebels (Turoth.Turreb. COOP(t+3), 
Turreb.Turoth.COOP (t), -0.290, p<0.01). It is possible to read the loop 
beginning from Turkish rebels’ behavioural change: Turkish rebels decrease 
their cooperation, 3 quarters later Turkish civilians increase their 
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cooperation, 8 quarters later Turkish rebels increase their cooperation, 3 
quarters later Turkish civilians decrease their cooperation, so on... The loop 
implies that Turkish civilians are hesitant in cooperating with rebels when 
initiative comes from the other side, and their response time is shorter than 
them.  
 
Figure 37 Cooperation between Turkish rebels and Turkish civilians 
7.4.2. Relations between Turkish Government and Turkish rebels 
and Turkish Foreign Policy 
The following table presents the significant partial correlation values 
about the relationship between Turkish government’s affairs with Turkish 
rebels and Turkish government’s foreign activity.  
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Table 24 Partial Correlations between Turkish government’s affairs with 
Turkish rebels and Turkish Foreign Policy 
Domestic	  Dyad	   International	  Dyad	   28th	  degree	  Partial	  Cor.	  Coefficient	   Significance	  level	  Turgov.Turreb.CONF	   Turgov.NonTur.CONF	   0,3789	   0.001	  Turgov.Turreb.COOP	   NonTur.Turgov.COOP	   0,3083	   0.01	  Turgov.Turreb.COOP	   Turgov.NonTur.COOP	   -­‐0,1833	   0.1	  Turreb.Turgov.CONF	   NonTur.Turgov.COOP	   -­‐0,2423	   0.05	  Turreb.Turgov.CONF	   Turgov.NonTur.CONF	   0,1952	   0.1	  
 
Turkish government’s conflictual behavior to foreign actors is 
positively correlated with Turkish government’s conflictual behavior to 
Turkish rebels. In other words, Turkish foreign policy becomes more 
conflictual whenever Turkish government acts aggressively against Turkish 
rebels. (Turgov.NonTur.CONF(t+16),  Turgov.Turreb.CONF (t) r(69)= 0.236, 
p<0.05) Accordingly, Turkish government 's cooperative behavior to Turkish 
rebels is positively correlated with foreign actors' cooperative behavior to 
Turkish government, suggesting cooperative gestures from foreign actors 
encourage Turkish government to cooperate more with Turkish rebels. 
(NonTur.Turgov.COOP(t-10), Turgov.Turreb.COOP(t), r(75)=  0.267, 
p<0.05). 
There is a negative correlation between Turkish rebels' conflictual 
behavior to Turkish government and foreign actors' cooperative behavior to 
Turkish government, indicating increasing terrorism in Turkey might 
diminish foreign support for Turkish government. Since partial cross 
correlation shows no longitudinal effect, the relationship can be interpreted 
in reverse order, i.e., increasing cooperation from foreign actors to Turkish 
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government may encourage Turkish rebels to act less aggressively towards 
Turkish government. 
After analyzing Turkish government’s relations with Turkish rebels 
and its relations with all foreign actors in general, in the following section 
different agreegations are used to asses the association between Turkey’s 
domestic terrorism on the one hand and Turkey’s foreign affairs on the 
other.  
7.4.3. Domestic Terrorism and Turkish Foreign Affairs 
In the first section, domestic terrorism is measured by relations 
Turkish rebels relations between Turkish government on the one hand, and 
its relations with Turkish civilians, on the other. In the second section, only 
Turkish government’s relations with Turkish rebels and foreign actors are 
dealt with. This section uses a different aggregation: Turkish government 
and Turkish civilians are treated as if they were one single actor to ease the 
analysis of the associations between their relations with different foreign 
actors on the one hand, and Turkish rebels on the other. All in all, 9 groups 
of foreign actors, and 2 groups of domestic actors (Turgoth=Turgov+Turoth 
and Turreb) were made. Turkish rebels’ relations with foreign actors are 
excluded from the analyses. As such, 22 dyads were created (See Table). 
With each dyad, event types are aggregated into four categories: Firstly, as 
conflict or cooperation, then as verbal and material. Then, each type of event 
is assigned a numerical value; Material Cooperation 2, Material Conflict 2, 
Verbal Cooperation 1 and Verbal Conflict 1. For each dyad, separate scores 
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are obtained for cooperation and conflict within a quarter year, which 
incrased number of dyads to 44 (=22x2). All in all, when partial correlations 
were computed between any two dyads, the variations by all other dyads 
(42) are controlled for.   
Table 25 Number of International and Domestic Dyads 
Source	   Target	   Event	  Type	   TOTAL	  Foreign	  Actor(9)	   Turgoth(1)	   CONF/COOP(2)	   18	  Turgoth(1)	   Foreign	  Actor(9)	   CONF/COOP	  (2)	   18	  Domestic	  Actor(2)	  	   Domestic	  Actor(2)	   CONF/COOP	  (2)	   8	  TOTAL	  NUMBER	  OF	  DYADS	   44	  
The following table shows the significant partial correlations of 42nd 
degree between Turkey’s international affairs and Turkey’s domestic 
terrorism. Turkey’s conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is mostly 
associated with Turkey’s relations with foreign non-state actors. Whenever, 
Turkey increases its conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels, it also increases 
its conflictual behavior to foreign non-state actors. Non-state actors on the 
other hand, reduce their conflict to Turkey. Indeed, their decreasing conflict 
precedes Turkey’s increasing conflict against rebels. (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF 
(t+1), Nst.Turgoth.CONF (t) r(84)=-0.248, Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+2), Nst. 
Turgoth.CONF(t) r(83)=-0.226, Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+3), Nst.Turgoth. 
CONF(t) r(82)=-0.264.), i.e. 1-3 quarters before any operation against Turkish 
rebels, Turkey experiences lower levels of conflict from foreign non-state 
actors. This is probably due to Turkey’s coercive strategies against foreign 
non-state actors 2 quarters before increasing their conflictual behaviour 
against the rebels. Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t), Turgoth.Nst.CONF (t-2)= 0.287. 
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Table 26 Significant partial correlations of 42nd degree between Turkey’s 
domestic terrorism and Turkish foreign affairs 
	  	   	  	   Domestic	  Dyad	   	  	   International	  Dyad	  
Partial	  
cor.	  coef.	  
42nd	  
degree	   Sign.Level	  
TURGO
TH	  
CONF	  
Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	  
FOREIG
N	   Asa.Turgoth.CONF	   -­‐0,2914	   p<0.01	  Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	   Asa.Turgoth.COOP	   -­‐0,2737	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	   Igo.Turgoth.COOP	   0,2488	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	   Lam.Turgoth.CONF	   -­‐0,2364	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	   Nst.Turgoth.CONF	   -­‐0,2477	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	  
TURGO
TH	   Turgoth.Afr.CONF	   -­‐0,3030	   p<0.01	  Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	   Turgoth.Asa.COOP	   0,2612	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	   Turgoth.Igo.COOP	   -­‐0,3611	   p<0.001	  Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	   Turgoth.Mea.COOP	   0,2259	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	   Turgoth.Nst.CONF	   0,4806	   p<0.001	  Turgoth.Turreb.CONF	   Turgoth.Wst.COOP	   -­‐0,2233	   p<0.05	  
COOP	  
Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	  
FOREIG
N	  
Afr.Turgoth.COOP	   -­‐0,2309	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	   Eeu.Turgoth.COOP	   0,2626	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	   Igo.Turgoth.CONF	   -­‐0,2234	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	   Lam.Turgoth.COOP	   0,2258	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	   Mea.Turgoth.COOP	   0,4419	   p<0.001	  Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	   Nst.Turgoth.CONF	   -­‐0,2389	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	   Weu.Turgoth.COOP	   -­‐0,2554	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	   Wst.Turgoth.COOP	   -­‐0,2366	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	  
TURGO
TH	   Turgoth.Eeu.COOP	   -­‐0,2791	   p<0.01	  Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	   Turgoth.Weu.COOP	   0,2569	   p<0.05	  Turgoth.Turreb.COOP	   Turgoth.Wst.COOP	   0,2329	   p<0.05	  
TURRE
B	   CONF	  
Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	  
FOREIG
N	   Asa.Turgoth.CONF	   0,3580	   p<0.001	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Igo.Turgoth.CONF	   0,2161	   p<0.05	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Igo.Turgoth.COOP	   -­‐0,2599	   p<0.05	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Mea.Turgoth.COOP	   -­‐0,2127	   p<0.05	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Nst.Turgoth.CONF	   0,4445	   p<0.001	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Weu.Turgoth.CONF	   -­‐0,2380	   p<0.05	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Weu.Turgoth.COOP	   0,2733	   p<0.05	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	  
TURGO
TH	   Turgoth.Afr.CONF	   0,2189	   p<0.05	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Turgoth.Igo.COOP	   0,2980	   p<0.01	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Turgoth.Nst.CONF	   -­‐0,4727	   p<0.001	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Turgoth.Nst.COOP	   0,4021	   p<0.001	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Turgoth.Weu.COOP	   -­‐0,2888	   p<0.01	  Turreb.Turgoth.CONF	   Turgoth.Wst.CONF	   0,3620	   p<0.001	  
COOP	   Turreb.Turgoth.COOP	   FOREIG
N	  
Eeu.Turgoth.CONF	   -­‐0,2215	   p<0.05	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There is also a positive correlation between Turkish rebels’ conflictual 
behavior to Turkey, and foreign non-state actors’ conflictual behavior to 
Turkey. The association is also long term: partial cross correlation shows 
non-state conflict comes 1 year after Turkish rebels’ increasing conflict. 
Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t-4), Nst.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(81)=0.234, p<0.05) 
Whenever Turkish rebels increase their conflictual behavior, Turkey reduces 
its conflict to non –state foreign actors, and increases its cooperation to 
foreign non-state actors. The associations imply that Turkey seeks foreign 
non-state actors’ cooperation when faced with increasing aggression from 
Turkish rebels through peaceful strategies but actually receives more conflict 
from them. Only after guaranteeing their cooperation through coercive 
strategies, Turkish government takes action against Turkish rebels. 
Turkey’s conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is associated with 
Turkey’s affairs with intergovernmental organizations. Turkey's conflictual 
behavior to Turkish rebels positively correlated with intergovernmental 
organizations’ cooperation to Turkey and negatively correlated with 
Turkey’s conflictual behavior to intergovernmental organizations. In other 
words, whenever Turkey makes operations against rebels, it reduces its 
conflict to IGOs, and IGOs increase their cooperation to Turkey. Partial cross 
correlation analysis shows that IGOs’ cooperation to Turkey begins to 
increase 2 quarters before Turkey’s operations against rebels, and decreases 
5 quarters after the operations.  (Igo.Turgoth.COOP(t-2), 
Turgoth.Turreb.CONFW(t) r(83)= 0.250, p<0.05 and Igo.Turgoth.COOP(t+5), 
Turgoth.Turreb.CONFW(t) r(80)= -0.269, p<0.05)  
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Whenever Turkey faces increasing rebel aggression, it cooperates 
more with IGOs but IGO's cooperation to Turkey decreases, and IGOs 
conflictual behavior to Turkey increases. Partial cross correlation analysis 
suggests that IGOs’ conflictual behavior leads to lower levels of conflictual 
behavior from Turkish rebels in the long run. (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+6), 
Igo.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(79)=-0.303, p<0.01) Turkey's cooperation with 
Turkish rebels is negatively correlated with IGO's conflict to Turkey.  
The associations imply that Turkey seeks IGOs cooperation around 
the time of increasing rebel aggression. But IGOs immediate respond is 
usually reprimand. This reprimand alone seems to have a reductive effect on 
Turkish rebels’ aggression. But when it comes to Turkey’s retaliation against 
rebels, Turkey guarantees IGOs’ cooperation, acts against rebels, after which 
IGO’s cooperation to Turkey again reduces.  
The third most important set of foreign affairs with respect to 
Turkey’s domestic terrorism is Turkey’s relations with Western Europe. 
Actually, in terms of longitidunal effect, Western Europe-Turkey relations 
are the most important set of foreign affairs with respect to Turkey’s 
domestic terrorism.   
There is no contemporaneous association between Turkey’s 
conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels and WEU-Turkey relations. Yet, 
increasing WEU cooperation, decreases Turkey’s conflictual behaviour to 
Turkish rebels in 1 and 5 quarters (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+1) 
Weu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(84)= -0.294, p<0.01 and Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+5) 
Weu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(80)= -0.266, p<0.05). WEU’s increasing level of 
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conflict and Turkey’s conflict to Turkish rebels is associated in a 15 months-
long loop. Increasing WEU conflict to Turkey leads to Turkey’s increasing 
conflictual behavior against Turkish rebels in the next quarter 
(Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+1) Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(84)= 0.308, p<0.01.). 
Turkey’s increasing conflictual behavior against Turkish rebels, in turn leads 
to increasing Weu conflict to Turkey in a year. (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t-4) 
Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(81)= 0.234, p<0.05.)  
Turkey’s conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels has also long term 
associations with Turkey’s behavior to Western Europe. Turkey’s 
cooperative behavior to Western Europe precedes Turkish government’s 
conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels by 1 and 5 quarters. 
(Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+1) Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(84)= 0.219, p<0.05 and 
Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+5) Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(80)= 0.272, p<0.05). 
Nevertheless, in the long run, (app. 2 years) Turkey’s cooperative behavior 
to Western Europe leads to lower levels of conflictual behavior by Turkey 
against Turkish rebels. (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+9) Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) 
r(76)= -0.231, p<0.05). Turkey’s conflictual behavior to Western Europe, also 
leads to lower levels of conflictual behavior by Turkey against Turkish 
rebels. (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+1) Turgoth.Weu.CONF(t) r(84)= -0.223, 
p<0.05) 
Turkey’s cooperative behavior to Turkish rebels has also 
contemporaneous and long term associations with Turkey’s behavior to 
Western Europe. Turkey’s cooperation with Turkish rebels is negatively 
correlated with W.Europe's cooperation to Turkey. In the very long run 
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(app. 6 years) however, increasing cooperation from Turkey to Turkish 
rebels leads to increasing cooperation from Western Europe. (Turgoth. 
Turreb.COOP(t-23) Weu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(62)= 0.266, p<0.05).  
Turkey's cooperation with Turkish rebels is positively correlated with 
Turkey's cooperation to W.Europe. In 2 quarters, however, Turkey's 
increasing cooperation to W.Europe leads to decreasing cooperation from 
Turkey to Turkish rebels (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t+2), 
Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(83)=-0.223, p<0.05).  Turkey's cooperation with 
Turkish rebels and W.Europe’s conflictual behavior to Turkey constitutes an 
approx. 8 years (31 quarters) long loop. W.Europe’s increasing conflictual 
behavior to Turkey leads to increasing cooperation from Turkey to Turkish 
rebels in 5 quarters, (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t+5), Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t), 
r(80)= 0.255, p<0.05), which in turn leads to increasing conflict from 
W.Europe to Turkey in 26 quarters (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-26), 
Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t), r(59)=0.262, p<0.05). 
Turkish rebels’ behavior to Turkey has also contemporaneous and 
long term associations with Turkey’s relations with Western Europe. 
Turkish rebels’ conflictual behavior to Turkey is negatively correlated with 
Turkey's cooperation to W.Europe. Partial cross correlations show increasing 
cooperation from Turkey to Western Europe leads to lower levels of conflict 
from Turkish rebels to Turkey in 5 and 20 quarters (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF 
(t+5), Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(80)=-0.273, Turreb. Turgoth.CONF(t+20) 
Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(65)=-0.243). Lower levels of conflict from Turkish 
rebels to Turkey, in turn leads to higher levels of cooperation from 
 
252 
W.Europe to Turkey in 9 quarters (Turreb.Turgoth. CONF(t-9), 
Weu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(76)=-0.284), although  Turkish rebels’ conflictual 
behavior to Turkey is also positively correlated with W.Europe's cooperation 
to Turkey within the same quarter and in 5 quarters. (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF 
(t+5) Weu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(80)= 0.248). In 5 years, long term, the two is 
also positively correlated. (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+20) Weu.Turgoth.COOP 
(t) r(65)= 0.265.) 
Turkish rebels’ conflictual behavior to Turkey is negatively correlated 
with W.Europe's conflictual behavior to Turkey. The effect of W.Europe's 
increasing conflictual behavior to Turkey leads to lower of conflict from 
Turkish rebels to Turkey in 5 quarters.( Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+5) 
Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(80)= -0.244)  
There is no contemporaneous association between Turkish rebels  
cooperative behavior to Turkey and WEU-Turkey relations. Yet, there are 
significant associations over the longer term. Turkish rebels increasing 
cooperation to Turkey leads to lower levels of conflict and higher levels of 
cooperation from Turkey to W.Europe in 19 quarters (Turreb.Turgoth. 
COOP(t-19) Turgoth.Weu.CONF(t) r(66) = -0.322, Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t-
19) Turgoth.Weu.COOP(t) r(66)= 0.248).  Higher levels of conflict from 
W.Europe to Turkey, leads to lower levels of cooperation from Turkish 
rebels to Turkey in 3 quarters, (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t+3) Weu.Turgoth. 
CONF(t) r(82)= -0.257, p<0.05) but higher levels of cooperation from Turkish 
rebels to Turkey in 4 quarters. (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t+4) 
Weu.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(81)= 0.237, p<0.05) 
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Turkish rebels conflictual behavior to Turkey is negatively correlated 
with M.East's cooperation to Turkey. There is no long term association 
between the two. Turkey's conflict to Turkish rebels is positively correlated 
with Turkey's cooperation to the Middle East. Partial cross correlations 
shows that Turkish government increases its cooperation to the Middle East 
7 quarters before its operations against Turkish rebels. Turgoth.Turreb. 
CONF(t+7), Turgoth.Mea.COOP(t) r(78)= 0.225 
Higher levels of Middle Eastern cooperation to Turkey leads to lower 
levels of Turkish rebels conflict to Turkey in 13 quarters. In other words, 
over the long run, Middle Eastern cooperation decreases terrorist aggression 
in Turkey. (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+13), Mea.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(72)= -
0,242. ) Higher levels of Turkish conflict to Middle East in turn leads to 
lower levels of cooperation from Turkish rebels to Turkey in 8 quarters 
(Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t) Turgoth.Mea.CONF(t-8) r(77)= -0.262) 
Turkey's cooperation with Turkish rebels is positively correlated with 
M.East's cooperation to Turkey. There is no long term association.  
Although there are no long term associations between Turkey’s and 
Turkish rebels cooperation with each other on the one hand and Turkey-
Middle Eastern affairs, there are significant long term effects of cooperation 
between Turkey’s and Turkish rebels on Turkey-Middle Eastern relations. 
Higher levels of Turkey’s cooperation to Turkish rebels leads to higher levels 
of Turkey’s conflict to the Middle East in 2 quarters, but lower levels of 
conflict to Middle East in 4 quarters (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t) 
Turgoth.Mea.CONF(t+2) r(83)= 0.223 and Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t) 
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Turgoth.Mea.CONF(t+4) r(81)=-0.290). Higher levels of Turkey’s 
cooperation to Turkish rebels leads to lower levels of Middle East conflict to 
Turkey in 2 quarters(Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t) Mea.Turgoth.CONF(t+2) 
r(83)= -0.244).   
Higher levels of Turkey’s cooperation to Turkish rebels lead to 
increasing Turkey cooperation to Middle East in 13 quarters. 
(Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t) Turgoth.Mea.COOP(t+13) r(72)= 0.327. 
Higher levels of Turkish rebels’ cooperation to Turkey leads to 
increasing Middle eastern conflict in 8 quarters (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t) 
Mea.Turgoth.CONF(t+8) r(77)=0.318) , but lower level of Middle Eastern 
conflict in 15 quarters. (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t) Mea.Turgoth.CONF(t+15) 
r(70)= -0.269)  Higher levels of Turkish rebels’ cooperation to Turkey leads to 
lower levels of Turkish cooperation to Middle East in 19 quarters. 
(Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t) Turgoth.Mea.COOP(t+19) r(66)=-0.241).  
Turkey’s conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is positively correlated 
with Turkey’s cooperation to Asia. Partial cross correlation shows, higher 
levels of Turkish cooperation to Asia leads to lower levels of Turkish conflict 
to Turkish rebels in 18 quarters. (Turgoth.Asa.COOP(t), Turgoth.Turreb. 
CONF(t+18) r(67)= -0.271, p<0.05) By 30 quarters however, Turkey’s 
conflictual behavior to rebels increases (Turgoth.Asa.COOP(t), 
Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+30) r(55)=0.292, p<0.05). Unlike with Middle East 
then, Turkey does not proactively seek Asian cooperation before operations 
against Turkish rebels, but it only tries to cooperate with Asian countries 
around the time of operations. Turkey’s conflictual behavior to Turkish 
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rebels is also negatively correlated with Asia’s both conflictual and 
cooperative behavior to Turkey, and it follows slightly lower levels of Asian 
cooperation (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF (t), Asa.Turgoth.COOP (t-2) =-0.213, 
p<0.05.)  Turkey’s attempts at cooperation are met with hesitance by Asian 
countries, even though not with outright conflict. Turkey’s conflict to 
Turkish rebels has no long-term associations with Asian conflict to Turkey. 
Moreover, Turkish rebels conflict to Turkey is positively correlated 
with Asia’s conflict to Turkey. The contemporaneous association is very 
strong (p<0.001) but there is no long-term association inbetween. 
Turkish rebels conflict to Turkey is positively correlated with 
Turkey’s conflict to Non-European West. The long term association is 
negative, though. In other words, higher levels of Turkish conflict to Non-
European West leads to lower levels of rebel conflict in 3 and 7 quarters. 
Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+3), Turgoth.Wst.CONF(t) r(82)= -0.305,p<0.01, 
Turreb.Turgoth.CONF(t+7), Turgoth.Wst.CONF(t) r(78)= -0.265, p<0.05). 
But, higher levels of Western conflict to Turkey also leads to higher levels of 
rebel activity in 3 quarters, (Turreb.Turgoth.CONF (t+3), 
Wst.Turgoth.CONF (t), r(82)= 0.237, p<0.05).  
Turkey’s conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is negatively 
correlated with Turkey’s cooperative behavior to Non-European West. 
Partial cross correlation shows higher levels of Turkish cooperation to the 
Non-European West leads to lower levels of Turkish conflict against the 
rebels. Turgoth.Wst.COOP(t-3), Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t), r(82)=-0.325, 
p<0.01.).  
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Turkey’s cooperative behavior to Turkish rebels is positively 
correlated with Turkey’s cooperative behavior to Non-European West, but 
negatively correlated with Non-European West’s cooperation to Turkey. 
Higher levels of Turkish cooperation to rebels leads to higher levels of 
Turkish cooperation to Non-European West (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-12). 
Turgoth.Wst.COOP(t), r(73)= 0.309, p<0.01) and Non-European Western 
cooperation to Turkey in 3 years (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-12) , 
Wst.Turgoth.COOP(t)r(73)= 0.243, p<0.05), but lower levels of Non-
European Western cooperation to Turkey in 13 quarters 
(Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-13) , Wst.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(72)=-0.347, p<0.01), 
and lower levels of Turkish cooperation to Non-European West in 6 years 
(Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-24), Turgoth.Wst.COOP(t), r(61)=-0.299, p<0.05).  
In other words, Turkey’s reconciliation attempts effect Turkish foreign 
affairs with Non-European West in a positive manner in the mid-run (3 
years) but soon after 3 years, Western cooperation to Turkey decreases, in 6 
years Turkish cooperation to West decreases.   
Turkey’s cooperative behavior to Turkish rebels is positively 
correlated with Eastern Europe’s cooperative behavior to Turkey and 
negatively correlated with Turkey’s cooperative behavior to E.Europe. 
Partial cross correlation shows higher levels of Turkey’s cooperation to 
Turkish rebels leads to more cooperation from EEU to Turkey in 4 quarters, 
and 10 quarters Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t), Eeu.Turgoth.COOP(t+10), r(75)= 
0.337, p<0.01 and Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t), Eeu.Turgoth.COOP(t+4), r(81)= 
0.311, p<0.01) , but it leads to less cooperation from Turkey to Eeu in 10 
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quarters. (Turgoth.Eeu.COOP (t+10), Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t), r(75)=-0.336, 
p<0.01).  
Turkish rebels cooperation to Turkey is negatively correlated with 
E.Europe’s conflict to Turkey. In the long run, however, higher levels of  
conflict from Eeu to Turkey leads to higher levels of Turkish rebels 
cooperation in 13 quarters. (Turreb.Turgoth.COOP(t+13), 
Eeu.Turgoth.CONF(t) r(72)= 0.291, p<0.05). Turkey’s cooperation to Turkish 
rebels is negatively correlated with Turkey’s cooperation to Eeu. Lower 
levels of Turkish cooperation to Turkish rebels leads to higher levels of  
Turkish cooperation to Eeu in 10 quarters. (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t-10), 
Turgoth.Eeu.COOP(t), r(75)= -0.336, p<0.01). Turkey’s cooperation to 
Turkish rebels is also positively correlated with Eeu cooperation to Turkey. 
The association is stronger in the long run. Higher levels of Turkish 
cooperation to Turkish rebels lead to higher levels of Eastern Europe 
cooperation to Turkey in 4 and 10 quarters. (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-10), 
res.Eeu.Turgoth.COOP r(75)=0.337, p<0.01; Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-4), 
res.Eeu.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(81)=0.311, p<0.01)  
Turkey’s cooperative behavior to Turkish rebels is negatively 
correlated with Sub-Saharan Africa’s cooperative behavior to Turkey. 
Turkey’s cooperation to Turkish rebels leads to lower levels of sub-Saharan 
African cooperation to Turkey in 3 years. (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP(t-12), 
Afr.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(73)=-0.257, p<0.05) Turkey’s conflictual behavior to 
Turkish rebels is also negatively correlated with Turkey’s cooperation to 
sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, increasing conflict from Turkey to Turkish 
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rebels leads to increasing conflict from Turkey to Africa in 5 quarters. 
(Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t-5) Turgoth.Afr.CONF(t) r(80)= 0.241) 
Turkish rebels conflict to Turkey is positively correlated with 
Turkey’s conflict to sub-Saharan Africa but there is no long term association 
inbetween. 
Turkey’s conflictual behavior to Turkish rebels is also negatively 
correlated with Latin American conflict to Turkey. Higher levels of Latin 
American conflict to Turkey leads to lower levels of Turkish conflict to 
Turkish rebels in 2 quarters (Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+2),  
Lam.Turgoth.CONF(t), r(83)= -0.250,  p<0.05) but in the very long run (app.6 
years), it leads to higher levels of Turkish conflict to Turkish rebels 
(Turgoth.Turreb.CONF(t+25),  Lam.Turgoth.CONF(t), r(60)= 0.361, p<0.01). 
Turkey’s cooperation to Turkish rebels is positively correlated with 
Latin American cooperation to Turkey. There is interesting loop in between: 
Higher levels of Turkish cooperation to Turkish rebels lead to lower levels of 
Latin American cooperation in 5 quarters, (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t-5), 
Lam.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(80)= -0.290), but to higher levels of Latin American 
cooperation in the next quarter (Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t-6), 
Lam.Turgoth.COOP(t) r(79)=0.293). Higher levels of Latin American 
cooperation, in turn, leads to lower levels of Turkish cooperation to Turkish 
rebels in 1 and 4 quarters ( Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t+1), Lam.Turgoth.COOP 
(t) r(84)= -0.253 and Turgoth.Turreb.COOP (t+4), Lam.Turgoth.COOP(t) 
r(81)= -0.243).  
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7.5. Conclusion 
The findings presented in this chapter reveal that domestic level 
factors such as identity, and interrelationships between sub-state actors are 
important in shaping Turkish foreign affairs.  
Despite Turkey’s efforts to balance its cooperation with respect to 
Muslim and non-Muslim entities, Turkey’s improving relations with Non-
Muslims elicits negative reaction from Muslims. Conversely, Turkey’s 
relations with non-Muslim entities however, is positively effected by its 
improving relations with the Muslim entities.  
Contrary to the widespread opinion, Turkey’s overall interaction with 
previously Ottoman countries were higher in pre-AKP periods, compared to 
its interactions with other countries. However, there is a significant change 
between periods before and after 2007. Turkey has become signficantly less 
proactive towards previously Ottoman and Muslim countries in the first five 
years of AKP rule, but significantly more proactive in second five years.  
The findings also confirm the arguments about increasing 
prominence of Turkey’s civil actors in Turkey’s foreign affairs under AKP. A 
comparative look at first and second half of AKP’s term reveals that the 
increasing prominence of civil actors in foreign affairs is largely confined to 
the first five years of AKP rule. In their foreign affairs, Turkish civil actors 
behave more independently toward Western Europe and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Compared to Turkish government, civil actors are more engaged 
with Western Europe, foreign non-state actors, intergovernmental 
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organizations, and Latin America, less engaged with the Non-European 
West, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. 
The findings in this study also revealed that the relationships between 
sub-state actors in Turkey are also particularly related to Turkey’s foreign 
affairs. Among innumerable possibilities, this chapter provided two 
examples as heuristic case studies. The first analysis dealt with Turkish civil-
military relations and Turkey-Israeli relations, whereas the second focused 
on the association between domestic terrorism and Turkey’s foreign affairs.  
On average Turkish government is both more cooperative and more 
conflictual towards Israel, than Israel is to Turkish government. There is not 
a significant difference in Turkish government’s cooperative behavior to 
Israel before and after AKP, as well as between AKP’s first and second five 
year in rule. Both Israel’s and Turkish government’s conflictual behavior 
towards each other increased under AKP, particularly in the 2007-2012 
period. 
Israel’s cooperative initiative towards the military seems to have a 
mollifying effect on Turkish foreign policy towards Israel. Whenever 
Turkish military receives Israeli cooperation, Turkish government is more 
cooperative to both Israel and Turkish military. Turkish military’s 
cooperative initiatives towards Israel on the other hand, has a negative effect 
on Turkish government’s behaviour to Israel. When Turkish military shows 
more initiative in cooperating with Israel, this disrupts Turkish 
government’s behavior to both Israel and Turkish military. The findings also 
show that Turkish government’s decreasing cooperation to Israel leads to 
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Turkish military’s increasing cooperation to Turkish government. In sum, 
relations with Israel is more important when Israel becomes a foreign policy 
target, as both the government and the military recalibrate their behaviour 
to each other according to the other’s behavior to Israel.  
The most important findings in this chapter are about the dynamics of 
domestic terrorism and its association with Turkey’s foreign affairs. A closer 
look at the relationship between rebels and Turkish government reveals that 
coercive behaviour from Turkish government induces  –albeit slightly- more 
cooperation from Turkish rebels at the time. But, it induces ever more 
conflict in the long run: It takes approximately 2 years for rebels to fight 
back.  
Turkish government’s coercive strategies towards against Turkish 
rebels negatively effects Turkish foreign policy in general: when the 
government acts aggressively against Turkish rebels, Turkish government’s 
behaviour to foreign actors are also become more conflictual both 
immediately and in the long run. Cooperative gestures from foreign actors 
on the other hand encourage Turkish government to cooperate more with 
Turkish rebels. 
There is also a negative correlation between Turkish rebels' conflictual 
behavior to Turkish government and foreign actors' cooperative behavior to 
Turkish government, indicating either 
A) increasing terrorism in Turkey might diminish foreign support for 
Turkish government. OR 
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B) increasing cooperation from foreign actors to Turkish government 
may encourage Turkish rebels to act less aggressively towards Turkish 
government. 
In either way, foreign cooperation to Turkey is anti-thetical to 
domestic terrorism in Turkey.   
A more in-depth analysis, which focus on specific foreign agents 
show that domestic terrorism in Turkey affects and is effected differently by 
Turkey’s relations with different regions.  
Whenever rebels’ aggression in Turkey increases, Western Europe 
reduces its conflict and increases its cooperation to Turkey. However, 
foreign non-state actors, Asia and IGOs increase their conflict, while both 
IGOs and the Middle East also decrease their cooperation.  
Turkey’s foreign behavior is also associated with increasing rebel 
aggression. Whenever, rebel aggression increases Turkey increases its 
conflictual behavior to sub-Saharan Africa and Non-European West, and 
reduces its cooperation to Western Europe. Conversely, Turkey reduces its 
conflictual behaviour to non-state actors, while it increases its cooperation to 
both IGOs and non-state actors.  
At times of operation against rebels, Turkey seeks Asian, Non-
European Western and Middle Eastern cooperation.  It also reduces its 
conflict to sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the Middle East and Non-
European Western countries do not offer immediate cooperation to Turkey.  
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Asia, on the other hand, responds by decreasing its both cooperative and 
conflictual behavior, suggesting it refrains from taking sides in the matter.  
Higher levels of Turkish conflictual behavior to rebels are also 
associated with lower levels of Turkish cooperation to IGOs and Non-
European West, but higher levels of conflictual behavior against non-state 
actors. IGOs increase their cooperation to Turkey, whereas non-state actors 
and Latin America decrease their conflict. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
CONCLUSION: PROPOSING A NEW MODEL 
 
 
 
When the blind men had each felt a part 
of the elephant, the king went to each of 
them and said to each: “Well, blind man, 
have you seen the elephant? Tell me, 
what sort of thing is an elephant?”395 
 
In the third chapter, it has been argued that every theory is based 
upon observation of facts. Yet, as evident in the epistemological discussions 
about the relationship between facts and values, facts are not universal, nor 
do they speak for themselves. In this chapter, I propose a model of data, 
based on longitudinal observations about Turkey’s foreign and domestic 
affairs. Following rules of “abduction”, the model offers several concepts 
and proposes relations between those concepts in explaining a mid-sized 
power’s foreign affairs. The model employs a standpoint perspective, in the 
sense that foreign affairs of a mid-power are conceptualized through putting 
Turkey at the centerpoint.  
                                                
395 Udana, 68-69, quoted in Randy Wang, “Parable of the blind men and the elephant” 
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rywang/berkeley/258/parable.html 
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The first part conceptualizes foreign affairs and domestic affairs as a 
complex web of interrelated nodes and explains the characteristics of the 
system. It also provides an overview of how volume of a country’s foreign 
behavior is related to volume of foreign actors’s behavior on the one hand, 
and its domestic affairs, on the other. It argues that increasing domestic 
responsiveness to foreign actors’ behavior may help explain why a country 
is more active in foreign affairs in some periods, while not in others. It also 
clarifies the distinction and the relationship between proactivism and 
activism.  
The second part explains how and why a foreign policy change is 
instigated from a decision-making perspective, and explains how 
governments’ capability to modulate intermestic and international nexus 
shape the outcome. It proposes that a mid-sized country’s domestic affairs 
are linked to its relations with foreign actors, based on its specific problems 
of social cohesion. 
 The third part takes foreign policy change as an explanatory variable 
and argues that if succesfully employed, such a foreign policy change leads 
to power accumulation. The fourth part explains how the model can be 
applied to various issues of Turkish foreign affairs. The next three parts deal 
with theoretical, methodological and policy implications of the study 
respectively. The chapter concludes by a summary of the study’s potential 
contributions to community building in Turkish IR.  
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8.1. Foreign and Domestic Affairs as a Complex System 
A country’s foreign and domestic affairs constitute a complex web of 
interactions, each having repercussions for other interactions. Theoretically, 
these interactions are not only between states, but in every level of analysis. 
In some cases, interaction between two individuals may be as influential as 
interactions between two states.  
The most important characteristic of these systems is that the major 
explanatory variable is not the individual agent or its properties, whether it 
is an individual or a country, but the relations of that agent with other 
agents. In other words, a complex system is a relational construct, where the 
relations between actors, which effect relations between other actors, are 
more meaningful entities for explanation than individual actors’ properties, 
such as being capitalist, democratic, “Western” or communitarian. These 
properties are relevant to the explanation to the extent they reflect upon 
their behaviours toward other agents. Therefore, a complex system is shaped 
by the behavioural patterns, rather than pre-defined properties of agents.  
In a complex system, each relationship of the agent is considered a 
separate “node”. Each node is composed of relations between at least two 
agents. The nature of these agents can be various: individuals, sub-state or 
non-state groups based on profession, class, ethnicity or religious/secterian 
affiliation, states, IGOs, etc. Therefore, the agents whose behaviours are 
conventionally excluded from the analysis of foreign policy, are indeed 
endogenous to a complex system of political (domestic and foreign) affairs.  
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Moveover, their relations with foreign agents and other domestic 
agents have important repercussions for foreign policy.  
A bilateral relationship, i.e. a “node”, has several properties. One is 
the volume or density of relations. Denser relations occur where two agents 
are geographically proximate, identity-wise close, or historically connected. 
It is measured by either comparing the volume of interactions between two 
agents in a period to previous periods, or comparing it against the volume of 
relations between other agents in the same period. Density also has another 
dimension. A relationship is symmetrically dense if an agent’s behaviour is 
met in volume by the other agent. It is asymmetrically dense, if one agent’s 
volume of behavior significantly surpasses the volume of the other agent. 
Symmetrically dense relationships imply the agents are interested in and 
capable of responding to each other, whereas an asymmetrically dense 
relationship implies one of the agents is more interested in or capable of 
responding to the other. A dense relationship, whether it is symmetrical or 
not, does not automatically refer to a peaceful relationship between two 
agents, however.  
The second property of a relationship is the reciprocity. Reciprocity is 
when behavior of one agent to another is met in kind. As opposed to 
theoretical constructs which posit cooperation and conflict as mutually 
exclusive and dichotomous, in a complex system of affairs, conflictual and 
cooperative interaction can be dense at the same time. The relationship can 
be conflictually reciprocal, cooperatively reciprocal, neither or both. 
Theoretically, one agent’s interaction with the other may be symmetrically 
dense, but it may be only conflictually reciprocal, only cooperatively 
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reciprocal, neither or both. In practice however, a symmetrically dense 
relationship usually involves some form of reciprocity, since a dense 
relationship with no reciprocity would mean a highly erratic, if not outright 
chaotic, relationship.  
The third property of the interaction is the presence of osciliation in 
one agent’s behavior toward another. Oscilliation refers to cases where an 
agent’s conflictual and cooperative behaviors to another agent are 
contemporenous. The oscilliating agent has a mixed perception of the other 
agent: either it could not decide whether cooperation or conflict is more 
productive towards that agent, or relations with the other agent raise 
disagreement within the ingroup. Therefore, osciliation happens when the 
osciliating actor perceives the relationship as embedded with both grave 
risks and lucrative opportunities. 
Lastly, any interaction between two actors may have feedback loops 
i.e. contemprenous or time-lagged feedback mechanisms that either inhibit 
or facilitate the original interaction. The loops are, by definition, either short 
term or long term repercussions of any interaction over itself, and closely 
related to historicity in domestic and foreign affairs. More often than not, 
longer loops exist between agents, which have a long history of interaction, 
i.e. when the relationship between two actors is historically mature enough 
to allow for wider intricacy and deeper integration.  
The facilitating feedback mechanisms are called positive feedback 
loops, whereas inhibiting feedback mechanisms are negative feedback loops. 
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Positive feedback loops happen when an agent’s (A) cooperation is 
contemprenous with or leads to lesser conflictual behavior from the other 
agent (B) or A’s conflictual behavior is contemprenous with or leads to lesser 
cooperative behavior from B. “Positive” implies the reinforcing effect of 
one’s behavior over the other’s behavior.  
Positive feedback loops imply the issues of contention and 
cooperation between two agents are either the same, or closely interlinked. 
Cooperation in one issue, leads to less conflict in another or the same issue. 
If A’s cooperation leads to less conflict from B, but B’s cooperation does not 
lead to less conflict from A, then A and B have different perceptions of the 
relationship. The conflict reducing or increasing agent is usually the one 
who perceives the issue more interlinked than the cooperation reducing or 
increasing partner, since conflict is mose costly than cooperation in most 
cases. Absence of positive feedback loops implies the issues are 
compartmentalized.  
Negative feedback loop happens when an agent’s (A) cooperative 
behavior to another agent (B) cohappens with or follows B’s conflictual 
behavior to A or when A’s conflictual behavior cohappens with or follows 
B’s cooperative behavior to A. “Negative” implies the dampening effect of 
the original behavior over the other’s behaviour. Thus, negative feedback 
loop means the original behavior is responded with an opposite type of 
behavior. If B’s conflict leads to A’s cooperation, it means A complies to B’s 
force or threat, if B’s cooperation leads to A’s conflict, then it means A 
suspects B’s behavior.  
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The negative feedback loops imply one agent perceive the intent of 
the other agent in opposition to its behavior. A conflictual behavior is 
perceived as an assertive demand for cooperation, whereas a cooperative 
behavior is interpreted as having ulterior motives. Therefore, negative 
feedback loops point to issues of mistrust. Absence of negative feedback 
loops implies there is a certain level of clarity and directness in a 
relationship.  
Any relationship between two agents can have a combination of the 
above attributes, depending on the complexity of the relationship. The most 
complex relationships have all of them, whereas less complex relationships 
have only some. More complex a relationship, it is more likely that the 
bilateral interaction between those two agents will have repercussions for 
both agents’ relationships with third parties.  
If an agent’s relationship with another agent has repercussions for its 
relationship with a third agent, then these two nodes form a nexus. The first 
node can have a reinforcing, or inhibiting effect on the second node. The 
greater the number of nexus, the more complex is the whole system. 
A country’s foreign and domestic affairs constitute a complex system, 
which consists of many diverse, autonomous but interdependent nodes, 
linked with other nodes. It is an evolving system, in the sense that past 
interactions have a longitidunal effect on future interactions, emanating 
from country’s willingness to adapt. Closed societies, in which interactions 
between domestic and foreign agents are restricted by either the 
government, or by outside agents (embargo, isolation, etc.) have fewer 
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nexus, and become less adaptive to their environment. In the long run, this 
lack of adaptation leads to a failing society. A self-inflicted isolation is 
usually to evade the repercussions of any node on others, and reduce the 
number of nexus to control the overall system, but it ends up in severely 
limiting the adaptive mechanisms of the country in question. This is why 
policies like embargoes, political isolation, denial of membership to IGOs are 
inflicted as a form of punishment by outside agents. Yet, if the end purpose 
is to change the behaviour of the isolated agent, more interaction, rather 
than less interaction, is more efficient.    
The nexus in question can be threefold, a domestic nexus is when there 
is a link between a sub-state agent’s behavior to another sub-state agent, and 
its behavior to a third sub-state agent. The majority of social sciences are 
devoted to study the nodes and the domestic nexus these nodes form. Since 
the focus of this study is foreign affairs, purely domestic nexus are left out of 
the analysis. An intermestic nexus is the link formed between a domestic 
node, and an international node. The study of foreign policy looks at this 
sort of nexus, by studying two-level games, intermestic policy, role of media, 
public opinion and bureaucracy in foreign policy decision-making, etc. But 
most of these studies focus on deliberate, calculated behaviors, i.e. policies 
and positions directed at some specific goal. Accordingly, they focus on the 
deliberate negotiations between a sub-state actor and the decision-making 
authority about a specific issue area, one the one hand, and that authority’s 
negotiations with a foreign decision-making authority about the same issue; 
hence the two-table metaphor.  However, intermestic affairs often have four 
tables in question, not two: in addition to the “domestic” and “foreign” table 
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of the decision-maker, the sub-state actors in country A have relations with 
sub-state actors in country B, which are increasingly unmodulated by either 
decision-maker in a globalized world. This form of relations are studied 
under diaspora politics, immigration studies, MNCs, advocacy groups and 
global terrorism under “transnational studies.” As such, this sort of 
phenomena are conceptualized, but not succesffully integrated into models 
that account for foreign affairs.  The last table, on the other hand, is under-
theorized. It is the relationship between one foreign governmental actor and 
one domestic non-governmental actor. Even when there is no direct 
“intermeddling in domestic affairs”, foreign states may form relationships 
with domestic constituencies, in ways the domestic decision-makers may or 
may not modulate. Public diplomacy is a case in point. 
Complex systems are usually at the edge of chaos, with multiple 
actors more often unknowingly influencing their target’s other affairs. 
Complex systems are consequences of human action, but not of human 
design. Therefore, the effect may not be built through deliberate 
negotiations, with specific purposes in mind. For example, theory of soft 
power, conceptualizes the positive effect of peaceful domestic or foreign 
affairs of a country on its other foreign affairs. Of course, a country does not 
always conduct its domestic affairs with generating a positive image on 
foreign audience as a purpose in mind: the positive foreign repercussions 
are a welcome side-effect. Nevertheless, theory of soft power conceptualizes 
only presence and absence of positive repercussions, and falls short of 
conceptualizing the negative impact.  
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The last nexus is the international nexus. The international nexus is the 
link between an agent’s relationship between two foreign actors. In other 
words, it is the link between two international nodes. Systemic level theories 
of international relations, such as structural realism and liberalism, refer to 
this type of nexus, especially in explaining alliances, balances of power, and 
working of international organizations, and international regimes. However, 
most of these theories refer to properties of individual agents in explaining 
their relationships. For example, democratic or capitalist peace refer to 
economic and social systems of individual societies in explaining their 
relationship to each other, whereas structural realism’s explanatory variable 
is power, defined as material capabilities. Therefore, they are explaining 
foreign behavior in relation to properties of individual agents, not 
interaction. Other systemic theories such as constructivism or English School 
are more prone to explaining relations between two agents based on their 
previous relations, but do not particulary dwell on how one set of relations 
effect another set of relations. There are of course an abundance of studies as 
to how relations with one superpower have affected a country’s relations 
with the other superpower especially in the context of the Cold War. 
Concepts such as balance-of-threat and bandwagoning, 
reactivism/passivism396, international clientalism, dependency offer such 
explanations.  
 
                                                
396 See Kent E. Calder “Review Article:Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: 
Explaining the Reactive State” World Politics 40, no.4 (1988): 517-541 for an explanation 
of how Japanese foreign economic policy is dependent upon its foreign relations with the 
US.  
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The nexus, whether they are domestic, intermestic or international 
can be mutually inhibiting or reinforcing. Inhibitive nexus exist when an 
agent’s affairs with another agent are associated with opposite behaviors 
between the first and a third agent. Reinforcing nexus exist the when an 
agent’s affairs with another agent is associated with similar behaviors 
between the first and a third agent.  
Conceptualizing domestic and foreign affairs as a complex system 
allows for looking at each part of “the elephant” in an all-encompassing 
manner: not only specific issue areas, not only deliberate calculated 
behavior, not only governmental actors, not only a single level of analysis, 
not only positive impacts. It allows for not only focusing on empirically 
prominent relationships and their attributes, but analytically possible 
attributes of and associations between those relationships. Therefore, it 
portrays the wider system of affairs each domestic and foreign interaction of 
an agent is embedded within. As with all complex systems, the whole 
foreign-domestic affairs system is not definable by a few characteristics, 
since there are multiples nodes and several nexus between them, each 
having particular characteristics.  
8.2. Foreign policy change 
The model depicts all political affairs of a country as a complex 
system. As stated earlier, the whole system is a consequence of human 
action, but not human design. Most of the change in the system is 
evolutionary: emergence and development of nodes and nexus is a part of 
reciprocal and recursive processes instigated by increasing movement of 
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goods, people and ideas around the world. In other words, in the age of 
globalization, the complex systems are naturally prone to more 
interconnectedness. Nevertheless, the agents can modulate parts of the 
system through behavioral and discursive strategies. These strategies can be 
twofold. Either the agent manipulates one node of the existing nexus to 
create a desired outcome in other node of the nexus, or the agent may 
attempt to establish a previously non-existant nexus between two nodes.  
The first strategy, i.e. drawing on historically established connections 
between nodes, is less risky, but the outcome is more limited. For example, 
based on previous experiences, the primary agent may become more 
cooperative or conflictual towards a particular agent to modulate not only 
that second agent’s, but also a third agent’s behavior. The first step of 
triggering of nexus usually begins with identifying the targeted node, and its 
extant and/or possible domestic, intermestic or international nexus. The 
triggering of the nexus can follow numerous ways.
 
Figure 38 Intermestic and international nexus in foreign policy change 
For example, the primary agent may take a specific action towards a 
domestic agent, and use it as a catalyst to change the behavior of the foreign 
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  Policy	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  Turkey	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actor. If the nexus is successfully analyzed and triggering is properly carried 
out, the consequences of foreign response can be used as a catalyst to change 
the primary agent’s other international or domestic nodes. For example, 
Turkish government may seek reconciliation with certain ethnic groups to 
garner a cooperative attitude from international actors. Alternatively, the 
triggering can start with a change in the primary agent’s behavior to a 
foreign actor, which would either generate a change in the domestic or 
international node of the primary agent. Following the previous example, 
the consequences of the positive international response could then be used 
to increase cooperation with business groups and other foreign agents.  
The second course of strategy, i.e. establishing a previously non-
existant nexus, takes a longer to time and effort to implement, and the 
consequences of the strategy are both wider and less prone to full control. 
The foreign partners should both be interested and capable of affecting and 
be affected from the primary agent’s other affairs. If not, capacity or interest 
building beforemath is essential in successful cross-linking.  
A succesful establishment of a nexus, which brings about intended 
consequences, can bring about changes in the overall system in two ways. 
First, establishment of a nexus creates more interdependence: the political 
affairs of the agent become more sensitive to each other. The learning 
process associated with the triggering, increases the involved agents’ belief 
in continual improvement at the domestic and foreign spheres through more 
interaction, and results in more integration and adaptation. Secondly, the 
involved agents also become more capable at engagement and participation, 
and thus more prone to strategically triggering or establishing other nexus.  
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This second consequence, however, poses great risks if the intended 
consequences are not achieved. In other words, if a nexus is built between 
two domestic nodes, but the triggering is ill done so as it does not lead to 
eventual improvement in domestic or foreign affairs, the attempt may turn 
into an uncontrolled chain reaction because of the related recursive loops. 
Especially with respect to intermestic nexus, failure in strategic triggering 
may turn domestic responsivity into domestic vulnerability to foreign 
affairs.  
8.3. Power Accumulation by Exercise: Helical Model 
These attempts at modulation and manipulation are mostly directed 
at mitigation of problems the agent faces in domestic and international 
domains. For mid-powers like Turkey, the grand objective is usually 
resolution of domestic problems of social cohesion, i.e. large discrepancies in 
income, social and economic development, ethnic, religious or ideological 
tension, gender inequality, and inequality in rights and freedoms. Since 
most mid-powers have limited resources (money, time, manpower, 
knowledge) to deal achieve social cohesion, the modulation of especially 
intermestic nexus are paramount in addressing them: the triggering of 
intermestic nexus allows the agent to utilize foreign agents resources in an 
indirect manner, by triggering them use their resources, in a way which 
would improve cohesion in domestic sphere. For example, addressing a 
domestic economic problem with an international cultural exercise (for 
example holding olympics), is more efficient than addressing it by a 
domestic and economic measure (such as lowering taxes). 
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No matter the exact pathway of change, the most important rule in a 
successful strategy is to manipulate the chain reaction so that it would have 
an alleviating affect on the domestic social cohesion problem as immediately 
as possible. Multi-step loops and/or longer loops have diminishing returns, 
because the feedback from foreign agents is usually weaker in volume and 
tone than primary agent’s foreign behavior. Moreover, it takes several 
months and/or years to address the domestic problem. If the loop is multi-
step, or very long, the foreign feedback loses its impact. 
A second concern is to cross-link the nodes with different scopes. 
What the primary agent is most capable of, should define the initial 
triggering node and its scope. One or more scopes of a social, military, 
economic, cultural nature can be effective in triggering a certain nexus. For 
better results, if the expected change in the domestic node is one of four 
scopes, the change in the international node should be determined as one of 
other three scopes, preferably the one in which the primary agent has more 
to offer to the foreign agent. For example, the cross linkage of domestic 
security problems (target node) with foreign economic relations is more 
efficient than crosslinking domestic security problems with foreign security 
relations. Similarly, cross linkage of domestic security problems with foreign 
economic relations is more efficient than crosslinking domestic security 
problems with foreign cultural relations, if the primary agent is more 
capable of offering economic benefits than cultural benefits.  
The third concern is to choose the right partner in addressing the 
domestic problem. The foreign partners should both be interested and 
capable of affecting and be affected from the resolution of the domestic 
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problem. And of course, the foreign agent shold also be interested in what 
the primary agent is able to offer. If not, capacity or interest building 
beforemath is essential in successful cross-linking. 
Problems of social cohesion are very common and in most cases, 
protracted in the developing world: democracy, terrorism, development, 
infrastructure, etc. While a few of these countries are almost completely 
overwhelmed by these problems due to their limited resources, others still 
show limited success in overcoming these problems despite their 
considerable resources.  
Accordingly, these developing countries’ influence in foreign affairs is 
also limited. In most cases, they are considered important partners, or 
pivotal players in a select few regional and international issues, but they do 
not have wider regional or global influence.  
Problems of social cohesion are leakages of power; they drain energy 
and resources. As long as these problems are not addressed efficiently, the 
country cannot fully involve in international affairs: they cannot reciprocate, 
nor become active or proactive. When proactivity comes at the times of not 
particularly active periods, it is meant to redress what is missing inside.   
Therefore, resolution of domestic problems not only leads to a more 
cohesive society, which “works towards the well-being of all its members, 
fights exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes 
trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward mobility.” 397 but 
                                                
397  OECD, Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World, OECD 
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also more influence in international affairs.  As such, solving domestic 
problems is also the key to power build-up.  
In 21st century, most domestic problems (indeed, almost all of them) 
have an international, or global aspect to it, which constrains individual 
states to solve them by their own means.  The reciprocal and recursive 
processes, which cut across domestic and international relations, offer 
alternative venues for resolution of such conflicts. Triggering feedbacks from 
international domain leads to mutual changes of behaviour in domestic 
sphere and alleviates the social cohesion problem. With each successful 
triggering, the agent becomes more powerful in the international domain. 
This model of power accumulation defines power as a constant 
exercise, as opposed to acquisition of resources such as money, manpower, 
technology or knowledge. The best indicator of power, is not volume of such 
resources, but volume of behavior.  Because as long as such resources are not 
reflected in behavior, i.e. when resources are accumulated, but not 
manifested behaviorally, power fades. Projection of those resources, 
however, generates more resources, in the sense that repercussion of the 
initial behavior may trigger change in the behaviour of others.  
This power accumulation model is based on interlinkages between 
domestic and international spheres, hence inherently helical: the 
inside/outside cross-linking makes it cyclical, whereas resolution of social 
cohesion problems leads to a vertical power build-up. Keeping the 
momentum in carefully weaving issues and actors is paramount in power 
                                                                                                                                    
Publishing, 2011,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/persp_glob_dev-2012-en 
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accumulation. Immediate full-scale success with respect to one specific 
foreign policy goal is not as much relevant to power build-up as the 
constancy and subsequent linkage to domestic sphere. Constant 
maneuvering and investment in building linkages with various means is 
crucial. Even when the immediate costs of an international node are high in 
comparison with its immediate benefits, the same action may be rational 
when looked at in terms of its effect on domestic social cohesion.  
8.4. Turkish Foreign Affairs as a Complex System 
Turkey’s periodic attempts a more active foreign policy is illustrative 
of complex system and may provide more clues about different dynamics at 
play when a mid-sized power tries to expand its influence in foreign affairs. 
Activism, i.e. increase in the density of foreign activity, occurs because of 
two reasons: either there is increasing foreign interest to the country in 
question, or the country increases its foreign behaviour.  Over the last 22 
years, Turkey had two distinct periods of foreign policy activism: 1995-1999 
and 2002-2006. The first period was mainly instigated by foreign behaviour, 
whereas the second was mostly due to Turkey’s own initiative. The lowest 
points of 1994, 2001 and 2008 need further clarification.  
In an interdependent world, economic crises are the major reasons 
why a country’s foreign activity diminishes. Interestingly, not only domestic 
but also economic crises in other regions, which do not directly affect the 
country in question also hinders its foreign policy activism. When a 
country’s initiatives are not met in volume by foreign actors, country’s  
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behaviour diminishes eventually because of decreasing levels of positive 
feedback from foreign actors.  
Another hindering factor for foreign policy activism is increasing 
domestic responsivity to foreign behaviour. Domestic responsivity is defined 
as the country’s level of domestic responsiveness to foreign behaviour. 
Operationally, it can be measured as the ratio of volume of domestic 
behavior to volume of foreign behavior within a specific time period.  For an 
open society in a globalized world, domestic responsivity is a constant 
phenomenon, increasing year after year. As the country in question is 
becoming more integrated to the rest of the world, the domestic responsivity 
to foreign behavior increases. Nevertheless, if domestic behaviour is 
measured by news, increasing domestic responsivity would also imply less 
social cohesion.398 Accordingly, one can attempt at “abduction”399 and argue 
that increasing domestic responsivity means that governments are more 
constrained in responding to international behaviour more actively.  
In Turkish case, one can test this argument by measuring variation of 
Turkish foreign behaviour by domestic responsivity, defined as Turkish 
domestic affairs/foreign actors’ behaviour to Turkey (TDA/FBT). There is a  
negative relationship between domestic responsivity and TFB. It seems to be 
phenomenon of post-1998 period. In the pre-1998 period, there is no  
 
                                                
398 Good developments, or peaceful domestic affairs in a foreign, mid-power country rarely 
make international news. Mustapha Masmoudi “New World Information Order” Journal 
of Communication 29, no.2 (1979): 172-179. Pamela J.  Shoemaker, "News and 
newsworthiness: A commentary." Communications 31, no.1 (2006): 105-111. 
399 See pp.39-47. 
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correlation between them, r(71)= -0.03. In the post-1998, correlation is r(176)= 
-0.32, p< .001.  
Whether the foreign actors’ behaviour is positive (e.g. demands for 
cooperation, visits, verbal support) or negative (.e.g. international terrorism, 
threats, denounciations),  when volume of foreign actors’ behaviour 
surpasses that of the mid-sized power, as happened to Turkey in second half 
of 1990s, it can be said that the country comes under international pressure, 
and behaves reactively rather than proactively. While this pressure compels 
the country to be more active, it also hinders country’s proactivism.  
Considering the reinforcing relationship between FBT and TDA, Turkey 
would possibly experience a domestic pressure at the same time. In other 
words, in higher levels of domestic responsivity, increasing foreign actors 
behaviour leads to even denser domestic behaviour, which leads to 
decreasing TFB. Since FBT has an independent increasing effect on TFB, the 
resulting TFB is a combination of FBT and “TDA’s responsivity towards 
FBT”.   
 
Figure 39 Interrelationships between Foreign Behavior to Turkey, Turkish 
Foreign Policy and Turkey’s Domestic Affairs  
 
FBT	  
TFP 
TDA 
 
284 
 
 
Figure 40 Domestic Responsivity and Turkish Foreign Behaviour 
The argument that there is a strong positive relationship between FBT 
and TDA, is valid for all periods. But the fact that their ratio leads to 
decreasing TFB is a post-1998 phenomenon. 
It is probably not a coincidence that 1999-2001 is a turning point for 
Turkey’s foreign policy proactivism. Although not particularly active, Turkey 
has become more proactive in this period, and continued to be so. Whereas 
increasing domestic responsivity decreases the likelihood of being more 
active, it actually leads to higher chances of being proactive.  
This conclusion is in parallel to this study’s arguments about foreign 
policy change in a mid-power’s complex system. A less powerful agent is 
the one, which is swayed by international behavior. Although, the decision-
making authority tries to overcome the international and domestic pressure, 
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their room for maneuver is usually hindered by this double pressure. A 
succesful triggering of nexus - in Turkish case, this seems to be careful 
planning and manipulation of foreign relations, which led to capturing of 
PKK leader Ocalan, and ultimately alleviated Turkey’s domestic terrorism- 
was a key factor for the decision-making authority to take the upper hand.  
Turkey has managed to modulate several intermestic nexus in the 
post-1998 period. Capture of Ocalan, and subsequent alleviation of domestic 
terrorism, was used to trigger its relations with Syria, Greece and more 
importantly Iraq. At around the same time, Turkey addressed its 
vulnerabilities in financial sector through collaboration with IMF, and at 
least partially overcome the economic hindrances on its foreign interaction. 
Turkey’s increasing collaboration with its neighbours, in turn generated a 
capacity in Turkey’s economic actors, which expanded their activities into 
previously overlooked regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa.  Flourishing of 
relations with Africa, in turn led to Turkey’s election as a non-permanent 
member of UN Security Council, with majority of sub-Saharan African 
votes. Turkish decision-making authrorities relied on discursive practices 
such as highlighting common history, religion in establishing all these 
nexus. These practices were strengthened through constant interaction, 
encouraging movement of people and goods. Turkish fears of Islamic 
fundamentalism are remedied by opening up trade with its Muslim 
neighbours, showing Turkish entrepreneurs how Islam may not be a liability 
but an asset. 
Despite Turkey’s expansion of foreign interest in this period, relations 
between Turkey and the Western Europe constituted the primary node of all 
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Turkey’s foreign affairs system. Turkey’s EU membership prospects 
encouraged Turkish decision-making authorities to take steps in addressing 
Turkey’s long-term social cohesion problems: normalization of civil-military 
relations, redefinition of national security, expanding rights and freedoms to 
ethnic and religious groups, are among many. In many ways, the relations 
between the EU and Turkey’s domestic affairs resembled a boomerang, 
rather than a bow-string. Turkey threw the boomerang to EU, making it an 
anchor in addressing its domestic problems. The positive feedback from EU 
is used as a justification for adressing even more controversial issues. As 
long as the feedback is strong and supportive, Turkey decided to throw it 
again to the same foreign actor. When the feedback is not as strong or 
negative, Turkey decided to throw it to another actor.  
An important difference of post-2007 period, is the change in Turkey’s 
choice of foreign partners. The continuing effects of global economic crisis, 
which crippled foreign feedback from Turkey’s traditional partners such as 
EU, might have led to such change. Accordingly, several issues of social 
cohesion around 2007,  –such as disagreements over presidency elections 
and straining of civil-military relations with Ergenekon indictments- were 
dealt with without any intermestic triggering, and resulted in a markedly 
less active and less proactive foreign policy in the this period.  
From 2007 onwards, Turkey has become increasingly less successful 
in triggering intermestic nexus. Two examples may be illustrative of the 
steps taken and reasons for failure. 
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Claims of genocide against Ottoman Armenians during WWI have 
been debilitating Turkey’s foreign affairs for forty years. A powerful 
Armenian diaspora, and their efficient lobbying in the US, as well as in 
Western Europe, hindered Turkey’s relations with these actors. Accordignly, 
Turkey saw the problem as a predominantly international one, which 
Turkey unsuccessfully tried to negotiate with the third parties, which were 
usually states with a considerable number of Armenian citizens, such as 
France and the USA. The attempts at resolution failed because, the issue 
remained an outside issue for Turkey, mostly an issue of prestige in Western 
eyes, whereas it was a domestic one, with important stakes for Western 
counterparts, who responded to their domestic constitutuencies’ demands 
by bashing Turkey. These two factors, seriously diminished Turkey’s 
leverages, as the main framework the issue is dealt with, was designed to fit 
Western states, and diaspora. 
Understanding these disadvantages, Turkey tried to domesticize the 
issue: in the aftermath of murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant 
Dink, Turkish politicians make Armenian issue a problem of Turkish and 
Armenian people, so that they could vocalize an indigeneous interest in its 
solution. As the second step, Turkey linked this domestic demand to its 
relations with Armenia. It also changed the scope of the issue from 
diplomatic and military (geopolitical, legal) to cultural and economic by 
opening organizing sports events and encouraging trade. By granting 
economic rights to minority foundations (including Armenians), it tried to 
show its Turkey’s goodwill in resolution of the both domestic and 
international problem. With these steps, the issue become a domestically 
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important issue, with Turkey’s citizens’ well-being at stake and one in which 
Western intervention is less relevant in its solution. And most importantly, it 
became a less complicated (with less actors) more managable (one-to-one) 
problem, which can be addressed with more sophistication. Nevertheless, 
the foreign feedback from Armenia was particularly weak, and later on 
outright negative, which hindered the international node of the nexus. With 
such insufficient feedback, the domestic node also remained untriggered; the 
resolution process with respect to Armenian minority has also stagnated. 
The main reason for such a weak foreign response was the lack of organic 
link between Armenia and Turkish Armenian minority. Cultivation of 
interest between two agents could have helped this otherwise well-designed 
strategy to work more efficiently.   
Another less successful attempt at triggering in this period was 
linking Turkey’s problem of discrimination against Alevi minority and the 
Turkey-Syria relations. Turkey pursued a simultaneous effort to remedy 
domestic discrimination by introducing the “Alevi Opening,” and to 
improve Turkey-Syria relations.  
The Alevi issue was a blind spot in the policy agenda of governing 
AKP until the second half of 2007.400 After the elections in July, the AKP 
government showed signs of new attitude toward Alevi community, which 
culminated in a process of dialogue in the second half of 2008.401 In 
                                                
400 Kose, Talha. "The AKP and the “Alevi opening”: understanding the dynamics of the 
rapprochement." Insight Turkey 12.2 (2010): 143-165. 
401 Soner, Bayram Ali, and Şule Toktaş. "Alevis and Alevism in the Changing Context of 
Turkish Politics: The Justice and Development Party's Alevi Opening." Turkish Studies 
12.3 (2011): 419-434. 
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December 2008, Minister of Culture, Ertuğrul Günay, apologized to Alevi 
citizens as the representative of the state for the past victimhood that the 
ancestors of Alevis had suffered:“Alevis had experienced many painful 
experiences such as the Sivas and Maraş events in the past. As a 
representative of the state I would like to apologize.”402 A series of 
workshops were organized to discuss demands and problems of Alevi 
community with civil society leaders. The workshops were completed in 
2010. In December 2011, the Turkish Prime Minister apologized for the 
killingsin Dersim (today Tunceli) in the late 1930s, an Alevi-Kurdish 
populated region: this was the first official recognition and apology for the 
events. 403 
Addressing Dersim meant addressing discrimination against Alevi 
and Kurdish community simultanously. If Dersim is discussed in an open 
way, this would not only increase social cohesion in Turkey, but also Turkey 
would be more confident in addressing problems in its neighbourhood, 
which are ethnic and religious tensions which are endemic in the region. In 
Syria, the ruling elite and the society belong to different Alevi and Sunnite 
sects respectively. There is a substantial Kurdish population in Syria as well. 
In parallel to its Alevi Opening, Turkish government also opened 
upto Syria. The major venue was trade. In 2007, a Free Trade Agreement was 
signed between parties. Consequently, bilateral trade volume tripled by 
2010. Visa regime was abolished in 2009, which boosted movement of 
                                                
402 “Bakan Günay’dan Aleviler için tarihi çıkış,” Milliyet, December 24, 2008.  
403  Zeynep Alemdar, and Rana Birden Çorbacıoğlu. "Alevis and the Turkish state." Turkish 
Policy Quarterly 10.4 (2012): 117-124. 
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people from both sides. Turkey also helped Syria to break its international 
isolation, mediating the brokering peace talks between Syria and Israel in 
2008. Turkish Armed Forces held joint military manoeuvres with Syrian 
Army in 2009.  
The cultivation of Syria-Turkey relations, was focused on pragramtic 
concerns, and seldom complemented by a focus on human rights and 
democratization. Consequently, the start of uprisings in Syria against the 
regime in 2011 caught Turkish government by surprise. In time, the bilateral 
relations experienced a drastic change from cooperation to condemnation. 
Turkish government weighed down and blamed Syrian regime for 
sectarianism against its Sunnite subjects, and considered a military operation 
against Syrian regime. The highlighting of sectarianism, rather than human 
rights and democratization in Turkish government’s framing of the conflict 
in Syria, heightened criticism against Turkish government, because at this 
time the Alevi opening in Turkey also slowed pace. Moreover, Turkish 
government also failed to convince Sunnite majority in Turkey that crimes 
against their Sunnite brethren in Syria need immediate military response 
from Turkey. Turkish society was unwilling to pay such high costs in search 
for peace and democracy in a neighbouring country. 
Not only for Syria, but also for other countries swept by Arab 
uprisings in of 2011-2012, Turkish domestic responsivity was not sufficient. 
Domestic responsivity declines since 2010, and Turkish foreign behavior did 
not increase in 2012. 2012 signals beginning of a trend, a return to pre-1998 
pattern, where Turkey conducted its foreign affairs with less concern over 
domestic repercussions.  
 
291 
Therefore, in both Armenian and Syrian cases it seems that the 
organic link between domestic agent and foreign partner was missing. 
Cross-linking through a superficial delineation of ethnic and religious 
identities across borders are not only insufficient for a nexus to be built-up, 
but may prove to particularly detrimental to resolution of social cohesion 
problems. A more successful strategy would be to anchor resolution of the 
domestic issue to a more capable and interested foreign partner, and use the 
positive domestic repercussion for projection in other bilateral relations.  
It is no coincidence that relations between Turkey and the Western 
Europe constitute the primary node of all Turkey’s foreign affairs system, it 
is densest dyad with most of the attributes present. Turkey’s relationship 
with Western Europe is associated with Turkey’s behavior to all other agents 
as well as its domestic affairs. Hence, despite strong-willed attempts at 
opening upto new regions and distant actors, Turkish foreign affairs is 
historically entrenched in its European connection. Futher expansion of 
Turkey’s geographical interest as well as successful management of 
complexity in domestic and foreign affairs is embedded in Turkey-Europe 
connection.  
The relationship with the Middle East is a strong candidate for 
several emerging nexus. Despite the richness of historical and cultural 
common ground, the relations suffer from two dynamics. First, there is a 
lack of contemporary organic link between socities, whose cultivation 
require a long-term commitment. Secondly, whereas the Middle Eastern 
countries are important partners in trade, they are less capable in providing 
feedback for resolution of Turkey’s domestic social cohesion problems. 
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Relations with non-European West are not as complex as relations with the 
Middle East or Western Europe, but they are capable at providing an anchor 
for Turkey’s other affairs.  Relations with Asia and Eastern Europe, despite 
increasing interdependence, remains peripheral to Turkey’s power build up, 
since they have a mostly uncomplex, tit-for-tat character. Turkey’s relations 
with respect to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are in the initial phase 
and mostly cooperative.  
8.5. Theoretical Implications 
The basic theoretical implication of this study is that for non-Western 
IR community, novel conceptualizations are not only possible but also 
politically and scientifically necessary. Non-Western conceptualizations are 
possible: there are already a number of studies, which successfully based 
their conceptualizations on standpoint epistemologies and local experiences.  
They are politically necessary to overcome the inequality in disciplinary 
International Relations and international relations, and they are scientifically 
necessary because non-Western conceptualizations offer alternative and 
objectivity-increasing viewpoints for describing and understanding 
international phenomena.  
The success of any novel conceptualization, on the other hand, is 
based on the level of wider engagement with the theory, model, and 
concepts in the wider discipline.  Disinterest, not refusal, is the main reason 
why any novel conceptualization becomes stillborn. The structural reasons 
aside (such as availability of funding, attitudes of other scholars, the number 
and efficiency of communication channels), the homegrown theorist’s main 
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strategy should be to clarify his/her concepts and the relationships 
inbetween as much as possible, so that scholars with different social and 
political backgrounds have less difficulty in understanding, and evaluating 
them. This, of course, necessitates rigor, not only in data collection methods, 
but also theory-building methods, which are given seldom attention in IR 
curricula. Since the objects of theory-building are ideas, the graduate IR 
students, in addition to rigorous theoretical and methodological training, 
should also be trained in philosophy of science, with an eye to seek ways to 
build original concepts.  
This study’s main purpose was of course to arrive at a homegrown 
conceptualization of Turkish foreign affairs. The helical model, defines an 
agent’s relations as a complex system, composed of domestic and foreign 
relations, which are linked to its other domestic and foreign relations. The 
model offers an operationalizable definition of how globalization is 
experienced by individual and collective agents, and is embedded in a 
globalization perpective.  
Secondly, the model offers not only more prominent, but also possible 
connections between an agent’s domestic and international affairs. As such, 
in addition to (state-to-state) foreign policy, (state-to-society) domestic 
policy, (non-state-to-non-state) transnational relations, undertheorized 
engagement of domestic groups with foreign governments, and engagement 
of governments with foreign sub-state groups, are also offered as integral 
parts of an agent’s environment. Therefore, the model is an improvement 
upon Putnam’s two-level game model of foreign affairs.  
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Thirdly, in terms of ontology, the model’s main focus on relations and 
behaviours rather than individual agents. Obviously, the model is not state-
centric, but it does not rule out importance of states as central actors whose 
web of relations is still more complex than any other type of agent. Action, 
whether it is verbal or material, rather than properties of agents, is the 
ontological basis of the model. Consequently, the model does not reitretate 
the politically infused pre-defined conceptions such as “the democratic”, “ 
the free”, “the authoritarian”,  “the West.” Any researcher who uses the 
model can define the agent in question differently; identify the behavioral 
patterns and their relationship to other patterns based on his/her own 
definition.  The only essentialist argument intrinsic to the model is that “the 
agent is the one who engages with another.” 
In relation to its ontological basis, the model also accounts for why 
and how a foreign policy change occurs. Most of the change is a natural 
evolution of complex system. As the agents become more interconnected, 
the complexity of the system increases, and new nexus are formed. These 
nexus can also be dependent on time, i.e. any node is a function of its own 
past(feedback loops), and when it is a part of nexus, it is effected by the past 
changes in other nodes. Therefore, the model also accounts for historicity of 
relations. Foreign policy change can also be modulated by agents, through 
carefully analyzing pre-existing nexus and manipulating nodes, or by 
forming new nexus through establishing linkages between previously un-
linked nodes. The deliberate foreign policy change is usually intended to 
alleviate problems of social cohesion in the collective agent. 
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Finally, the model accounts for power accumulation. The model 
defines power as an exercise, as opposed to traditional views of power as 
material or ideational resources. In other words, power is defined as 
projection of resources to relations with other agents and more importantly 
it is accumulated through using the outcomes of the behavioral change as a 
catalyst in manipulating other nodes, domains, and spheres of interaction. In 
the model, the mere accumulation of material and ideational resources does 
not lead to power accumulation. A moderately powerful agent is the one 
who is able to influence the nodes it is part of, whereas a great power is the 
one who is able to use its resource projection to influence nodes between a 
second and third, even fourth agent. As such, the power conceptualization is 
also relational, the more the number of cascades from one node to another, 
the more powerful the agent. Power accumulation is also conceptualized as 
the result of foreign policy change. Solving social cohesion problems 
through foreign behavior, stops leakages of power resources, and makes the 
agent more capable at successful and purposeful modulation of its other 
foreign affairs.  
8.6. Methodological Implications 
The data collection method used in the study, the event data, is a 
quantitative tool to mathematically summarize Turkish domestic and 
foreign affairs. The ultimate purpose of this study was to seek patterns in 
behavior: the method proved useful in clarifying concepts and identifying 
relationships between them. Once the patterns, trends and orientations are 
identified, any point of shift with respect to them generated 
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questions, which in turn instigated formation of new conceptual tools. 
Therefore, TFAED can be useful for exploring new venues for generating 
theoretical frameworks for other scholars as it was for current author. 
However, even when novel conceptualizations are not sought, the merits of 
event data –and of course similar large-N quantitative methods- are still 
numerous.  
Firstly, the TFAED has the potential to answer, in a quantitative 
manner, various fundamental questions about Turkey’s foreign affairs. Since 
detailed generic codes are produced with respect to actors, and coding 
categories are extensive, researchers are able to regroup data in diverse ways 
–according to actor types, event types, timespans--which makes it possible to 
test various hypotheses and compare them with each other. So, other 
students of Turkish foreign and domestic affairs can also benefit from the 
dataset. 
The dataset enables researchers to arrive at general observations 
regarding Turkey foreign policy behaviour in a more reliable manner. What 
is the nature of Turkey’s relations with Country X/ Region Y, cooperative or 
conflictual? Has such cooperation/conflict been military, economic or 
cultural? Is cooperation with Country X greater than cooperation with 
Country Y?  Is conflict with Country X physical or verbal?  
When the data are grouped according to timespan, it could help the 
researchers to make historical comparisons, with respect to the behaviours 
of the same actor. It is possible to support or refute arguments about change 
in Turkish foreign policy before and after important events, like the Mavi 
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Marmara incident, the War in Iraq, the 2003 and 2007 general elections, the 
2005 beginning of EU membership accession talks, etc. Moreover, some less 
dramatic yet equally important time periods can be identified.  
Thirdly, research questions about Turkey’s domestic inter-actor 
cooperation and conflict can be analyzed over time and across various 
domestic groups, as well as their relations with foreign actors. Tests for 
dependence between domestic and foreign relations can be made to see if 
any domestic relations affect or are affected by foreign relations.   
In addition to these benefits, the dataset can be improved in a 
multitude of ways, which would help deal with more detailed questions in a 
more reliable manner. For example, with adjustments in filtering programs, 
various other news sources can be used to enrich the dataset. A major 
improvement would be to devise a textual analysis program that would 
process Turkish-language news reports. Of course, such an endevaour 
would necessitate a team of computer scientists and linguists, as well as IR 
scholars.  
Secondly, the program can be updated to include not only news 
reports, but also other textual data, which can be analyzed in terms of 
sentiment and tone in addition to behaviour. Twitter and Facebook feeds, 
and reader comments on news reports are all canditates for such an analysis. 
The analysis of sentiments and tone can help to understand the attitudes of 
individuals even before such attitudes materialize in behaviour.  
On a related plane, in addition to partial and cross correlation used in 
ths study, more complex and elaborate statistical models can be applied to 
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data to predict future course of events. Such predictive capability may prove 
beneficial to policy-makers to devise strategies for coping with potential 
crises and problems.  
Fourthly and more obviously, the dataset should be improved by 
focusing on agents other than Turkey. For the purposes of this study, only 
actors from Turkey are identified and given separate codes. The foreign 
actors are not given codes as specific as those of Turkish actors, which limits 
the extent of questions that can be answered. For example: How a Turkish 
agent interacts with civilians from Country A in comparison to 
governmental actors from Country A, can be asked, but cannot be reliably 
answered unless all actors in Country A are identified and given proper 
codes. A systematic and in-depth study of non-Turkey agents, however 
would help to compare Turkey with other agents. Since the current dataset 
only includes Turkey’s affairs, it is not possible to compare, for example, 
Turkey-Germany relations, and Greece-Germany relations. A systematic 
collection of all relevant data (e.g. about Germany and Greece) would 
greatly improve and support comparative case studies. A long-term, 
comparative project with this purpose in mind would train several graduate 
students and can also act as a community-building initiative.  
8.7. Policy Implications 
The model suggested in this study offers a few insights about how to 
conduct foreign policy. But before any such suggestions, the basic 
assumptions of the model should be given. 
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Firstly, the model is based on a worldview, which depicts 
globalization as the irresistible systemic force that shapes all domains of 
human activity. Even when agents are successful at hindering 
globalizational effects, the long-term implications of such hindering are 
grave. The severity comes from the limits imposed on agent’s capability to 
adapt to its environment. Isolation, whether intended or imposed, leads to 
failed, rogue or tyrannical societies. It is no coincidence that these societies 
are less connected to world than the rest.  
Globalization is a tough teacher, though. Increasing communication 
and transportation connects simple individuals, corporations, states but also 
armed groups, illegals, etc. As the connection increases, states are more 
pressured to keep up with the growing demands.  
Although this systemic impact is not reversible, it can be modulated. 
The model proposes that agency, is all the way more important. 
Dialectically, the growing power of agents is the reason why systemic 
impact is so hard to resist. The primary agent is the state, but it loses its 
prominence, more so in international affairs then in domestic affairs as 
democratization lags behind globalization.  
The less powerful is either swayed by the globalization impact, 
unable to foresee or manage the relationship between foreign and domestic 
affairs, or through (self or other-imposed) isolation, implodes onto itself 
under grave domestic problems. The more powerful is the one who 
successfully manages to weave its domestic and foreign affairs so that taking 
action in one domain ultimately alleviates the problem in the other domain.  
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From a mid-power’s perspective, road to power build-up is to 
enhance domestic and international connections. Relations with high profile, 
small states are as much important as relations with distant superpowers. 
Isolation should be avoided at all costs. More communication and less 
infringement with the civil society are crucial. Especially civil society’s 
engagements with the outside world should be encouraged no matter their 
ideological position is.  Each and every sort of connection with each and 
every foreign actor is crucial to increase the number of possibilities for 
future linkages.  
The second step is for a mid-power is to focus one’s energy into 
alleviating domestic problems through foreign action. Choosing right 
foreign partners, cross- linking spheres of action and careful analysis of 
previous reactions are paramount in building successful strategies which 
would result in increasing social cohesion. The domestic and regional 
problems with highly contentious parties are opportunities for projecting 
power resources, but they are equally risky if the wrong partner, wrong 
course of action is taken and the final outcome is detrimental rather than 
alleviating.  
8.8. Implications for the Discipline 
Turkish International Relations (IR) is a growing discipline both in 
terms of the number of researchers working within it and the broadness of 
subjects being covered. Over the last decade in particular, along with 
Turkey’s increasing level of interaction with its neighboring regions and 
beyond, there have been numerous studies to decipher what has been going 
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on in Turkish foreign affairs. Despite the increasing number and breadth of 
these studies, one can still ask whether such growth may actually lead to 
theoretical development. A 2008 study on Turkish IR describes the 
community’s engagement with theory as “complex and uncomfortable,”404 
and argues that there are few if any Turkish  IR scholars who engage in 
“pure theory.”405 
Present study revealed that theory development and communication 
between researchers are intimately related. For cognitive scientific progress, 
in addition to individual studies and theories, a consensus—albeit 
temporal—among researchers should be established at a) the axiological 
level, consisting of claims about aims and objectives of the discipline; b) the 
methodological level, involving claims about the proper procedures for data 
collection and analysis, and c) the empirical level, including claims about 
theoretical entities as well as assertions about directly observable events.406 
Such a “shared framework” signals a “professional agreement” and eases 
communication within a scientific community. Therefore, theoretical 
development and intra-disciplinary communication are mutually 
reinforcing.  
A growing collection of independent unrelated works, as in the case 
of Turkish IR, is seldom productive for theory formation, or disciplinary 
                                                
404 Ersel Aydınlı and Julie Mathews, “Periphery Theorizing for a Truly International 
Discipline: Spinning IR Theory out of Anatolia”, Review of International Studies 34, 4 
(2008): 693-711. 
405Pure theory consists of grand theories that account for large number of phenomena with 
no reference to specific regions or areas. 
406 Larry Laudan, Science and Values: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate, 
Pittsburgh Series in Philosophy and History of Science (University of California Press, 
1986).  
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community building. In Turkish IR, there is not enough communication 
within the community, let alone work being done in a cohesive research 
program.407 With such limited communication and collaboration, there 
seems little common background, hence no constructive consensus among 
researchers. 
Such limited communication comes hand in hand with a uniform 
reliance on qualitative methods. Within the Turkish IR community, there is 
an actual, yet probably unintentional,  convergence towards using 
qualitative methods. Such convergence, however, cannot be called a 
consensus because it is not based on deliberate discussion and open 
agreement. According to one senior scholar, quantitative methodologies are 
not given enough importance and, consequently, the distance between the 
global IR and Turkish IR communities is growing.408 This same scholar also 
claims that because of conceptual and methodological diversity, studies by 
the Turkish IR community are very much alike, even repetitive of each 
other. On the other hand, another scholar criticizes the compulsory statistics 
classes that are required in some undergraduate programs, and compares 
their necessity for IR research to that of taking an accounting class.409 In a 
separate study, Kurubaş also states that overreliance on historical methods, 
which mostly consist of chronological descriptions of events, impedes 
engagement with theory. 410 
                                                
407 Mustafa Aydın,“Türkiye’de Uluslararası I ̇lis ̧kiler Çalıs ̧maları ve Eg ̆itimi Toplantı 
Tutanakları, Türkiye’de Uluslararası !lişkiler Eğitiminin Dünü, Bugünü,” Uluslararası 
!lişkiler 2, no.6 (2005): 28.  
408  Duygu Sezer, Uluslararası !lişkiler 2, 6 (2005): 35-36. 
409“ Kamer Kasım, Uluslararası !lişkiler 2, 6 (2005):  p. 116. 
410 Ersel Aydinli, Erol Kurubas and Haluk Ozdemir, Yöntem, Kuram, Komplo Türk Uluslararası 
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Overall, it seems that the Turkish IR community is not organized 
around long-term research programs, as a part of which findings are 
discussed, compared, refuted or confirmed and accumulated in a constant 
and consistent manner. Despite the increasing number and breadth of 
studies, the Turkish IR community remains a fragmented community, both 
scientifically—in terms of the theories used—as well as socially. The 
discussions and increasing number of platforms aside, the current level of 
collaboration and communication is still insufficient to overcome such 
fragmentation.411 In the words of one scholar, without collaborative “hands-
on practice” of scientific research, it is almost impossible to overcome the 
divides in the community. Such collaboration, however, requires long-term 
commitment to specific research questions, agendas and paradigms.  
The stakes in overcoming this fragmentation are even higher when 
one looks at the picture from the perspective of core/periphery balance of 
power in both academia and in the real world.412 It can be argued that 
inequalities in academia, in terms of theoretical and methodological 
development between the Western and the non-Western worlds, are in 
parallel to inequalities in global politics.413 Such an argument is based on the 
                                                                                                                                    
İlişkiler Disiplininde Vizyon Arayışları (Ankara: Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 2009). 
411 Aydınlı and Mathews, “Periphery Theorizing”, p. 709. 
412 Steve Smith, "International Relations and international relations: The Links Between 
Theory and Practice in World Politics", Journal of International Relations and Development 6, 
No. 3, (2003): 233-239. 
413 Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin, “Still Waiting after all these Years: ‘The Third World’ 
on the Periphery of International Relations,” British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 6 (2004): 249; Mohammed Ayoob “Inequality and Theorizing in International 
Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism” International Studies Review 4, no. 3 (2002): 27-
48; Arlene Tickner “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World” Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 295-324; Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever, 
International Relations Scholarship Around the World (New York: Routledge, 2009);  
Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker, “The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a 
Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire”, International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 
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idea that theories that have dominance in International Relations also serve 
to reinforce power in international relations and vice versa .414 As Ayoob 
points out, IR theory and international practice have reinforced each other so 
much that “[a] monopoly over the construction of theoretical knowledge 
depicts fundamentally the problem of inequality in both international 
relations and International Relations. It shapes the thought patterns of 
policymakers and analysts alike across much of the globe.”415  
Reducing fragmentation, improving communication, and 
constructing original theory are all keys to a disciplinary community’s 
academic and social improvement.416 One step in that direction would be to 
build up the empirical foundations upon which synchronized theoretical 
development can be based. The discipline would benefit from the addition 
of new research using quantitative methodologies, as well as long-term 
research and training programs that would focus on theory development. 
The virtual non-existence of coordinated research programs within Turkish 
IR, and seldom participation of individual Turkish IR researchers in global 
research programs, necessitates such an action. Quantitative methods such 
as Event Data Analysis could contribute not only to the scientific 
accumulation of knowledge about Turkish foreign affairs, but also to the 
                                                                                                                                    
(1984): 121-42; Şennur Özdemir “Bilgi Sosyolojisi Açısından ‘Doğu’ ve ‘Batı’” Uluslararası 
!lişkiler 1, no 1 (2004):61-92; Howard Wiarda “The Ethnocentrism of the Social Science 
Implications for Research and Policy” The Review of Politics 43, (1981):163-197; Tony 
Smith “Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies” World Politics 37, no.4 (1985): 
532-562. 
414 Arlene Tickner “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World” Millennium - Journal 
of International Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 295.  
415Mohammed Ayoob “Inequality and Theorizing.”  
416ErselAydınlı and Julie Mathews, “Türkiye Uluslararası I ̇lis ̧kiler Disiplininde Özgün 
Kuram Potansiyeli: Anadolu Ekolü Olus ̧turmak Mümkün mü?”, Uluslararası I ̇lis ̧kiler 5, 
no. 17 (2008): 161- 187; Ersel Aydinli, Erol Kurubas and H. Özdemir, Yöntem, Kuram, 
Komplo Türk Uluslararası !lişkiler Disiplininde Vizyon Arayışları, (Ankara: Asil Yayın 
Dağıtım, 2009). 
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generating of new hypotheses, which could in turn eventually lead to new 
theoretical constructions. More importantly, employing quantitative 
methodologies might offer a venue through which the Turkish IR 
community can overcome its current fragmented state and achieve a more 
cohesive and progressive research agenda.
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APPENDIX 
 
 
CAMEO EVENT CODE LIST 
 
 
 
Version: 1.1b3 (January 2013) 
 
CAMEO EVENT CODE      AGGREGATION 
01: MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT  COOP.VERB 
010: Make statement, not specified below  COOP.VERB 
011: Decline comment  COOP.VERB 
012: Make pessimistic comment  COOP.VERB 
013: Make optimistic comment  COOP.VERB 
014: Consider policy option  COOP.VERB 
015: Acknowledge or claim responsibility  COOP.VERB 
016: Reject accusation, deny responsibility  CONF.VERB 
017: Engage in symbolic act  COOP.VERB 
018: Make empathetic comment  COOP.VERB 
019: Express accord  COOP.VERB 
02: APPEAL  COOP.VERB 
020: Appeal, not specified below  COOP.VERB 
021: Appeal for material cooperation  COOP.VERB 
0211: Appeal for economic cooperation  COOP.VERB 
0212: Appeal for military cooperation  COOP.VERB 
0213: Appeal for judicial cooperation  COOP.VERB 
0214: Appeal for intelligence cooperation  COOP.VERB 
0215: Appeal for military cooperation  COOP.VERB 
022: Appeal for diplomatic cooperation or policy support  COOP.VERB 
023: Appeal for material aid, not specified below  COOP.VERB
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0231: Appeal for economic aid  COOP.VERB 
0232: Appeal for military aid  COOP.VERB 
0233: Appeal for humanitarian aid  COOP.VERB 
0234: Appeal for military protection or peacekeeping  COOP.VERB 
024: Appeal for political reform, not specified below  COOP.VERB 
0241: Appeal for leadership change  COOP.VERB 
0242: Appeal for policy change  COOP.VERB 
0243: Appeal for rights  COOP.VERB 
0244: Appeal for change in institutions, regime  COOP.VERB 
025: Appeal to yield  COOP.VERB 
0251: Appeal for easing of administrative sanctions  COOP.VERB 
0252: Appeal for easing of political dissent  COOP.VERB 
0253: Appeal for release of persons or property  COOP.VERB 
0254: Appeal for easing of economic sanctions, boycott  COOP.VERB 
0255: Appeal for international involvement (not mediat.)  COOP.VERB 
0256: Appeal for target to deescalate military engage.  COOP.VERB 
026: Appeal to others to meet or negotiate  COOP.VERB 
027: Appeal to others to settle dispute  COOP.VERB 
028: Appeal to others to engage in or accept mediation  COOP.VERB 
03: EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE  COOP.VERB 
030: Express intent to cooperate, not specified below  COOP.VERB 
031: Express intent to engage in material cooperation, not specified below  COOP.VERB 
0311: Express intent to cooperate economically  COOP.VERB 
: Express intent to cooperate militarily  COOP.VERB 
0313: Express intent to cooperate judicially  COOP.VERB 
0314: Express intent to cooperate on intelligence  COOP.VERB 
032: Express intent to engage in diplomatic cooperation such as policy support 
 COOP.VERB 
033: Express intent to provide material aid, not spec below  COOP.VERB 
0331: Express intent to provide economic aid  COOP.VERB 
0332: Express intent to provide military aid  COOP.VERB 
0333: Express intent to provide humanitarian aid  COOP.VERB 
0334: Express intent to provide military protection or peacekeeping  COOP.VERB 
034: Express intent to institute political reform, not spec. below  COOP.VERB 
0341: Express intent to change leadership  COOP.VERB 
0342: Express intent to change policy  COOP.VERB 
0343: Express intent to provide rights  COOP.VERB 
0344: Express intent to change institutions, regime  COOP.VERB 
035: Express intent to yield, not specified below  COOP.VERB 
0351: Express intent to ease administrative sanctions  COOP.VERB 
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0352: Express intent to ease popular dissent  COOP.VERB 
0353: Express intent to release of persons or property  COOP.VERB 
0354: Express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott  COOP.VERB 
0355: Express intent to allow international involvement (not mediat.)  COOP.VERB 
0356: Express intent to deescalate military engagement  COOP.VERB 
036: Express intent to meet or negotiate  COOP.VERB 
037: Express intent to settle dispute  COOP.VERB 
038: Express intent to accept mediation  COOP.VERB 
039: Express intent to mediate  COOP.VERB 
04: CONSULT  COOP.VERB 
040: Consult, not specified below  COOP.VERB 
041: Discuss by telephone  COOP.VERB 
042: Make a visit  COOP.VERB 
043: Host a visit  COOP.VERB 
044: Meet at a “third” location  COOP.VERB 
045: Engage in mediation  COOP.VERB 
046: Engage in negotiation  COOP.VERB 
05: ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION  COOP.VERB 
050: Engage in diplomatic cooperation, not specified below  COOP.VERB 
051: Praise or endorse  COOP.VERB 
052: Defend verbally  COOP.VERB 
053: Rally support on behalf of  COOP.VERB 
054: Grant diplomatic recognition  COOP.VERB 
055: Apologize  COOP.VERB 
056: Forgive  COOP.VERB 
057: Sign formal agreement  COOP.VERB 
06: ENGAGE IN MATERIAL COOPERATION  COOP.MAT 
060: Engage in material cooperation, not specified below  COOP.MAT 
061: Cooperate economically  COOP.MAT 
062: Cooperate militarily  COOP.MAT 
063: Engage in judicial cooperation  COOP.MAT 
064: Share intelligence or information   COOP.MAT 
07: PROVIDE AID  COOP.MAT 
070: Provide aid, not specified below  COOP.MAT 
071: Provide economic aid  COOP.MAT 
072: Provide military aid  COOP.MAT 
073: Provide humanitarian aid  COOP.MAT 
074: Provide military protection or peacekeeping  COOP.MAT 
075: Grant asylum  COOP.MAT 
08: YIELD  COOP.MAT 
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080: Yield, not specified below  COOP.MAT 
081: Ease administrative sanctions, not specified below  COOP.MAT 
0811: Ease restrictions on political freedoms  COOP.MAT 
0812: Ease ban on parties or politicians  COOP.MAT 
0813: Ease curfew  COOP.MAT 
0814: Ease state of emergency or curfew  COOP.MAT 
082: Ease political dissent  COOP.MAT 
083: Accede to requests or demands for political reform not specified below 
 COOP.MAT 
0831: Accede to demands to change leadership  COOP.MAT 
0832: Accede to demands to change policy  COOP.MAT 
0833: Accede to demands to provide rights  COOP.MAT 
0834: Accede to demands to change institutions, regime  COOP.MAT 
084: Return, release, not specified below  COOP.MAT 
0841: Return, release persons  COOP.MAT 
0842: Return, release property  COOP.MAT 
085: Ease economic sanctions, boycott or embargo  COOP.MAT 
086: Allow international involvement, not specified below  COOP.MAT 
0861: Receive deployment of peacekeepers  COOP.MAT 
0862: Receive inspectors 0863: Allow for humanitarian access  COOP.MAT 
087: De-escalate military engagement, not spec. below  COOP.MAT 
0871: Declare truce, ceasefire  COOP.MAT 
0872: Ease military blockade  COOP.MAT 
0873: Demobilize armed forces  COOP.MAT 
0874: Retreat or surrender militarily  COOP.MAT 
09: INVESTIGATE  COOP.MAT 
090: Investigate, not specified below  COOP.MAT 
091: Investigate crime, corruption  COOP.MAT 
092: Investigate human rights abuses  COOP.MAT 
093: Investigate military action  COOP.MAT 
094: Investigate war crimes  COOP.MAT 
10: DEMAND  CONF.VERB 
100: Demand, not specified below  CONF.VERB 
101: Demand material cooperation, not spec. below  CONF.VERB 
1011: Demand economic cooperation  CONF.VERB 
1012: Demand military cooperation  CONF.VERB 
1013: Demand judicial cooperation  CONF.VERB 
1014: Demand intelligence cooperation  CONF.VERB 
1015: Demand military cooperation  CONF.VERB 
102: Demand diplomatic cooperation such as policy support   CONF.VERB 
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103: Demand material aid, not specified below  CONF.VERB 
1031: Demand economic aid  CONF.VERB 
1032: Demand military aid  CONF.VERB 
1033: Demand humanitarian aid  CONF.VERB 
1034: Demand military protection or peacekeeping  CONF.VERB 
104: Demand political reform, not specified below  CONF.VERB 
1041: Demand leadership change  CONF.VERB 
1042: Demand policy change  CONF.VERB 
1043: Demand rights  CONF.VERB 
1044: Demand change in institutions, regime  CONF.VERB 
105: Demand target yield, not specified below  CONF.VERB 
1051: Demand easing of administrative sanctions  CONF.VERB 
1052: Demand easing of political dissent  CONF.VERB 
1053: Demand release of persons or property  CONF.VERB 
1054: Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott  CONF.VERB 
1055: Demand international involvement (not mediat.)  CONF.VERB 
1056: Demand de-escalation of military engage.  CONF.VERB 
106: Demand meeting, negotiation  CONF.VERB 
107: Demand settling of dispute  CONF.VERB 
108: Demand meditation  CONF.VERB 
11: DISAPPROVE  CONF.VERB 
110: Disapprove, not specified below CONF.VERB 
111: Criticize or denounce CONF.VERB 
112: Accuse, nor specified below  CONF.VERB 
1121: Accuse of crime, corruption CONF.VERB 
1122: Accuse of human rights abuses CONF.VERB 
1123: Accuse of aggression CONF.VERB 
1124: Accuse of war crimes  CONF.VERB 
1125: Accuse of espionage, treason CONF.VERB 
113: Rally opposition against CONF.VERB 
114: Complain officially CONF.VERB 
115: Bring lawsuit against CONF.VERB 
116: Find legally guilty or liable  CONF.VERB 
12: REJECT  CONF.VERB 
120: Reject, not specified below CONF.VERB 
121: Reject material cooperation, not spec. below  CONF.VERB 
1211: Reject economic cooperation CONF.VERB 
1212: Reject military cooperation CONF.VERB 
1213: Reject judicial cooperation CONF.VERB 
1214: Reject intelligence cooperation CONF.VERB 
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1215: Reject military cooperation  CONF.VERB 
122: Reject request for material aid, not specified below CONF.VERB 
1221: Reject request for economic aid CONF.VERB 
1222: Reject request for military aid CONF.VERB 
1223: Reject request for humanitarian aid  CONF.VERB 
1224: Reject request for military protection, peacekeeping CONF.VERB 
123: Reject demand for political reform, not specified below  CONF.VERB 
1231: Reject request for leadership change CONF.VERB 
1232: Reject request for policy change CONF.VERB 
1233: Reject request for rights CONF.VERB 
1234: Reject request for change in institutions, regime  CONF.VERB 
124: Refuse to yield, not specified below CONF.VERB 
1241: Refuse to ease administrative sanctions CONF.VERB 
1242: Refuse ease popular dissent CONF.VERB 
1243: Refuse to release of persons or property CONF.VERB 
1244: Refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott CONF.VERB 
1245: Refuse to allow international involvement (not mediation) CONF.VERB 
1246: Refuse to de-escalate military engagement  CONF.VERB 
125: Reject proposal to meet, discuss, negotiate CONF.VERB 
126: Reject mediation CONF.VERB 
127: Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute CONF.VERB 
128: Defy norms, law  CONF.VERB 
129: Veto  CONF.VERB 
13: THREATEN  CONF.VERB 
130: Threaten, not specified below CONF.VERB 
131: Threaten non-force, not specified below  CONF.VERB 
1311: Threaten to reduce or stop aid CONF.VERB 
1312: Threaten to boycott, embargo, or sanction CONF.VERB 
1313: Threaten to reduce or break relations  CONF.VERB 
132: Threaten with administrative sanctions, not spec below CONF.VERB 
1321: Threaten with restrictions on political freedoms CONF.VERB 
1322: Threaten to ban political parties or politicians CONF.VERB 
1323: Threaten to impose curfew  CONF.VERB 
1324: Threat to impose state of emergency or martial law CONF.VERB 
133: Threaten political dissent CONF.VERB 
134: Threaten to halt negotiations CONF.VERB 
135: Threaten to halt mediation CONF.VERB 
136: Threaten to halt international involvement (not medit.) CONF.VERB 
137: Threat with repression CONF.VERB 
138: Threaten force, not specified below  CONF.VERB 
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1381: Threaten blockade CONF.VERB 
1382: Threaten occupation CONF.VERB 
1383: Threaten unconventional violence CONF.VERB 
1384: Threaten conventional attack CONF.VERB 
1385: Threaten attack with WMD  CONF.VERB 
139: Give ultimatum  CONF.VERB 
14: PROTEST   CONF.MAT 
140: Engage in civilian protest, not specified below CONF.MAT 
141: Demonstrate or rally, not specified below  CONF.MAT 
1411: Demonstrate or rally for leadership change CONF.MAT 
1412: Demonstrate or rally for policy change CONF.MAT 
1413: Demonstrate or rally for rights CONF.MAT 
1414: Demonstrate for change in institutions, regime  CONF.MAT 
142: Conduct hunger strike, not specified below CONF.MAT 
1421: Conduct hunger strike for leadership change CONF.MAT 
1422: Conduct hunger strike for policy change CONF.MAT 
1423: Conduct hunger strike for rights CONF.MAT 
1424: Hunger strike change in institutions, regime  CONF.MAT 
143: Conduct strike or boycott CONF.MAT 
1431: Strike or boycott for leadership change CONF.MAT 
1432: Strike or boycott for policy change CONF.MAT 
1433: Strike or boycott for rights CONF.MAT 
1434: Strike or boycott for change in institutions, regime  CONF.MAT 
144: Obstruct passage or block, not specified below CONF.MAT 
1441: Obstruct passage for leadership change CONF.MAT 
1442: Obstruct passage for policy change CONF.MAT 
1443: Obstruct passage for rights  CONF.MAT 
1444: Obstruct passage for change in institutions, regime CONF.MAT 
145: Engage in violent protest, riot, not specified below  CONF.MAT 
1451: Violently protest for leadership change CONF.MAT 
1452: Violently protest for policy change CONF.MAT 
1453: Violently protest for rights CONF.MAT 
1454: Violently protest for change in institutions, regime  CONF.MAT 
15: EXHIBIT MILITARY POSTURE  CONF.MAT 
150: Exhibit military or police power, not specified below CONF.MAT 
151: Increase police alert status CONF.MAT 
152: Increase military alert status CONF.MAT 
153: Mobilize or increase police power  CONF.MAT 
154: Mobilize or increase armed forces CONF.MAT 
155: Mobilize or increase cyber-forces  CONF.MAT 
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16: REDUCE RELATIONS  CONF.MAT 
160: Reduce relations, not specified below CONF.MAT 
161: Reduce or break diplomatic relations CONF.MAT 
162: Reduce or stop material aid, not specified below  CONF.MAT 
1621: Reduce or stop economic assistance CONF.MAT 
1622: Reduce or stop military assistance CONF.MAT 
1623: Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance  CONF.MAT 
163: Impose embargo, boycott or sanctions CONF.MAT 
164: Halt negotiations CONF.MAT 
165: Halt mediation CONF.MAT 
166: Expel or withdraw  CONF.MAT 
1661: Expel or withdraw peacekeepers CONF.MAT 
1662: Expel or withdraw inspectors, observers CONF.MAT 
1663: Expel or withdraw aid agencies  CONF.MAT 
17: COERCE  CONF.MAT 
170: Coerce, not specified below CONF.MAT 
171: Seize or damage property, not specified below  CONF.MAT 
1711: Confiscate property  CONF.MAT 
1712: Destroy property CONF.MAT 
172: Impose administrative sanctions, not specified below  CONF.MAT 
1721: Impose restrictions on political freedoms CONF.MAT 
1722: Ban political parties or politicians CONF.MAT 
1723: Impose curfew CONF.MAT 
1724: Impose state of emergency or martial law  CONF.MAT 
173: Arrest, detain CONF.MAT 
174: Expel or deport individuals CONF.MAT 
175: Attack cybernetically  CONF.MAT 
18: ASSAULT  CONF.MAT 
180: Use unconventional violence, not specified below CONF.MAT 
181: Abduct, hijack, take hostage CONF.MAT 
182: Physically assault, not specified below  CONF.MAT 
1821: Sexually assault CONF.MAT 
1822: Torture CONF.MAT 
1823: Kill by physical assault  CONF.MAT 
183: Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military bombing, not specified below 
 CONF.MAT 
1831: Carry out suicide bombing CONF.MAT 
1832: Carry out vehicular bombing CONF.MAT 
1833: Carry out roadside bombing (IED)  CONF.MAT 
184: Use as human shield CONF.MAT 
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185: Attempt to assassinate CONF.MAT 
186: Assassinate  CONF.MAT 
19: FIGHT  CONF.MAT 
190: Use conventional military force, not specified below CONF.MAT 
191: Impose blockade, restrict movement CONF.MAT 
192: Occupy territory CONF.MAT 
193: Fight with small arms and light weapons  CONF.MAT 
194: Fight with artillery and tanks CONF.MAT 
195: Employ aerial weapons, not specified below  CONF.MAT 
1951: Employ precision-guided aerial munitions  CONF.MAT 
1952: Employ remotely piloted aerial munitions CONF.MAT 
196: Violate ceasefire  CONF.MAT 
20: ENGAGE IN UNCONVENTIONAL MASS VIOLENCE  CONF.MAT 
200: Engage in unconventional mass violence, not specified below  CONF.MAT 
201: Engage in mass expulsion  CONF.MAT 
202: Engage in mass killings  CONF.MAT 
203: Engage in ethnic cleansing  CONF.MAT 
204: Use weapons of mass destruction, not specified below  CONF.MAT 
2041: Use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons  CONF.MAT 
2042: Detonate nuclear weapons  CONF.MAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
